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Thesis Summary 
 
For many decades, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been widely known for being a 
reliable oil exporter.  This fact, however, has not exempted it from facing significant 
domestic energy challenges.  One of the most pressing of these challenges involves 
bridging the widening electricity supply-demand gap where, currently, the demand is 
growing at a very fast rate.  One crucial means to address this challenge is through 
delivering power supply projects with maximum efficiency.  Project delivery delay, 
however, is not uncommon in this highly capital-intensive industry, indicating electricity 
supplies are not coping with the demand increases.  To provide a deeper insight into 
the challenges of project implementation and efficient practice, this research adopts a 
pragmatic approach by triangulating literature, questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews.  The research was conducted in the Saudi Arabian power supply industry – 
Western Operating Area.  A total of 105 usable questionnaires were collected, and 28 
recorded, semi-structured interviews were conducted, analysed and synthesised to 
produce a conceptual model of what constitutes the project implementation challenges 
in the investigated industry.  This was achieved by conducting a comprehensive 
ranking analysis applied to all 58 identified and surveyed factors which, according to 
project practitioners in the investigated industry, contribute to project delay.  28 of 
these project delay factors were selected as the „most important‟ ones.  Factor 
Analysis was employed to structure these 28 most important project delay factors into 
the following meaningful set of 7 project implementation challenges: Saudi Electricity 
Company‟s contractual commitments, Saudi Electricity Company's communication and 
coordination effectiveness, contractors‟ project planning and project control 
effectiveness, consultant-related aspects, manpower challenges and material 
uncertainties, Saudi Electricity Company's tendering system, and lack of project 
requirements clarity.  The study has implications for industry policy in that it provides a 
coherent assessment of the key project stakeholders‟ central problems. From this 
analysis, pragmatic recommendations are proposed that, if enacted, will minimise the 
significance of the identified problems on future project outcomes, thus helping to 
ensure the electricity supply-demand gap is diminished. 
 
Key words: project management, project delay, Saudi Arabia, electricity supply 
projects 
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1. Research Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction  
In the middle of 2008, the global economy suffered its worst contraction since World 
War II as a direct result of the financial crisis.  The resulting recession had (and is still 
having) a dramatic impact on various challenges facing the world.  At the heart of 
these challenges is the security of energy supply, something that has continuously 
fuelled the concerns of both politicians and economists.  Lessons are still being 
learned about the unfortunate economic downturn that hit every region of the world.  
As a consequence, various governments have adopted new measures and policies in 
response to the crisis in order to seek the rapid recovery of their economies.  
  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has the privilege of having the most 
authoritative sources of information and analysis in the international energy sector, 
assisting policy makers around the world to pursue adequate regulations and policies 
that serve their interests.  In its 2009 World Energy Outlook report, it optimistically, but 
carefully, stated that there were signs that the world economy was beginning to 
recover from the recession, although the global GDP fell by 6.5% in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 (on an annualised basis), with emerging economies contracting by 4% and the 
advanced economies by around 8%.  However, according to the same report, the 
exact shape of the recovery remains uncertain and fluctuating. 
   
This optimistic economic recovery forecast was, though, coupled with a genuine 
concern that future energy demand will be more challenging than ever.  Since the 
17 
 
onset of the recession, the lower cash flow driven by the tougher financing 
environment has weakened final demand for energy and, therefore, many ongoing 
energy projects (drilling oil and gas wells, building refineries, pipelines and power 
stations, etc.) have been slowed, postponed or even cancelled.  As a result, the 
energy investment shortfall could potentially have serious consequences for energy 
security when demand is likely to be recovering.  For example, the report estimated 
that global upstream oil and gas investment budgets for 2009 would be cut by 19% 
compared with 2008 (IEA, 2008, IEA, 2009).  Power sector investment was also 
severely affected by financial difficulties and by weak demand for the short term.  
However, the likely global economic recovery in the future will increase energy 
demand, and the estimated capital required to meet the projected demand through to 
2030 amounts to $25.6 trillion (in 2008 dollars).  This is equivalent to 1.4% of global 
GDP per year on average (or $1.1 trillion).  Over half of the total investment (53%) is 
required for the power sector alone.  This will be needed to expand supply capacity 
and to replace existing aging facilities that will be closed during the projection period.  
If the investment in the oil, gas and coal supply chains required to meet global power 
generation fuel needs was taken into account, power sector investment needs will rise 
to about 70% of total energy investment (IEA, 2009).    
 
Compared to the 2008 outlook (IEA, 2008), world electricity demand in 2030 is 
projected to be slightly higher in contrast to all other final forms of energy (IEA, 2009).  
World electricity demand was projected to grow at an annual rate of 2.5% over the 
period 2007-2030 (Table 1.1).  Non-OECD accounted for over 80% of the growth, with 
a 3.9% rate of annual growth for the quoted period (IEA, 2009).         
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Table 1.1: Final electricity consumption by region in Reference Scenario (TWh) 
    
 
Table 1.2 shows that installed power generation capacity for the world is projected to 
rise from 4509 GW in 2007 to 7820 GW in 2030, with 30% of the increase installed by 
2015.  Over half of the total investment required for the power sector is needed for 
generating plants ($7.2 trillion), and the remainder is required for both transmission ($2 
trillion) and distribution networks ($4.5 trillion).    
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (IEA,2009)
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Table 1.2: Projected capacity additions and investment in power infrastructure 
by region   
 
 
1.2 The Saudi Arabian Role in the Global Oil Market 
Since September 1960 when, with four other countries (Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and 
Venezuela), it formed the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries‟ (OPEC) in 
Baghdad, the Middle Eastern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played a key role in the 
international energy market (OPEC, 2010).  According to its official Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources website (MOPM, 2010), the Kingdom owns the 
world‟s largest oil reserves, proven and recoverable, of around 260 billion barrels (one 
quarter of the world reserves), 13% of world production and a refining capacity of more 
than 3.5 million barrels per day.  Therefore, its current role as the leading petroleum 
country in terms of reserves, production, exports and refining capacity can never be 
Table 1.2: Projected capacity additions and investment in power
Source: (IEA,2009)
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under-estimated.  Its future role is even more crucial for securing world energy 
supplies if it is considered that the Kingdom‟s production rate of 13% of world 
production is not in proportion to the capacity of its reserves (25% of the world‟s total).  
Although its 2009 production rate was approximately 9.6 million barrels per day (BP, 
2010), the Kingdom increased its production capacity to 12 million barrels per day in 
2010.  If world consumption proves demanding, the Kingdom is considering the 
possibility of raising the production capacity to 15 million barrels per day to stabilise 
the fluctuating market (MOPM, 2010).  
  
The World Energy Outlook has estimated that the OPEC share of the global oil market 
will increase from 44% today to 55% in 2030 (IEA, 2009).  The IEA Chief Economist 
has expressed genuine concern that failure to invest in new oil and gas infrastructure 
may result in supply shortfall that will lead to new record energy prices.  Although 
today‟s 12-member organisation OPEC is keen to efficiently play its role in securing 
world energy supplies of oil, challenges vary from one country to another.  This is 
especially true when considering the catastrophic oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico 
on April 20th, 2010.  BP‟s Deepwater Horizon rig explosion was the world‟s largest 
accidental offshore oil spill, killing 11 workers and injuring 17.  According to a US 
government estimate, the ruptured Macondo well spilled 4.9 million barrels in 152 days 
before it was finally sealed (Meyer, 2010, Pfeifer, 2010).  According to Barclays Capital 
commodities research team member Amirta Sen,  
The spill is an obvious severe blow to the reputation of the industry, and raises 
a whole series of questions about the technology that is key to the development 
of the deep and ultra-deep water fields that represent the frontier for non-OPEC 
production.                                                                                   
                                                                                                  (Sen, 2010)   
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Before the accident, Deutsche Bank estimated that deep water production would 
account for 10% of global oil production for the period 2008 – 2015.  However, both 
Norway and China have stopped any deep water drilling and will not allow any further 
drilling, at least for the short term (Hume, 2010). The UK Department of Energy, on the 
other hand, has agreed to let Chevron begin drilling off the Shetland coast since, 
compared to the USA, the Department has placed greater stress on having much 
stricter safety regulations in the UK (Stacey, 2010).  In fact, the Obama administration 
has already lifted the ban on deep water oil drilling in the US after imposing new rules 
that are believed to reduce the risk of similar catastrophic accidents (Daly, 2010).  
However, the overall resultant shortage in oil supplies will shift the pressure of 
balancing the global oil demand-supply towards OPEC – especially Saudi Arabia as 
the top producer and exporter in the Cartel - which is very keen on stabilising oil prices 
within the $70-$80 per barrel levels (Blair, 2010). 
 
1.3 Research Problem Statement   
To efficiently play its international role as main energy resource provider, Saudi Arabia 
needs to effectively address its internal and national challenges.  Thanks to the spiked 
oil prices that accounted for over 90% of its export earnings, the Saudi Treasury has 
enjoyed enormous income from its oil reserves with the Ministry of Finance 
announcing consistently high governmental expenditure for seven consecutive years 
between 2004 and 2010 (Table 1.3) (OPEC, 2010, MOF, 2010).  Yet, the Kingdom is 
facing serious questions over the quality of various public services.  Astonishingly, 
meeting the national electricity demand is now at the top of the government‟s agenda.  
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The frequent service interruptions, especially in the summer when the demand peaks, 
have “left many Saudis wondering bitterly why the world‟s top energy exporter could 
not supply more electricity to its own people” (Allam, 2010).  While world electricity 
demand is projected to annually increase by 2.5% in the period 2007 – 2030 (IEA, 
2009), Saudi Arabia‟s demand is growing at the much faster rate of 8% (KFUPM, 
2006, SEC, 2009).   
Table 1.3: The Saudi Government Budget Data  
 
 
In June 2010, the government formed a Committee of six Ministers to immediately 
report recommendations on methods for financing the required expansive investments 
on time.  In the short term, Saudi Arabia requires an allocation of SR 330 billion (US$ 
88 billion) to invest in new projects between 2009-2018 (SEC, 2009).  This shows that 
most of the investment required in the Middle East for additional power infrastructure 
($127 billion over 2008-2015) will take place in Saudi Arabia (IEA, 2009).  Moreover, it 
Source: Ministry of Finance
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has been estimated that the additional required generating capacity in Saudi Arabia 
will triple from 45 GW in 2008 to 120 GW in 2032 just to meet the growing national 
demand for electricity.  
  
These facts represent compounded challenges for Saudi Arabian policy makers.  
According to the Electricity Co-generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) governor in 
June 2010, the heavily subsidised service was consuming 320 million barrels of oil 
equivalent in 2009 and was projected to consume 900 million barrels of oil equivalent 
in 2032.  The adopted mono-generation policy of burning fossil fuels placed Saudi 
Arabia as the sixth largest oil consumer with a daily consumption rate of 2.6 million 
barrels per day in 2009.  This consumption rate exceeded that of Germany, the largest 
European economy, which consumed 2.4 million barrels per day in 2009 (BP, 2010).  
Moreover, when oil is likely to have a decreasing role in world power generation (from 
6% of total oil consumption in 2007 to 2% in 2030) (IEA, 2009), Saudi Arabia is likely 
to triple its oil consumption to generate electricity over roughly the same period.   
 
This research adopted a problem-driven approach where the researcher explicitly 
asked the following question to the Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs, the Board 
Chairman of the Saudi Electricity Company, Dr. Saleh Al-Awaji: “Among all the 
challenges surrounding the Saudi electricity industry, what is your top concern?” The 
answer was immediately given: “Delivering Power Projects on time!”  Knowing that 
Saudi Arabian public projects are severely impeded by many different factors, the 
concern was not a surprise.  The Saudi media (newspapers) have pointed to many 
possible reasons and explanations but, unfortunately, with no sufficient intervention or 
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Table 1.2: Projected capacity additions and investment in power infrastructure 
by region   
 
 
1.2 The Saudi Arabian Role in the Global Oil Market 
Since September 1960 when, with four other countries (Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and 
Venezuela), it formed the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries‟ (OPEC) in 
Baghdad, the Middle Eastern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has played a key role in the 
international energy market (OPEC, 2010).  According to its official Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources website (MOPM, 2010), the Kingdom owns the 
world‟s largest oil reserves, proven and recoverable, of around 260 billion barrels (one 
quarter of the world reserves), 13% of world production and a refining capacity of more 
than 3.5 million barrels per day.  Therefore, its current role as the leading petroleum 
country in terms of reserves, production, exports and refining capacity can never be 
Table 1.2: Projected capacity additions and investment in power
Source: (IEA,2009)
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means for addressing the dilemma of meeting the growing demand for electricity in the 
Kingdom, the research also aimed to explore the various challenges, and their 
significance, surrounding the Saudi Arabian power supply industry in order to 
appreciate the role of projects in minimising their effects.    The main objectives of the 
research study were as follows: 
 To develop a basic understanding of the challenges facing the Saudi Arabian 
electricity industry.  This required conducting a comprehensive review of the 
industry history to understand how these challenges developed. 
 To document the industry-related adopted polices and assess their role in 
addressing the identified industrial challenges. 
 To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the project management practice in 
the investigated industry and present the significant factors contributing to 
project delay identified by the frontline project practitioners.  
 To construct a conceptual model of the Project Implementation Challenges 
(PICs) in the project electricity supply industry.  These were formulated by the 
identified project delay factors.   
 
1.5 Research Significance and Areas of Knowledge Contribution   
The research findings have been used to inform the Saudi electricity-related 
organisations of the most pressing “Project Implementation Challenges” and their 
potential impact on project delivery progress.  These have provided the Saudi 
Electricity Company and their relevant Contractor and Consultant executives a 
coherent outlook of their projects‟ central problems.  The research significance would 
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be, therefore, motivating all relevant stakeholders, especially the Saudi Arabian 
government and the Saudi Electricity Company, to embrace practical 
recommendations and rational actions in order for them to improve the state of the 
Saudi Arabian electricity industry.   
 
This study has contributed two main areas of knowledge to the research field. The first 
contribution was the provision of a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the serious 
challenges facing the Saudi Arabian power supply industry and their potential impact 
on the international and domestic oil and gas industries.  This study has critically 
reviewed the development of these pressing challenges with a comprehensive 
explanation of the constraints facing the policy makers.  The other area of knowledge 
contribution was the development of a coherent and detailed model describing the 
challenges impeding the timely delivery and operation of the power supply projects in 
Saudi Arabia.  These challenges were thoroughly appraised and critically reviewed for 
the first time.     
1.6   Research Scope and Limitations 
The study focused on authorised turnkey projects, a type of project in which relevant 
funds are already allocated; therefore, it is imperative that these projects are executed 
in a timely manner to meet the country‟s need for electricity supplies.  Hence, the 
research has confined the investigation to one which seeks to comprehend the 
working relationship between the key project stakeholders of project owner, project 
contractors and project consultants in all three project areas of power generation, 
power transmission and power distribution projects.  The project owner in this research 
was represented by the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), which had the major share 
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of electricity generation, accounting for 81% of the Kingdom‟s total generation.  
Geographically, this research took place in the Western Operating Area, which 
accounted for 30.9% of total electricity consumption in the Kingdom, the highest when 
compared to other operating areas.   
 
Below are listed the limitations of this research study:   
 Although the research focused on the key project stakeholders involved in the 
Saudi electricity supply industry (i.e. the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), 
Contractors and Consultants), very few interviews were conducted with 
Contractor Project Managers (PMs) (only two recorded interviews) and only one 
(non-recorded) conversation with a Consultant PM.  Accessing these industry 
key players‟ was indeed very difficult.  Contractor and Consultant PMs felt 
uncomfortable criticising the SEC‟s behaviour as a client.  This, understandably, 
was reasoned by the desire to prevent any chance of sharing information with 
the SEC in a manner that may affect the relationship between the two.  
Consultants, however, revealed even greater resistance to both conducting 
interviews and filling in the questionnaire.  Similarly, this was also reasoned as 
a desire to prevent any chance of sharing information with the SEC which might 
damage their relationship with the SEC.  This is especially true when the small 
sample of Consultant PMs who participated in the questionnaire survey 
regarded the SEC-related Project Delay Factors (PDFs) group as their most 
important one.  For these reasons, the research mainly focused on the SEC‟s 
participants‟ point of view.  
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 Fifty eight PDFs were considered in the questionnaire survey.  The researcher 
probably missed an important PDF, although an extensive review of the 
literature and careful listening to the recorded interviews were carried out.  Yet, 
the researcher identified a PDF during the questionnaire pilot study through a 
participant, and might have missed more.  Moreover, each PDF could be 
viewed from different angles.  This presented a challenge in interpreting these 
PDFs differently.  All of these were causes of project delay.  These can also be 
viewed as effects rather than causes, or even both.  The progressive nature of 
the research developed the descriptions and interrelations of these PDFs.   
 The study was based on a convenience research participant sample and, 
therefore, generalisation was avoided.  However, some degree of agreement 
between PMs who worked for different organisations with varying project 
interests and experiences presented some confidence in the findings.  These 
findings were believed to be reflective of the project environment reality. 
 The ranking results of the surveyed PDFs are likely to change with time.  
Therefore, the elements of the Project Implementation Challenges Model will 
consequently change, presenting a new set of topical problems.  This change 
will either result from enforcing remedial actions to resolve these challenges or 
new problems will create even more complex challenges.  Most likely, the 
change will result from the mixture of these two possibilities.  However, the 
main purpose of this study was to suggest a practical, remedial set of actions to 
minimise the effect of the modelled PICs.  In other words, the study advocated 
improving the project management practice in the industry that would lead to 
the introduction of a new set of Project Implementation Challenges.  
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 The study was not able to analyse project differences between Power 
Generation, Power Transmission and Power Distribution projects in great depth.  
This required data collection relevant to numerical information of project values 
and the extent of delays in these projects before conducting any comparison 
analysis.  These data were not accessible.    
 The study did not report information about the extent of project delay in the 
industry.  In addition to the restrictive access to such data, the literature also 
proved that such information was not usually accessible.    
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2. The Saudi Arabian Electricity Industry Challenges 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the research problem plays a key role in bridging the seemingly growing 
electricity supply-demand gap in Saudi Arabia, it was convenient to first understand 
the challenges facing the industry as a whole before narrowing the focus towards 
uncovering the Project Implementation Challenges in the same industry.  Therefore, 
this chapter will present the most pressing challenges that concern the policy makers, 
followed by a more focused research question statement with explicit explanation of its 
relevance and significance to address the industry‟s challenges.  It is argued that the 
challenges described in this chapter have been developing since the early days of the 
industry.  Therefore, Appendix A presents the historical development of the Saudi 
Arabian electricity industry with thorough description of the current physical 
infrastructure (i.e. Power Generation capacities, Transmission Grids and Power 
Distribution Networks) along with identifying the key industry stakeholders and their 
roles.  Before stating the holistic challenges facing the investigated industry, it was 
convenient to present the relevant issues contributing to the industry challenges into 
two categories: demand-side issues and supply-side issues.  These issues will be 
followed with a brief profile description of the Saudi Electricity Company as the Project 
Owner and its key project departments.     
2.2 Demand-side Issues 
This section describes relevant matters that influence the increasing demand for 
electricity in Saudi Arabia.  When electricity was first introduced in Saudi Arabia, the 
consumption was modest and it was mainly used for lighting.  Consumers were then 
slowly introduced to new electrical appliances, and this was when loads started 
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increasing.  Before the government took over the ownership of the supply industry, 
electricity businesses produced very generous profits for its private producers, and the 
tariffs varied from one producer to another depending on the cost of production and 
operation.  The government‟s first intervention was in 1954 when it set, for example, 
the electricity price in Jeddah (the largest city after Riyadh, the Capital) from SR 
0.55/kWh to SR 0.325/kWh (SR: Saudi Riyals; US$ 1 = SR 3.75).  The level of tariff 
adjustment was believed to offer a very reasonable return to the service producers.  In 
1959, the Council of Ministers decided to introduce a new tariff scheme, as shown in 
Table 2.1, where more reduction was applied.     
    
Table 2.1: Electricity tariffs in a few major cities in 1959 
 
 
In the 1970s, however, Saudi consumers became familiar with more electrical 
appliances, including air conditioning, as a result of increased per capita income, and 
this immediately reflected in an electricity demand increase.  This was in addition to 
the development plans that encouraged construction, industrial and agricultural 
growth.  The increased oil revenues in the 1970s shifted the Saudi lifestyle 
dramatically, both socially and economically, and electricity was transformed from a 
privilege to have into a social right.  This was when the government was financially 
very stable and thus able to promote further reductions in the tariff and guarantee the 
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private producers subsidies that covered their operating costs with a promise of 
providing a profit margin of 15%.  Table 2.2 shows how low the tariff was when it was 
introduced in 1972 when further reductions were applied.  
 
Table 2.2: Electricity prices in various cities as per Royal Decree (1099) of 
January 17, 1972 
 
 
The tariff was subject to more modifications in which additional subsidies were offered, 
adding financial burdens to the government‟s budget.  In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, oil revenues dropped and this affected the government‟s budget. Moreover, the 
second Gulf War was an unexpected additional and very intensive cost.  To act upon 
necessary budget spending cuts, the Council of Ministers requested the Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity (at the time) to conduct a comprehensive study to reform the 
costly industry.  In 1995, the Ministry of Industry and Electricity suggested the 
necessity of restructuring the entire industry and the need to merge all regional 
electricity companies (SCECOs) into a single entity as a first step to introduce a liberal 
and free electricity market.  The Council of Ministers approved the recommendation in 
1998 and the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) became operational in April, 2000.  
Table 2.3 shows the tariff structure that offered a reasonable financial income where 
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the company could manage its operational and maintenance costs, re-pay credit 
facilities and loans inherited from the previous companies, and finance required 
expansive capital investments along with the support of government subsidies.   
 
   Table 2.3: The SEC tariff as of April 6, 2000 
 
 
The tariff was then changed in less than seven months as shown in Table 2.4.  A 
review of the official documents that described the history of tariff changes in Saudi 
Arabia (ECRA, 2007, ECRA, 2008, MIE, 2000, MIE, 2004, SEC, 2009) reveals an 
apparent lack of explanation for understanding the forces surrounded these changes.  
The government was sensitive to point out the implications of such tariff reductions.  
To discover why these reductions were forced through in such a short time, Dr. Saleh 
Al-Awaji, Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs and Chairman of the Board of the Saudi 
Electricity Company, was asked to explain. Dr Saleh Al-Awaji stated that “those who 
were capable to pay, unfortunately, were the ones who complained and influenced the 
decision makers to reduce the tariff.”  The Deputy Minister explicitly pointed out that 
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these influencers complained to the King, Crown Prince or the Second Deputy of 
Council of Ministers to reinstate the older tariff.  
Table 2.4: The SEC tariff as of October 28, 2000 
 
    
Comparing the last two tariff schemes, the amended tariff affected only residential 
users who consumed over 4000 kWh per month, in addition to agricultural users.  This 
provided evidence for Dr. Al-Awaji‟s statement that capable consumers influenced the 
reduction of the, seemingly, commercial tariff introduced just seven months before. 
 
The sector officials strongly believed that subsidies and controlling service prices were 
necessary for social wellness and economic development.  Introducing low tariffs 
attracted local and foreign investors to base their industries in Saudi Arabia, thus 
boosting non-oil businesses.  However, the extent of these tariff subsidies was not 
reflecting the operational cost of the SEC and did not encourage efficient electricity 
usage. 
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In the presence of a World Bank representative, the Minister announced in a press 
conference to the public media that Saudi Arabia was flooded with non-compliant and  
inefficient electrical appliances with a striking share of 80% of the local market 
(Qahtani, 2008).  Since its establishment, the Saudi Arabian Standards Organisation 
(SASO) has suggested specific electrical appliance standards but has not had the 
authority to enforce these standards (Al-Ajlan et al., 2006, Qahtani, 2008).  Moreover, 
the low tariff encouraged wasteful usage of electricity, whether from residential, 
industrial or commercial users.  The Ministry of Water and Electricity undertook several 
campaigns for electricity rationalisation, but they were largely ineffective as no 
incentives were offered, especially with such a low tariff.  These campaigns were 
described as follows:  
They serve as a valuable lesson to show that unless sustainable energy 
conservation policies are developed at a national level, they are themselves 
unsustainable.  More importantly, such policies will not take root unless 
mandated by law, which in the Saudi context means a decree issued by the 
Council of Ministers.  
         (Al-Ajlan et al., 2006).  
 
Today, Saudi Arabia is experiencing huge development, with new industrial cities 
being built from scratch (SAGIA, 2010).  These developments have already led 
international investors to base their business operations and manufacturing facilities in 
these new cities.  There were also aggressive plans to electrify all rural areas that 
remain without the service by 2011 (SEC, 2003).  These areas were either completely 
deprived of electricity access or paying private producers commercial prices.  Such 
developments, when coupled with its rapid population growth - - 2.3% in 2009 and 
recognised by the World Bank as one of the highest in the world (WorldBank, 2010) - - 
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clearly shows why electricity demand in Saudi Arabia is among the highest in the 
world.  Compared to a world average growth in electricity demand of 2.5%, Saudi 
Arabian electricity demand is increasing 8% annually (IEA, 2009, SEC, 2009).  The 
SEC CEO and President also announced in February 2010 that the demand for 
electricity varied across the country and in some areas it reached up to 12% (Al-Bishi, 
2010).       
2.3 Supply-side Issues 
Supply-side issues refer to problems relevant to businesses and activities required to 
secure electricity supplies in a timely manner to meet the growing demand for 
electricity.  Securing electricity supplies to consumers includes activities in generating, 
transmitting and distributing electricity power to end-users.  The SEC, as the dominant 
player in all these activities, has strived to meet the growing demand since the 
beginning of its operation in April 2000.  The SEC faced its first serious challenge 
when the approved tariff scheme in April 2000 was replaced after seven months, an 
action which reduced the SEC‟s revenues by 30%.  The fact that the government 
adjusted the tariff without providing governmental compensation reduced the SEC‟s 
annual revenues by 4,000 million Riyals($1 = SR 3.75).  By the end of 2009, this 
totalled up to 40,000 million Riyals.  Therefore, the SEC has struggled to meet the 
growing demand through placing substantial investments which utilise its available 
resources (SEC, 2009). 
 
Between 2000 (the start of its operations) and 2009, the SEC invested 160,000 million 
Riyals to deliver power generation, transmission and distribution projects all over the 
Kingdom.  In its 2009 annual report published in May 2010 (titled “Financing 
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Challenges 2009 – 2018”), the SEC explicitly, for the first time, suggested that the tariff 
adjustment that took place in October 2000 had serious consequences including: 
 Delaying the execution of several planned power generation projects  
 Delaying the execution of interconnection project plans between 
dispersed areas through principal transmission lines  
 The inability to adequately replace aged generating units, transmission 
lines and substations  
 The inability to provide generating reserve margins during peak loads 
while the normal margin ranges from 15-20%. 
 
The peak load trend that represented the maximum collective demand in the same 
time was forecasted to increase from 41 - 68 GW for the period 2009 – 2018 (Table 
2.5).  This increase, therefore, requires an additional one third or more of the current 
available generating capacities, which must be delivered in a timely manner, otherwise 
the National Development Plans will face catastrophic risk.  This is in addition to 
replacing aging infrastructure with new transmission lines and distribution networks.  
The volume of capital investment required to address the challenge of the growing 
demand for electricity in Saudi Arabia was estimated to be SR 330 billion for the period 
2009-2018.  Power Generation Projects require SR 173.4 billion, Power Transmission 
Projects require SR 99 billion and Power Distribution Projects, which the country will 
be fully electrified by during the predicted plan, require SR 57.5 billion. 
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Table 2.5: Collective peak load trends in Saudi Arabia for 2009 - 2018 
 
 
The SEC, however, explicitly stated the shortage of funding required for executing the 
planned projects, as shown in Table 2.6 below.  As can be evaluated from the table, 
the SEC still needs to secure over one third of the required funds to authorise and 
execute the expansive projects.  
Table 2.6: Volumes of secured and required finance in the Power Industry for 
2009 – 2018 
       
 
2.4 Saudi Electricity Supply-Demand Challenges – Why is the Gap 
Widening? 
The previous sections and Appendix A presented various relevant issues which have 
contributed to the pressing challenges facing the Saudi Arabian Electricity Supply 
industry.  A large part of Appendix B analysed the barriers that have impeded the 
Table 2.10: Collective peak load trends in Saudi Arabia for 2009-2018 
Source: (SEC, 2009)
Table 2.11: Volumes of secured and required
Source: (SEC, 2009)
39 
 
enforcement of essential reform plans that would improve the industry‟s efficiency.  
This section will summarise the collective challenges of the investigated industry.  
These are believed to be strongly contributing to the widening electricity supply-
demand gap in Saudi Arabia:  
 The electricity tariffs in Saudi Arabia are cheap in a manner that encourages 
wasteful usage of electricity, whether from residential, industrial or commercial 
users. 
 Saudi Arabia is flooded with inefficient electrical appliances and there is little 
indication that the entry of these appliances into the Kingdom is being actively 
prevented. 
 Saudi Arabia is experiencing huge industrial and commercial development 
plans coupled with rapid population growth, driving the electricity demand to 
even more challenging levels of growth. 
  Most of the existing power system infrastructure is aged, in addition to being 
unable to provide reserve margins during peak loads.   
 High levels of uncertainty exist in terms of financing one third of the required 
supply projects to meet the projected demand for the period 2009 – 2018. 
 
2.5 The SEC project dilemma – on time delivery 
Despite the challenges above, and regardless of the recent global economic downturn, 
the Saudi Arabian power industry was considered a very large investment.  As shown 
in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, many projects have been executed by the SEC (Table 2.7) and 
the private sector (Table 2.8) that have recently entered into service. 
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Table 2.7: Projects executed by the SEC 
 
Table 2.8: Projects executed by the Private Sector  
 
There are also many large power generation and transmission projects that have been 
approved to be executed by the SEC and the private sector, as shown in Tables 2.9 – 
2.11. 
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Table 2.9: Planned projects that will be executed by the SEC and Private Sector 
 
 
Table 2.10: Planned projects and approved to be executed by the Private Sector 
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Table 2.11: Connecting Transmission Line projects in the Kingdom 
 
 
There are also more than 250 transmission substation projects of 132kV, 115kV, and 
110kV capacity spread over the Kingdom.  This is in addition to distribution level (69kV 
and below) substations to electrify rural areas and support urban systems.  In 2009 
alone, the total capital investment in the SEC‟s budget was about SR 18.732 billion 
when 206 new projects were authorised to expand and support the existing Electric 
Power System.  The demand trend has proven that there will be even more projects 
needed to cope with the growing demand for electricity.   
The electricity supply industry in Saudi Arabia is already facing uncertainty over 
securing proper funds to finance future necessary projects.  Authorised projects, 
where relevant funds have already been allocated, must be executed in a timely 
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manner to meet, at least partially, the country‟s need for electricity.  Projects in the 
investigated industry were normally delivered, but at a point which was often well 
beyond the expected delivery date.  This fact indicates that the delays in completing 
the continuously developing infrastructure accommodating newly delivered projects 
have the potential to widen the supply-demand gap even further.  If this observation 
were to be left without proper attention, the largest oil exporter the world has ever 
known could face unwanted consequences affecting its national economic growth and 
social wellbeing.   
 
This research adopted a macro-level view in which the concern was to provide the 
electricity consumers with adequate and sufficient supplies in a timely manner and 
without interruption.  Therefore, the central concern of this study was to consider how 
to deliver the SEC authorised projects on time.  Delivering projects on time in Saudi 
Arabia was proven to be of deep concern for the government.  This was especially true 
when a recent study revealed that 65% of public projects were managed without an 
established time schedule (Alhilali, 2011).  The remaining 35% had time schedules but 
were not necessarily delivered on time.   In this context, comprehending the 
surrounding causes and factors impeding these authorised projects from being 
delivered as planned will provide information of strategic value to the SEC, specifically, 
and for the entire Saudi Arabian electricity industry in general.  A starting point for this 
study, based on the literature discussion so far, will be the consideration of the 
following research question: 
What are the project delay factors in the Saudi Arabian electricity supply 
industry?      
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While the study seeks to identify the project delay factors, the research will also 
explore the following relevant sub-questions: 
How frequently do the identified project delay factors occur in the 
investigated industry? 
To what extent do these factors delay projects in the investigated 
industry? 
How significant and important are these project delay factors? 
   
Projects normally go through varying difficulties and problems after being 
conceptualised.  In such a sensitive industry, projects are of high urgency and, 
therefore, they must be delivered with maximum efficiency.  The SEC was established 
in 2000 but has collective project experience of over five decades.  Yet, projects were 
still being reported as being delayed, affecting the SEC strategic objectives.  
Identifying and understanding project progress delaying factors will enable strategic 
officers and project management practitioners in the Saudi Arabian electricity supply 
industry to conceptualise the collective challenges formed by these factors.  The 
resultant conceptual model of Project Implementation Challenges will dictate project 
stakeholders‟ actions to overcome these challenges in order to improve the project 
delivery rate in the industry.   
2.6 The Saudi Electricity Company – the Project Owner 
The share capital of the SEC is distributed as follows: the government holds 74.31% of 
the Company, 6.93% is owned by the giant national oil company Saudi Aramco and 
18.76% is owned by other private shareholders.  One form of the Saudi Arabian 
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government subsidies to the SEC was not to claim its share of dividends for ten years 
from the date of the Company‟s foundation in 2000.  This was recently extended for 
another ten years according to Decree No. 327 issued by the Council of Ministers on 
14th September, 2009 (SEC, 2009).  Saudi Aramco raised a claim for its share of 
yearly cash dividends for the period 5th April, 2000 (the inception of the Company) to 
31st December, 2008 which amounted to 1,533 million Riyals.  The SEC, however, 
believed that since Saudi Aramco is a wholly owned government organisation, it had 
no right for such a claim (SEC, 2009).  The government has also provided interest-free 
loans to the Company to authorise pending projects.  These financial supports, 
however, were not sufficient to pursue the Company‟s highly expensive operations and 
authorise appropriate projects.  Despite the various challenges surrounding the 
electricity industry described previously, the SEC has still managed to make enormous 
progress over the last decade (2000-2009). Its impressive achievements are 
documented in Table 2.12 below.   
Table 2.12: The SEC achievements until the end of 2009  
 
       
Source: (SEC, 2009)
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2.6.1 The SEC Organisational Segments   
At the inception of the SEC following the completion of the merging of all electric 
utilities in the Kingdom, the SEC undertook a gradual approach towards restructuring 
its business functions.  First, the Company was divided into branches based on 
geographical locations, which principally operated in a similar manner before the 
inception of the SEC (SEC, 2003).  The main difference was the appointment of the 
CEO and the setting up of a temporary Executive Committee empowered with specific 
tasks by type of business (i.e. Power Generation, Power Transmission, Power 
Distribution, Finance, Human Resources, Legal Affairs etc.).  The Executive 
Committee supervised the work of all Branches and sought to implement a unified 
code of practice, operating procedures and guidelines before implementing the 
transitional organisational structure in June 2002.  The organisational structure at 
present is based on the Company‟s main functional businesses (Figure 2.1).  The SEC 
today is divided into the three main activities of Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution (Figure 2.2).  There are also other related supporting activities of Finance, 
Legal Affairs, Contracting, Public Affair and Shareholder Relations, Human Resources, 
Internal Auditing and General Services.  
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Figure 2.1: The SEC organisational structure from prior inception to the end of 
2010 (SEC, 2003) 
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Figure 2.2: The SEC organisational structure  
(Source: SEC official website, 2010) 
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2.6.2 The SEC Key Project Departments  
Generation, Transmission and Distribution activities complement each other for the 
purpose of delivering the electricity to the consumer and, therefore, supply projects 
occur within these three sectors (SEC, 2009).  Each of these activity sectors are 
represented by an Executive Vice President (EVP) who oversees all relevant 
operational and project activities in all four operational areas (Central, Western, 
Eastern and Southern) (Figure 2.2).  The research is mainly concerned with 
management Departments that deal with developing projects from inception to closure.  
In other words, the investigation is focused on these Departments in which each has a 
key contribution to make in transforming a project from a „concept‟ to an operating 
„product‟.  Concentrating on these key Departments will assist in comprehending the 
nature of the Project Implementation Challenges since these are the entities that 
captured the most relevant events and incidents that impeded project progress.  There 
are many other Departments which each have a certain degree of involvement in 
developing a project.  Most of these will be referred to when describing the project 
lifecycle below.  As will be mentioned in the methodology Chapter 4, the only available 
organisational structure chart was Figure 2.2.  Therefore, the details herein which 
describe the key Departments involved in developing projects are part of the primary 
data collection.   The description will also focus on the Western Operating Area where 
the data were collected.   These Departments were, however, structured similarly in all 
other areas.  The key Project Departments existing in all three activities of Power 
Generation, Power Transmission and Power Distribution are Project Planning 
Department (Project Planning Division in Power Distribution), Project Specifications  
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and Design Department (Technical Support in Power Distribution) and Project 
Execution Department (Project Execution Division in Power Distribution) (Figure 2.3 – 
2.5).     
Figure 2.3: Key Project Departments in the SEC – Power Generation 
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Figure 2.4: Key Project Departments in the SEC – Power Transmission 
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Figure 2.5: Key Project Departments and Divisions in the SEC – Power 
Distribution 
 
 
 
 
2.6.2.1 Project Planning Department  
The following describes the relevant tasks identified in the conducted interviews in all 
Project Planning Departments (or Project Planning Division in Power Distribution) 
unless otherwise stated: 
 Analyse on a periodical basis the load direction and growth in order to forecast 
the electricity demand volume within its Working Area (in Power Generation 
(PG)); 
 Evaluate the best economical options to provide electric power services; 
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 Evaluate the impact of heavy consumers with large demand in the future on the 
main grid and distribution networks (in Power Transmission (PT) and Power 
Distribution (PD)); 
 Coordinate with large electricity providers (Saudi Water and Electricity 
Company, Marafiq, Saudi Aramco, SABIC etc.) to analyse the required 
additional utilities (PG and PT);  
 Estimate the required additional generating and transmission network 
capacities to meet the forecast demand and estimate the urgency of these 
projects (PG and PT); 
 Estimate the required capital investment volume to deliver the needed utilities 
(power plants, power transmission overhead lines, distribution networks etc.) 
and conduct related financial analysis and secure authorised signatures to 
allocate the adequate cash flow to finance these projects; 
 Coordinate with Finance Department to prepare project budgets for allocation; 
 Survey potential project sites; 
 Coordinate with Asset Management Department to purchase or lease project 
sites; 
 Coordinate with relevant government authorities to share any conceived 
developmental project plans owned by these authorities in order to analyse their 
impact on the SEC planned projects; 
  Issuance of required project work permits by the relevant authorities;    
 Arrange the primary scope of each project by providing the basic drawings and 
schematics;  
 Monitor the financial performance of projects under execution and update 
project estimate parameters for future use.   
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2.6.2.2 Project Specifications and Design Department  
The following describes the relevant tasks identified in the conducted interviews in all 
Project Specifications and Design Departments (or Technical Support Division in 
Power Distribution) unless otherwise stated: 
 Place engineering standards of the electrical devices and equipment by 
studying and analysing the properties of the state-of-the-art equipment and 
systems available in the market to promote existing systems of the SEC; 
 Prepare project designs for both brand-new or expansion projects in 
accordance with the SEC‟s specification standards in coordination with the 
relevant Project Proponents - mainly the Operations Departments in the same 
sector.  This is pursued through elaborating the primary project scope provided 
by the Project Planning Department; 
 Participate in corresponding with bidders as a member in the Offer Analysis 
Committee to answer any technical inquiries;  
 Analyse bidders technical offers in detail and assess whether these matched 
with the SEC requirements and standards;  
 
 Address any concerning technical deviations in bidders offers; 
 Solve any technical confusion between the SEC and bidders;   
 Coordinate with large Consumers‟ Specifications Departments (such as Saudi 
Aramco and steel manufacturers) to ensure that their systems and devices are 
adaptable to the SEC‟s system. 
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2.6.2.3 Project Execution Department  
The following tasks were performed by Project Execution Departments (or Project 
Execution Division in PD) in all three activity sectors: 
 Monitor the Contractor‟s project execution performance in accordance with the 
binding contract; 
 Coordinate with the Contractor to submit the relevant engineering drawings and 
designs for approval; 
 Coordinate with the Consultant engineer to review the Contractor‟s technical 
submittals; 
 Review both technical and financial aspects progress with the Contractor and 
the Consultant and prepare periodical progress reports;  
 Monitor the progress of manufacturing, shipping, supplying and testing the 
equipment with the Contractor; 
 Prepare the relevant letters addressed internally (within the SEC) and externally 
to progress the relevant project activities; 
 Review Contractor and Consultant submitted invoices and coordinate with 
Finance Department to progress the payments; 
 Coordinate with the Operations Department (Project Proponent) to attend the 
equipment testing to issue their technical approval and acceptance; 
 Coordinate with the Operations Department to secure necessary power system 
shut down for commissioning the project into the SEC system. 
.     
2.6.3 Development of Electricity Supply Projects in the SEC 
The following describes the development stages of electricity supply projects in the 
SEC and the interaction between various project stakeholders. 
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2.6.3.1 Project inception 
After estimating the required additional generating, transmission and distribution 
network capacities to cope with the increasing demand of electricity, the relevant 
Project Planning Department develops the primary scope of each project.  This is 
followed by providing initial estimates of the project resource requirements.  The same 
Department then surveys potential project sites and the financial resource estimates 
are updated.  This is followed by coordinating with the Assets Management 
Department after securing the required project budget to purchase the project site.  
The project is then handed over to the Project Specifications and Design Department 
to elaborate on the basic project primary scope developed by the Project Planning 
Department and to develop the technical requirements with further details to arrange 
the Bid Package. 
 
2.6.3.2 Developing the bid package 
A bid package consists of a detailed description of the project work to be performed by 
the awarded Contractor.  This includes the technical specifications of the procured 
equipment and systems with sufficient and clear details.  In addition to the relevant 
drawings and schematics, a bid package includes all other documents containing the 
terms and conditions which are necessary for the bidders to prepare their proposals.  
The Project Specifications and Design Department is responsible for providing the 
detailed scope of work and the technical information of the proposed project.  It also 
coordinates with the project operator (Project Proponent) to review the detailed project 
scope of work and secure the Project Proponent‟s acceptance.  The Contracting 
Department is responsible for preparing and completing the Bid Package which also 
includes written instructions, contract terms and conditions and contractual obligations 
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for both contracting parties.  The Contracting Department also reviews financially 
relevant terms with the Finance Department.  The Bid Package is considered the basis 
on which all bidders prepare both financial and technical proposals.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to ensure that the Bid Package is developed as carefully and as clearly as 
possible.   
 
2.6.3.3 Advertisement for prequalification  
The following statement is one of the SEC‟s general contracting and purchasing 
policies: 
[The] Company shall adhere to the suitable methods of work including giving 
fair chance to all manufacturers, contractors, suppliers and individuals to 
compete to satisfy [the] Company‟s different needs.  Clarity and transparency 
shall be observed in taking the decisions related to Contracts or Purchase 
orders awarding and settling disputes.  SEC employees performing work on its 
behalf shall avoid all situations in which their personal interests might conflict 
with [the] Company‟s interests.   
 
Therefore, the Company advertises the proposed project contract in local newspapers, 
on bulletin boards in the SEC areas normally visited by contractors and on the 
Company‟s official website.  For large and complex project contracts with estimated 
values of greater than 50 million Riyals, the Contracting Department also advertises 
the proposed project contract in international newspapers and magazines.  These 
projects (i.e. constructing power plants, transmission lines, substations etc.) are 
normally constructed on a turnkey basis.  The SEC employs a prequalification process 
to identify contractors with adequate technical and financial resources to perform the 
relevant activities within the required time schedule.  Both the Contracting Department 
and the Project Proponent establish prequalification criteria that are used to determine 
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whether or not a bidder is capable of performing the project.  The criteria involve both 
technical and financial considerations.  The technical criteria includes whether the 
bidder has sound organisation structure and relevant experience with similar work.  
The criteria also consider whether the bidder has sufficient manpower and equipment 
resources that are ready to deploy once the project is awarded.  Performance on other 
contracts with the SEC is also highly regarded since bidders must not have had any 
„unsatisfactory performance ratings‟ within a year from the prequalification request 
announcement.  The Contracting Department also ensures that a bidder has adequate 
financial resources that will meet the project requirements.   
2.6.3.4 Bid review and evaluation  
The qualified bidders examine in greater detail whether the contract is achievable with 
regard to their available and accessible resources.  These bidders review the SEC‟s 
initial requirements to better estimate their available manpower, financial and 
machinery resources.  After going through a „bid‟, or a „no bid‟ process, bidders who 
decide to bid then purchase the bid package from the SEC Contracting Department to 
carefully study the technical and financial requirements to further estimate the project 
activities and plan for the necessary resources.  The bidders also conduct site visits to 
improve the certainty level of the required resources for delivering the project.   
 
According to the SEC general contracting and purchasing policies, openly competitive 
bidding is the primary method of procuring SEC contracts.   This method, presumably, 
enhances the chance of selecting the best contractor for the work.  This will allow the 
SEC to obtain the best combination of lowest prices, best technology and work 
execution plan (SEC Contracting Manual).  To address any mistakes, inconsistencies 
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or unclear issues in the bid package, the SEC conducts a Job Explanation Meeting 
with the invited bidders to explain in detail the contract requirements.  After conducting 
these activities, bidders should be ready to develop their technical and financial offers 
and submit their offers to the SEC Contracting Department.    
 
The bids are then opened by the Bid Opening Committee in the presence of the 
bidders.  The bid of the lowest bidder is subject to an intensive review by the Bid 
Review and Evaluation Team composed of a Contracting Department representative, 
a Project Specifications and Design Department representative and a Project 
Proponent representative.  If the bid includes any major deviations from the required 
technical specifications or work requirements, the bidder will be given the opportunity 
to either clarify his position (i.e. whether the deviation will serve the SEC‟s best 
interests or not) or withdraw his deviations.  If the position cannot be clarified, the 
lowest bidder will be considered as non-complying and therefore as not acceptable.  
The bid of the second lowest bidder will then be considered and the procedure 
described above will be repeated until an acceptable bid is determined. 
 
2.6.3.5 Project award 
After determining the acceptable bid, the Bid Review and Evaluation Team writes its 
conclusions and recommendations in a summary document known as the „Award 
Recommendation‟.  This provides a complete justification for the recommendation with 
an accurate record of the review and evaluation process.  This Award 
Recommendation is then forwarded to the figure authorised to sign the contract known 
as the „Signature Authority‟.  The contract value determines the Signature Authority 
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level and this can be the Proponent Department Manager, the Proponent Executive 
Director, the Proponent Vice President, the Proponent Executive Vice President, the 
CEO or the Board of Directors.  After securing the Signature Authority approval, the 
successful bidder receives an official notification to sign the binding contract with the 
SEC and initiate the procurement activities.   
2.6.3.6 Project execution and closure    
The Contracting Department submits a copy of the awarded and signed contract to the 
Project Execution Department.  The Project Execution Department is responsible for 
monitoring the Contractor‟s performance and ensures the adherence to the contract‟s 
articles and clauses.  A kick-off meeting takes place between the SEC Project 
Execution Department (Department Manager and appointed Project Manager 
representing the SEC), the Contractor‟s representatives (an Executive Manager if 
applicable in addition to the Project Manager representing the Contractor) and the 
SEC‟s Consultant engineer.  The kick-off meeting establishes a common 
understanding between the parties as to how the project will proceed.  In this meeting, 
the Contractor submits his project organisational chart with sufficient contact details of 
the team members.  He also submits the project execution schedule plan which 
includes an overall statement of how the project will be carried out with details of 
project milestones and their delivery dates.  The meeting also clarifies project 
procedures including the submittal format and the timetable of future project review 
meetings.   
 
The Contractor then takes over the project site from the SEC and mobilises the 
manpower and equipment and starts executing the project contract.   In the initial 
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phase of the project execution, the engineering design dominates the project 
workload.  The Contractor, with an outsourced engineering design service, elaborates 
on the technical drawings and schematics in the bid package.  The designs are then 
carefully reviewed by the Consultant engineer outsourced by the SEC.  These 
drawings cover many work disciplines such as electrical, mechanical and civil work.  
After approving these drawings, the Contractor executes all sequenced activities 
based on the drawings.   As a quality control procedure, the SEC prevents the 
Contractor from proceeding with any activity or placing any order for equipment or 
material without securing the SEC‟s formal approval.   
 
The SEC relies on their outsourced Consultant engineers to make technical decisions 
before approving or rejecting the Contractor‟s submittals.  The only exception is in 
Power Distribution where the SEC relies on in-house engineers for technical decisions 
on the Contractor‟s submittals.  Making timely decisions on these submittals is 
important for the Contactor to proceed, if approved, and place orders for the relevant 
equipment.  This is especially important when considering the fact that large pieces of 
equipment take a long time to manufacture.   
 
While the manufacturing processes for major pieces of equipment are in progress 
(such as gas or steam turbines, boilers, transformers, switchgears, cables, etc.), the 
civil work takes place (such as foundations, cable trenches, lighting, etc.) to prepare 
the project site to accommodate the manufactured and delivered equipment.  The 
manufacturers and suppliers notify the Contractor of the manufacturing progress and 
delivery status on a regular basis.  Just before major pieces of equipment reach the 
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final stages of manufacturing, the Contractor Project Manager notifies the SEC Project 
Manager to arrange a factory visit.  Once manufactured, the SEC performs a 
„Manufacturing Inspection‟ which is attended by the SEC Project Manager, the SEC 
Project Proponent and the Contractor Project Manager.  If the equipment passes the 
inspection, the SEC Project Manager issues a „Shipment Release‟ letter.  The 
equipment is tested again at the project site before being installed and interconnected 
with other pieces into an integrated system.  Then, the whole system, after all other 
pieces have been interconnected, is tested before incorporating the system (or project) 
into the SEC operating electric power system.     
 
If this new, isolated system proves to be technically viable and passes the pre-
commissioning tests in the presence of the relevant inspectors, a Technical 
Completion Certificate is issued for the Contractor indicating the project is ready for 
commissioning and operation.  This is when the SEC‟s Contractor Project Manager 
issues a request to the SEC Project Manager to arrange for a major shutdown of the 
electric power system that will accommodate the new project product.  After the project 
becomes fully operational, the SEC Project Manager issues a Preliminary Acceptance 
Certificate and this is when the warranty period of the project starts.   
 
Finally, the Contractor works on delivering the punch items list to secure the Final 
Acceptance Certificate and release the final payment instalment.  These items, such 
as placing the nameplates on the feeders and transformers, providing missing spare 
parts, finishing painting works, etc., do not interrupt the project operation if they are not 
delivered. The project is then officially considered closed and terminated after 
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issuance of the Final Acceptance Certificate and when the warranty period comes to 
an end. 
 
2.6.3.7 Concluding Remarks 
The above is a brief description of an ideal project development in the Saudi Arabian 
electricity supply industry.  In reality, however, there are many more details that 
interrupt the steady execution of a project.  Given the unique features of projects 
where every project has its distinguishing story, this adds to the challenge facing this 
study‟s attempt to comprehend the factors impeding project progress.  One source of 
strength for this research, however, is restricting the inquiry context to a specific set of 
social actors (Project Owner, Project Contractor and Project Consultants) in a specific 
industry.  Knowing that the Project Owner represents only one, though large, 
organisation (the SEC - Western Operating Area) is considered an additional strength 
for this study.  This is because the working relationship culture is likely to emerge more 
quickly and be easier to capture when compared to working with several Project 
Owners with different organisational forces and, hence, cultures.   The next step this 
research project needs to take towards conceptualising the PICs will be identifying the 
most important factors impeding steady project progress in the industry (PDFs).      
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3. The Role of Project and Project Management in 
Organisations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The first chapter presented the global concern to secure adequate energy supplies to 
maintain the world‟s economic growth.  It also acknowledged the potential challenges 
facing Saudi Arabia to meet its local demand for electricity despite its ownership of 
substantial reserves and massive production levels of fossil fuels.  The second chapter 
described the general and most pressing challenges facing its need to meet its local 
demand for electricity.  One crucial means to meet the rapidly growing demand for 
electricity in Saudi Arabia is through authorising supply projects to increase the 
country‟s electricity production levels.  After acknowledging that project delay was 
noticed to be not only a major problem in the industry but also an accepted 
phenomenon, this chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding the research 
questions and objectives to set the study within its wider context.  After defining the 
key terms, this chapter will reflect on the relevant studies addressing project delay 
factors in the construction industry and state the knowledge gaps which this study 
would bridge.      
 
3.2 Projects and Project Management  
Project management is a mature and well-developed discipline for the exercise of 
professional expertise and for academic research.  Therefore, a great number of 
authors and scholars have attempted to define “project” and “project management” in 
many different ways.  For example, Gray and Larson (2008) define project as “a 
complex, non-routine, one-time effort limited by time, budget, resources, and 
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performance specifications designed to meet customer needs” (Gray and Larson, 
2008).  Pinto (2007) defines a project as  
any series of activities and tasks that: have a specific objective to be completed 
within certain specifications, have defined start and end dates, have funding 
limits (if applicable), consume human and nonhuman resources (i.e., money, 
people, equipment), and are multifunctional (i.e., cut across several functional 
lines).  
       (Pinto, 2007)   
 
Cleland and Ireland (2007) state that a project is “a combination of organisational 
resources pulled together to create something that did not previously exist and that will 
provide a performance capability in the design and execution of organisational 
strategies” (Cleland and Ireland, 2007).  Finally, the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBoK) guide of the Project Management Institute (PMI) has defined a 
project as “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, service, or 
result” (PMI, 2004).  Pinto (2007) refers to this definition as the simplest which was 
formulated by the largest professional project management association, with over 
285,000 members worldwide as of March 2009.  
The above definitions that when organisations need to implement their strategic plans 
to achieve their goals, some required activities cannot be addressed within normal 
organisational capabilities.  To achieve these goals, projects are authorised in these 
typical situations as the vehicle for creating organisational change (Anderson et al., 
2006, PMI, 2004).  The common themes emerging from the definitions quoted above 
reveal that a project is a vehicle to achieve a unique outcome, whether a product, a 
result or a service, which was conceptualised and authorised by customers using 
available resources within previously decided parameters of scope, time and budget.  
66 
 
 
The discipline that deals with projects from their inception to closure is widely known 
as “Project Management”.  Cleland and Ireland (2007) have defined the discipline as  
a series of activities embodied in a process of getting things done on a project 
by working with members of the project team and with other people 
(stakeholders) in order to reach the project schedule, cost, and technical 
performance objectives.  
                                        
(Cleland and Ireland, 2007)   
 
For the purpose of this research, the adopted definition of “project management” was 
the one defined by the PMBoK of the PMI: “project management is the application of 
knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to project activities to meet project 
requirements” (PMI, 2004). 
 
3.3 Programmes and Programme Management  
The above “project” definitions suggest that projects are undertaken in many industries 
and in different cultures.  Moreover, many organisations manage several projects 
simultaneously.  Such collections of projects are normally referred to as 
“programmes”.  “A programme is a group of related projects managed in a coordinated 
way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually” 
(PMI, 2008).  Therefore, programmes provide a means to bridge the gap between 
project delivery and organisational strategy (Lycett et al., 2004).  For example, one of 
the Saudi Electricity Company‟s strategic objectives is to electrify rural areas dispersed 
all over the Kingdom.  Therefore, to help achieve this strategic goal, the electrification 
programme has been broken-up into many power generation projects, power 
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transmission projects and distribution network projects (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A 
for details on this).     
The above suggests that programme management is observed as an evolution of 
project management, with the main purpose of such management being  to cope with 
the holistic, complex change brought by these groups of projects or programmes 
(Morris, 1994, Morris, 2009, Pellegrinelli, 2011).  Therefore “programmes” were viewed 
as an efficient vehicles to deliver organisational improvements and changes (Shehu 
and Akintoye, 2010) - without a strong priority system linked to strategy, problems 
would otherwise be created in the implementation of projects (Larson and Gray, 2011).   
“Programme management is the integration and management of a group of related 
projects with the intent of achieving benefits that would not have been realised had the 
projects been managed independently” (Lycett et al., 2004).  This indicates that 
programme management has benefits which include the following: 
- It improves the linkage between strategic objectives of organisations and the 
management activities – including project management - required to achieve 
these strategic objectives  
- It improves project definition to avoid project scope creep 
- It improves communication of overall goals and activities within and between 
projects 
- It embraces more effective knowledge transfer through improving the capturing 
of transferable lessons.  A holistic overview of projects will lead to identifying a 
trend of persisting problematic issues that could be noticed and, hence, enable 
practitioners to provide more practical solutions. 
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However, there are flawed assumptions, such as the following, which underlie 
programme management:  programme management is a scaled-up version of project 
management (Morris, 2009, Pellegrinelli, 2011, Artto et al., 2009, Lycett et al., 2004); 
and a “one size fits all” approach to programme management is appropriate (Lycett et 
al., 2004, Shenhar, 2001).  Programme management addresses the contents and 
contexts of organisational change in a manner that heavily involves other managerial 
disciplines (Pellegrinelli, 2011).  This obviously suggests that programme management 
is not a simple scaled-up version of project management and, therefore, the 
challenges faced in programmes are viewed as compounded and more complex when 
compared to those faced in projects. 
 
3.4 Project Characterisation    
The wide range of projects has invited scholars to undertake a common approach to 
the management of all projects in the programmes.  This has been perceived as a 
wise initiative since organisations can maximise the available resources through, for 
example, enforcing comparable progress reporting and consistent calculation of 
resource requirements enabling sharing of resources.  This will also ease the 
movement of project team members between projects within the programmes without 
having to learn a new management approach (Payne and Turner, 1999).  Therefore, 
there is a need to identify project characteristics in which project attributes and types 
are comprehended.   
Kerzner (2009) and Crawford et al. (2005) identified a list of attributes that can be used 
for characterising projects, but they also emphasised that the list can consist of 
endless attributes (Crawford et al., 2005, Kerzner, 2009).  Listed below are some of  
the most common attributes identified in the literature (Muller and Turner, 2007b, 
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Muller and Turner, 2007a, Zwikael et al., 2005, Cooke-Davies and Arzymanow, 2003, 
Shenhar et al., 2001, Kerzner, 2009): 
- Application area: projects are undertaken in several application areas and 
industries including in-house R & D, small construction, large construction, 
aerospace and defence, engineering and many others (Kerzner, 2009).  A field 
study by (Cooke-Davies and Arzymanow, 2003) which conducted an inter-
industry comparison of project management practices, showed that differences 
occurred not only between project practices across industries, but also between 
organisations within a single industry.  The most highly developed project 
management practices were in the Petrochemical and Defence industries when 
compared to Pharmaceutical R & D, construction, telecommunications and the 
financial services industries.   
- Strategic importance: organisations often classify projects based on their 
urgency.  Projects with high urgency, often described as emergency projects, 
are highly visible to top management.  For example, the Saudi Electricity 
Company has recently authorised a number of emergency projects to secure 
adequate electricity supplies to areas that suffered several inconvenient service 
interruptions.  The urgency of these projects forced the government to intervene 
by providing the SEC with urgent funds and authorising these necessary supply 
projects.      
- Technological complexity: arguably, the material and equipment technologies 
involved in projects differ from one industry to another and from one culture to 
another.  The pharmaceutical, information systems and manufacturing 
industries develop at a faster rate than those in the construction and utilities 
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industries.  Shenhar et al (2001) have categorised projects based on the level 
of technological uncertainty evaluated at the project initiation stage (Shenhar et 
al., 2001).  Such a grouping was proven to be an important independent project 
variable (Shenhar, 2001).  The more advanced the material or equipment 
technology used in a project, the more likely budget and schedule overruns 
were to occur.  The suggested project types were as follows (Shenhar et al., 
2001):  
1) “Low-tech projects which rely on existing and slowly developing technologies 
such as construction and road building where a contractor rebuilds an existing 
product; 
2) Medium-tech projects which rely mainly on existing technologies but incorporate 
some new features (for example, industrial projects of incremental improvement 
and modifications of existing products); 
3) High-tech projects in which most of the technologies developed are newly built 
but based on existing products such as new computer families and defence 
developments; 
4) Super high-tech projects which are relatively rare and based on new and as yet 
non-existent technologies which must be developed during project execution”.   
 
Shenhar et al.‟s (2001) project grouping above also indicates that projects involved 
with a lower level of technology had a more rigid scope and design when compared to 
projects involved with higher level technology.  For the purpose of this research, the 
project type that will be investigated could be considered to be medium-tech projects.  
Projects in the electricity supply industry (Power Generation, Power Transmission and 
Power Distribution Projects) are highly involved with construction work and these are 
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well established and mature project fields.  However, a large portion of these power 
projects also involve equipment that continuously faces incremental advancement in 
their procured products when compared with normal building construction materials 
and equipment (Nye, 2004, Mazer, 2007).  „Generating turbine‟ manufacturers, for 
example, continuously strive to enhance the energy conversion efficiency to reduce 
the required fuel to generate the same amount of electricity and minimise waste 
energy (Breeze, 2005).  Power Transmission control systems are also continuously 
equipped with additional features to improve the electricity supply-demand 
management in the grid.  Power Distribution substation protection systems are always 
enabled with improved and developed features to extend the lifetime expectancy 
under abnormal operational conditions (Aron, 2007). 
  
It could be easily argued in today‟s business environment that all technology levels 
(low-high) are exponentially advancing.  This research project, however, is concerned 
with Shenhar et al.‟s (2001) project type grouping based on project technology level, 
because this requires project team members with a certain set of skills and relevant 
knowledge of the project technology.  In other words, the higher the level of project 
technology involved in a project, the more likely skilful manpower is required to 
manage and deliver the project.  This is especially true knowing that project 
specifications and design rigidity is more flexible towards higher technology projects 
during the execution phase, increasing the uncertainty level of project outcomes.     
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3.5 Projects and Project Management Success  
The ultimate goal for all project management practitioners is to deliver projects 
successfully.  It was evident, previously, that project definitions all circulate around a 
project being a temporary activity to deliver a specific result within an allocated budget 
and specific time-frame.  Therefore, it might easily be assumed that the concept of 
project success could be limited to meeting these three constraints of project scope 
(specific result), project time (temporary activity) and project cost (allocated budget).  
This would be true if this perception were limited to project management professionals 
who were directly responsible for managing all the relevant activities to turn a project 
from a concept into an operating product or tangible result or service.  However, 
project outcomes are also assessed and valued by other project stakeholders.  PMI 
(2004) note that  
Project stakeholders are individuals and organisations that are actively involved 
in the project, or whose interest may be affected as a result of project 
completion.  They may also exert influence over the project‟s objectives and 
outcomes. 
         (PMI, 2004)  
 
Therefore, measuring project success involves an assessment of which project 
objectives have been delivered as they are perceived by all project stakeholders 
involved (Thomas and Fernandez, 2008, Mallak et al., 1991, Williams, 2002, Wit, 
1988).  Project stakeholders can be categorised as shown in Figure 3.1 (Mallak et al., 
1991): 
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Figure 3.1: Project stakeholders (Mallak et al., 1991) 
 
 
 
The concept of success in projects has been extensively discussed in the literature of 
project management (Thomas and Fernandez, 2008, Anderson et al., 2006, Baccarini, 
1999, Jugdev and Muller, 2005, Mallak et al., 1991, Munns and Bjeirmi, 1996, Wit, 
1988).  Although Mallak et al. (1991) admitted that satisfying all project stakeholders is 
a compromise, they elaborated on how to satisfy each category by considering the 
main interests of each stakeholders in the project and then evaluating the extent of 
their influence on the project‟s progress.  The likely differences between these 
lobbyists  
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stakeholders, therefore, make it difficult to achieve steady project implementation.  For 
example, the authorities and regulatory agencies, such as municipalities, are 
responsible for enforcing building codes in construction projects.  Therefore, project 
owners and contractors seek to minimise any potential problems with municipalities by 
complying with these codes which could be under continuous adjustment and change.      
Given the unique nature of each individual project (Anderson et al., 2006, Belassi and 
Tukel, 1996), considering the project interests of all stakeholders makes it difficult to 
objectively measure project success (Thomas and Fernandez, 2008, Wit, 1988).  The 
difficult task of defining project success was addressed in the PMI Annual Seminars 
and Symposium in 1986 (Baccarini, 1999): 
Project success is a topic that is frequently discussed and yet rarely agreed 
upon.  The concept of project success has remained ambiguously defined.  It is 
a concept which can mean so much to so many different people because of 
varying perceptions, and leads to disagreement about whether a project is 
successful or not.  
 
The above showed that there was a distinction between project success and the 
success of the project management application (Baccarini, 1999, Wit, 1988).  Unlike 
project success, project management success tends to be confined to the so-called 
triple constraint (PMI, 2004, Thomas and Fernandez, 2008, Pinto, 2007, Wit, 1988) or 
iron triangle (Atkinson, 1999) of project cost, time, and performance, the elements that 
define the very nature of a project (Pinto, 2007).  This suggests that a project 
management team must ensure a project is consuming the allocated resources 
without risking going over budget, going behind schedule or below the client‟s 
minimum expectation of project performance.  So, if the final product or service of the 
project is managed well from a project management perspective, it is not necessary to 
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be perceived as successful in the strategic level context (Thomas and Fernandez, 
2008, Baccarini, 1999, Jugdev and Muller, 2005, Lim and Mohamed, 1999, Munns and 
Bjeirmi, 1996).  Many cases can provide examples of when a project team 
successfully delivered projects within the allocated resources, but the final products 
did not have the expected impact at the business level.  These projects were managed 
well, although they were not perceived as successful.  If an energy company, for 
example, has successfully delivered an oil refinery within or even below the allocated 
budget and before the expected delivery time, the project team would be applauded.  
However, if the refinery became operational at a time when the refined and processed 
oil was below the shareholders‟ acceptable expectations, then the project would be 
perceived as having less value even if it was delivered as planned.   On the other 
hand, if the refinery was delivered beyond the allocated budget and with reported 
delays yet it operated at a time when the processed and refined oil price range was 
higher than shareholders‟ maximum expectations, the project would strategically be of 
much greater value (assuming losses incurred in delivering the project beyond the 
budget and time are quickly recovered).  This also means that a project success, to 
the shareholders, for example, can fluctuate during the project‟s lifecycle.  For 
example, BP‟s Macondo Well could have been perceived as a lucrative and successful 
project until the disastrous explosion of 20th April 2010, leaving behind it severe 
losses both financially and politically.   
 
These examples present evidence of the independent relationship between project 
success and project management success.  Project success is measured differently by 
a wide range of stakeholders and people, while the success of the project 
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management application is confined to a project team‟s performance to meet the 
project iron triangle.  Paradoxically, project success is the core concept of project 
management (Baccarini, 1999), but the project is surrounded and influenced by many 
factors that are beyond the direct control of the project management team (Munns and 
Bjeirmi, 1996), and in which tradeoffs between its main objectives are inevitable and 
common (Williams, 2002). 
 
This research study was concerned with improving project management practice in the 
Saudi Arabian electricity supply industry. Therefore, much of the focus will be directed 
towards delivering projects on schedule and within the planned budget and scope.  
Moreover, most of the attention will be directed towards transforming project 
management into a strategic asset value for the investigated industry from a tactical 
asset value.  Project management with strategic value is when a clear connection is 
made between how effectively and efficiently a project was delivered with the business 
value.  Project management with tactical value, on the other hand, is when project 
success is limited to meeting project schedule, budget and planned scope, where the 
links to the broader business are missing (Jugdev and Muller, 2005).  In other words, 
although the study was very concerned with meeting the challenging triple constraints 
in the targeted industry, the practice of project management would certainly have a 
strategic business value if the people involved were aware of their organisation‟s 
strategic goals.  This would enable these people to articulate to the stakeholders how 
their projects could contribute to the achievement of these goals (Crowe, 2006). 
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3.6 Project Success Factors 
As was mentioned previously, the main role of project management practitioners is to 
define, deliver and close projects successfully.  Although perceptions of success vary 
from one stakeholder to another, the project management literature presents an 
interest in understanding and modelling the factors surrounding project success.  For 
example, Lim and Mohamed (1999) define project success factors as “the set of 
circumstances, facts, or influences which contribute to the project outcome.  These are 
the influential forces which facilitate or contribute to project success but do not form 
the basis of judgment” (Lim and Mohamed, 1999).  However, the presence or absence 
of these factors does not guarantee the success or failure of a project, but they are 
good indicators of pre-conditions for its success or failure (Wit, 1988). 
   
The Project Implementation Profile (PIP) devised by Pinto and Slevin has been widely 
used and has facilitated the examination of which aspects in a certain set of factors 
determine the success or failure of a project (Slevin and Pinto, 1986). They have made 
a valuable contribution in this specific area where the PIP demonstrated ten critical 
success factors and was used as a tool to diagnose a project‟s status.  These ten 
factors were:  
1) “Project mission: initial clarity of goals and general directions.  
2) Top management support: willingness of top management to provide the 
necessary resources and authority/power for project success. 
3) Project schedule/plans: a detailed specification of the individual action steps 
required for project implementation. 
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4) Client consultation: communication, consultation, and active listening to all 
impacted parties. 
5) Personnel: recruitment, selection, and training of the necessary personnel for 
the project team. 
6) Technical tasks: availability of the required technology and expertise to 
accomplish the specific technical actions steps. 
7) Client acceptance: the act of “selling” the final project to its ultimate users. 
8) Monitoring and feedback: timely provision of comprehensive control information 
at each phase in the implementation process. 
9) Communication: the provision of an appropriate network and necessary data to 
all key factors in the project implementation. 
10) Trouble-shooting: the ability to handle crises and deviations from plan”. 
 
 
   (Pinto and Slevin, 1988)  
 
The PIP has facilitated the examination of which aspects of the above factors needed 
more attention when considering the success of a project (as perceived by the project 
management team) (Finch, 2003, Hyvari, 2006, Pinto and Prescott, 1988).  The 
relative importance of these factors changed significantly over each project stage; 
these changes were in terms of  project conceptualization, planning, execution, and 
termination (Pinto and Prescott, 1988).  Finch (2003) applied the PIP on an information 
system project within a global company (Finch, 2003).  Pinto and Slevin had previously 
addressed the absence of a few factors that were not considered in the PIP and could 
have played key roles in a project‟s progress; this suggests the limitation of the PIP 
methodology.  Finch (2003), however, emphasised the following limitations: excluding 
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the competence and characteristics of a project manager; not addressing the political 
activity and cultural climate; not considering the external organisational and 
environmental factors; and not addressing the perception of how urgent the project 
was (Finch, 2003).   
 
Hyvari (2006) has also employed the PIP to test whether dependencies between 
organisational context (size, type, experience) and critical success factors in project 
management exist.  She found that the importance of project communication is related 
to company size (Hyvari, 2006).  A positive correlation existed between an 
organisation‟s size and the importance of project communication.  The larger the 
company was, the more important project communication appeared.  She also used 
the PIP to analyse the most critical success factors along the project phases as was 
applied by (Pinto and Prescott, 1988).  Communication ranked as the most critical 
success factor in the planning, execution and closing of project phases.   
 
Belassi and Tukel (1996) developed a framework for determining critical success 
factors in projects.  They grouped the success factors into the following categories: 
project-related factors (i.e. size, value, complexity, urgency); project manager and 
project team members background factors (i.e. competency, commitment); the 
organisation (i.e. top management support, project sponsor); and the external 
environment (i.e. political, technological).  Addressing the external environment along 
with project and project team characteristics were their original contribution to the 
knowledge, they claimed (Belassi and Tukel, 1996).  The framework was conceptually 
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developed and empirically examined in several industries but was not applied in any 
further studies. 
 
Anderson et al.’s (2006) framework identified project success factors within the direct 
control of project managers.  The framework was empirically examined in four 
culturally different countries (the UK, France, China and Norway).  The most important 
factors identified were: strong project commitment; early-stakeholder influence; 
stakeholder endorsement of project plans; and rich project communication (Anderson 
et al., 2006).  The study also suggested that a well-structured and formal project 
approach will offer rich project communications channels and provide a learning 
project environment. 
 
Clarke (1999) addressed how to practically use project success factors in an 
aerospace engineering context.  After conducting a comprehensive investigation in the 
targeted organisation, she identified the following relevant critical success factors: 
focused and effective communication throughout the project; clear objective and 
scope; breaking the project into manageable work packages; using project plans as 
working documents.  The main problems in the investigated company were then 
targeted by focusing on these key success factors to enhance the effectiveness of 
project management practice (Clarke, 1999).  Compared to other work in this area, the 
main difference in Clarke‟s work was that her identified success factors were 
conceptualised through an understanding of the existing problems in a much more 
focused context.  Similarly, Diallo and Thuillier (2004) identified the significance of the 
political environment in the African development projects.  These projects were funded 
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by an international development community which required high level political skills for 
the project manager to successfully deliver the projects (Diallo and Thuillier, 2004).  
Loring (2007), on the other hand, considered an example of the public being the main 
stakeholder in having planning permission for wind energy projects in the UK and 
Denmark.  In this study, it was noted that projects with a high level of local community 
involvement during the conceptual phase were more likely to be publicly accepted.  
Public acceptance of these projects was an important factor for project permission, 
which indicated the urgent need to identify how to approach key stakeholders in a 
timely manner (Loring, 2007).  Ignorance of such issues could have significant effects 
on project progress and success (Cleland, 1989).   
 
The above studies reveal a genuine interest in identifying the factors surrounding 
project success.  Much of the research has adopted broader definitions of project 
success.  However, the traditional iron triangle constraint (time, budget and scope) 
seemed to prevail as the key project success criteria (Soderlund, 2004).  But even 
when project success criteria were limited to meeting these three constraints, projects 
were still demonstrating poor records of successful completion.  This could be rooted 
in a wide range of reasons.  For example, Anderson et al. (2006) identified common 
project success factors in four different countries.  However, applying the necessary 
steps to effectively make use of these identified success factors would differ not only 
from one country to another, but also from one organisation to another within the same 
country and industry (Bredillet et al., 2010).  The dynamic nature of projects required 
the pursuit of in-depth investigations in project-driven organisations to conceptualise 
how success factors could be applied (Clarke, 1999).  Clarke‟s success factors were 
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suggested when she adopted a problem-driven approach rather than measuring an 
established set of success factors and determining the weakest links.  Diallo and 
Thuiller (2004) also addressed the need for having project managers with high level 
political skills to be able to deliver development projects in Africa; without such a high 
skill level, both projects would have faced serious challenges (Diallo and Thuillier, 
2004).  In democratic countries such as the UK and Norway, public acceptance must 
be provided to secure wind energy project permission, for example, right from the 
conceptual phase.  As a result, understanding how to tackle public concerns was 
perceived as a critical project success factor (Loring, 2007).   
 
The examples above indicate that project success factors are either generic or specific 
(Thiry, 2005), where project professionals need to know what factors lead to 
consistently successful projects (generic factors) in addition to what factors are critical 
to success for an individual project (specific factors) (Cooke-Davies, 2002).  This 
demonstrates that different projects could present different sets of project success 
factors (Dvir et al., 1998).  Therefore, to maintain a sustainable project success in the 
Saudi Arabian electricity supply industry, a thorough understanding of what factors 
determine project success will be articulated through, as a necessary step, 
understanding what factors are indeed challenging the project success itself.  
     
3.7 Project Management Maturity Models     
Apart from identifying factors surrounding project success, there has been an 
increasing interest shown by organisations in reviewing their internal project 
management processes to make sense of why some projects succeed and others do 
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not (Jugdev and Thomas, 2002).  Although considered relatively new and none have 
achieved acceptance at a worldwide level yet, Project Management Maturity Models 
are well known for identifying project and organisational strengths and weaknesses, 
and for providing  benchmarking information (Jugdev and Thomas, 2002).  In fact, any 
newly introduced subject has great room for development, especially if it has been 
embedded within a fast developing discipline such as “project management”.  Project 
Management Maturity Models have already become part of documented practice in 
the APM and PMI Bodies of Knowledge (PMI, 2004, APM, 2006).  Brookes and Clark 
(2010) have highlighted a number of disparities in the ways in which these were 
conceptualised, including their delineation of the “maturity” construct and the project 
management knowledge areas they covered (Table 3.1).  This has consequently 
meant that the scope of each model is different from the others (Brookes and Clark, 
2010).   
Table 3.1: Knowledge Areas considered in established Project Management                   
Maturity Models 
 Source: (Brookes and Clark, 2010)
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For example, Ibbs and Kwak (2000) devised a Project Management Maturity Model 
that assessed how developed the project management was in organisations on a 
relative scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) (Ibbs and Kwak, 2000, Kwak and Ibbs, 2002).  
In their model, they targeted organisations in different industries, including 
construction, to assess their project management maturity against the following eight 
knowledge areas and five project phases introduced in the PMBoK guide (Table 3.2):   
Table 3.2: Project Management knowledge areas and project phases in Ibbs and 
Kwak’s (2000) Project Management Maturity Model 
Eight knowledge areas 
  
Five project phases 
  
Project scope management 
Project time management  
Project cost management  
Project quality management 
Project human resources management 
Project communication management 
Project risk management 
Project procurement management  
Project initiating 
Project planning 
Project executing  
Project controlling 
Project closing   
 
When compared to other industries, the construction industry had the highest score of 
3.36.  In general (i.e. projects across all investigated industries), results showed that 
the risk management and project execution phase were areas of low maturity.  On the 
other hand, cost management and project-planning were areas of high maturity (Ibbs 
and Kwak, 2000).  In other words, organisations showed well-established processes 
relevant to cost estimation during project planning, but processes relevant to 
identifying and responding to uncertainties during execution were not as mature.  The 
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study gave the participating organisations an indication as to which project knowledge 
areas and phases were of high or low maturity, leading to a competitive advantage if 
proper actions were taken.  Jugdev and Thomas (2002), however, concluded that such 
maturity models were not able to provide a sustainable competitive advantage.  This 
was reasoned in the fact that these models captured explicit, codified practice (know-
what), but did not include the intangible assets of project management (know-how).  
These models were typically overly disciplinary and impractical since they focused on 
the work processes and ignored the human and organisational interactions.  In a later 
development, Brookes and Clark (2010)  conducted a comprehensive examination 
across a wider range of Project Management Maturity Models that showed 
consideration of these intangible assets as in both studies of Cooke-Davies and 
Arzymanow (2003) and Andersen and Jessen (2003) (Table 3.1).  Yet, there was an 
apparent limitation in their extent of use impact on project performance.  This indicates 
that although the Project Management Maturity Models is a wide subject, there is a 
great need to identify which of these models stimulate effective change in project 
management practice to improve project performance. 
3.8 Project Owners, Consultants and Contractors  
Having a diverse range of project characteristics compounded with the involvement of 
several organisational stakeholders increases the challenges facing the project 
implementation process.  Several project stakeholders have different interests and 
influences on projects (Figure 3.1) (Mallak et al., 1991).  However, this study‟s central 
concern was with the main project stakeholders who were involved with day-to-day 
project details.  These were typically a project owner who recognises a need which 
can be satisfied by physical structure, a project consultant who is able to translate the 
owner‟s primary needs into basic drawings and schematics satisfying the main project 
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requirements, and, finally, a project contractor who actually creates and realises the 
physical structure fulfilling both the owner‟s and consultant‟s requirements.  The 
previously mentioned stakeholders represent, in simplest form, the three main phases 
of the construction project process, namely, project conception, project design and 
project construction (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997).  It would be ideal if a project 
could result in an overall win-win situation for all these three stakeholders, and this 
should always be a target (Lim and Mohamed, 2000).  In reality, the dynamics 
between these organisations, which also may be involved in other projects with each 
having unique business circumstances, makes it very difficult to have project progress 
without challenges.  In fact, project conflict between these three stakeholders has 
been perceived as a normal practice in projects (Al-Sedairy, 1994).  The concern, 
however, is when conflict can have a negative impact on meeting the project 
constraints of scope, budget and time.    
3.9   Construction Project Delay – Central Research Challenge 
The scale and breadth of project management challenges and problems are 
enormous, and they are definitely far greater when addressed in a single study.  
Moving from the divergent view of the challenges facing construction projects into a 
more convergent one, the focus of this study was centred on achieving the following 
elements that define a project: meeting a project‟s scope, its delivery schedule and the 
allocated budget to finance its construction activities.  These elements are highly 
dependent on each other.  For example, allocating insufficient funds for a project, can 
either have an effect on the project time delivery (until enforcement provision is 
secured) or require necessary adjustment to the project scope (downgrading the 
scope lowers the project‟s total cost).  Also, any change in project scope during project 
construction and execution will have an impact on the project‟s total cost (additional 
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working hours for redoing the activity is most probably required) in addition to the time 
extension needed to do the job (assuming the activity is within the critical path where 
the progress of other activities is affected).  Since this study is more concerned with 
the use of projects to bridge the growing gap between electricity supply and demand in 
Saudi Arabia, then, obviously, time is of the essence since electricity projects are 
urgently required to be delivered within the decided time schedule to reduce any 
further widening of the gap.  Substantial amounts of money are being invested in the 
industry, which has led to the authorisation of hundreds of projects seen as the most 
urgent means of addressing the growing challenges of meeting the accelerating 
electricity demand requirements.  Therefore, it is of great concern that the delivery and 
operation of these authorised projects is achieved as soon as possible and without any 
delay.  This is especially true due to the fact that the Saudi government announced its 
largest expenditure budget in its history at the end of 2009, authorising many more 
public projects requiring proper, basic infrastructure including electricity (Table 1.3). 
From this foundation, and knowing that the three project elements of scope, time and 
budget are dependent on each other; this study sought to identify the project 
implementation challenges through focusing on critical factors delaying projects in the 
investigated industry.  In other words, project delay factors in the Saudi Arabian 
electricity supply industry are used to model the project implementation challenges 
since project delay has already become an accepted phenomenon in the project 
industry.  It is argued that a holistic outlook and a comprehensive understanding of 
project delay factors will result in authoritative recommendations that seek to reduce 
the unwanted effects of the project implementation challenges.     
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A diverse range of project characteristics and involvement with various stakeholders 
(project owner, contractor, consultant, designers, suppliers etc.) who each come with 
different perceptions, objectives and hence priorities, and who each adopt different 
and probably inadequate practices in terms of project management tools and 
techniques, creates a fertile ground for construction project delays.  Therefore, many 
studies have strived to pinpoint the most important project delay factors with the aim of 
controlling them and  minimizing their adverse effects on project stakeholders (Faridi 
and El-Sayegh, 2006, Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Aibinu and Jagboro, 2002, 
Alaghbari et al., 2007, Alkass et al., 1996, Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Al-Khalil and 
Al-Ghafly, 1999a, Al-Momani, 2000, Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Chan 
and Kumaraswamy, 1997, Kaming et al., 1997, Kumaraswamy and Chan, 1998, Lim 
and Mohamed, 2000, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Ogunlana 
and Promkuntong, 1996, Sambasivan and Soon, 2007, Stumpf, 2000, Sweis et al., 
2008, Shehu and Akintoye, 2010, Assaf et al., 1995, Koushki et al., 2005).  Arguably, 
the vast majority of project delays have occurred during the construction phase (Chan 
and Kumaraswamy, 1997), where all inadequacies in the preceding phases have 
become apparent (Lim and Mohamed, 2000).  The following studies clearly 
demonstrate common project delay factors.    
3.10   Project Delay Studies in Developing Countries – A 
Construction Industry Context 
Many studies have been conducted in different parts of the world to identify 
construction project delay factors.  Results have shown that these project delay factors 
(PDFs) are usually interconnected (Alkass et al., 1996), complicating how the causes 
of the delays should be addressed.  Examples of studies conducted in several 
countries are summarised in Tables 3.3 – 3.5 below. They confirm that project delay 
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was a common feature in construction projects.  The traditional approach in these 
studies was to identify several PDFs either empirically, where data were collected from 
project practitioners, or conceptually, where they were based on relevant research 
conclusions, or both.  The PDFs were expected to have different attributes in which, 
for example, some were related to financial issues and others were related to material 
and manpower issues.   
 
Stumpf (2000) defines a project delay as “an act or event that extends the time 
required to perform tasks under a contract.  Delays usually show up as additional days 
of work or as the delayed start of an activity” (Stumpf, 2000).  Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study, a PDF was considered as any circumstance, force, or constraint 
that contributed to project delay.  To further understand PDF forms, the following 
tables present summaries of construction project delay factor studies conducted in 
different countries:
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Table 3.3: Literature Review summary of key project delay factors identified in various construction industries in Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researchers Country Project Type Time Overrun Cost Overrun Key Stakeholders Key Delay Factors Delay factor importance accoding to: Additional notes
Sambasivan Malaysia Construction NA NA Public and Private Inadequate client's finance and payments for completed All key Stakeholders considered
and Soon Projects Owners, works
(2007) Contractors Contractor's improper planning All key Stakeholders considered
and Consultants Inadequate Contractor's experience All key Stakeholders considered
Contractor's poor site management All key Stakeholders considered
Alaghbari Malaysia Construction NA NA Public and Private Financial factor was the most influencing delaying projects All key Stakeholders considered
et al. Projects Owners, Coordination problems between involved parties All key Stakeholders considered
(2007) Contractors Material-related problems All key Stakeholders considered
and Consultants
Long et al. Vietnam Large Construction NA NA Owners, Incompetent designer/contractor All key Stakeholders considered
(2004) Projects Contractors Poor estimation and change management All key Stakeholders considered
and Consultants Social and technological issues (obsolete technology and All key Stakeholders considered
burereaucracy)
Site related issues All key Stakeholders considered
Improper techniques/tools All key Stakeholders considered
Kaming Indonesia Construction 55% of PMs 52% of PMs Project managers Design changes Overall Project Managers' 
et al. Projects (hospitals, completed completed Poor labor productivity evaluation
(1997) residential, offices, more than 90% 70-90% of Inadequate planning and resource shortages
shopping and of projects projects
a hotel buildings) on time within budget
Chan and Hong Kong Construction NA NA Owners, Poor site management and supervision All key Stakeholders considered
Kumarswamy Projects Contractors Unforeseen ground conditions All key Stakeholders considered
(1997) and Consultants Slow decision making by project teams involved All key Stakeholders considered
Client initiated variations (change orders) All key Stakeholders considered
Necessary variations of works (change orders) All key Stakeholders considered
Ogunlana Thailand Construction Maximum NA Owners, Shortages of necessary resources Overall Project Managers' Survey of 12 
et al. Projects (hospitals, delay was 50% Contractors Problems caused by clients and consultants evaluation projects
(1996) residential, offices, of original and Consultants Contractor incompetence problems
academic buildings duration and
and a hotel) minimum was
5%
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Table 3.4: Literature Review summary of key project delay factors identified in various construction industries in the Middle East (except for Saudi Arabia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researchers Country Project Type Time Overrun Cost Overrun Key Stakeholders Key Delay Factors Delay factor importance accoding to: Additional notes
Sweis et al. Jordan Construction NA NA Owners, Financial difficulties faced by the contractor All key Stakeholders
(2008) Projects Contractors Too many change orders from owner Contractors and Consultants
and Consultants Contractor with poor project planning and scheduling Owners and Consultants
Incompetent Contractor technical staff Owners 
Shortage of manpower (skilled, semi-skiled and unskilled) Contractors
Faridi and United Arab Construction 50% of projects NA Contractors Preparation and approval of drawings All key Stakeholders considered Project owner
El-Sayegh of Emirates Projects encountered and Consultants Inadequate early planning of project All key Stakeholders considered number of 
(2006) (UAE) delays Slow decision making by the owner All key Stakeholders considered participants was
Shortage of manpower (skilled, semi-skiled and unskilled) All key Stakeholders considered neglegible
Koushki Kuwait Private Residential 55% of NA Owners and Change orders due to the insufficient time and money All key Stakeholders considered
et al. Construction projects Developers allocated in their desig phases 
(2005) Projects experiened Financial constraints All key Stakeholders considered
change orders Owner's lack of experience All key Stakeholders considered
were delayed
Odeh and Jordan Public and private NA NA Contractors Finance and payments of completed works All key Stakeholders considered Public owners
Battaineh Construction and Consultants Owner interference All key Stakeholders considered did not participate
(2002) including buildings, Inadequate contractor experience All key Stakeholders considered
roads, water and Lowest bidder 
sewage projects selection basis
Mezher and Lebanon Construction NA NA Public owners, Financial aspects including progress payments by the owner All key Stakeholders considered
Tawil Projects Contractors and financing difficulties by Contractors
(1998) and Consultants Contractual relationship problems including uncooperative All key Stakeholders considered
owners, slow-decision making and poor communication
Project Management aspects including poor estimation and All key Stakeholders considered
planning and lack of personel training
Arditi et al. Turkey Public Construction NA NA Public owners Contractors and public agencies experienced financial All key Stakeholders considered
(1986) Projects and Contractors difficulties
Shortage of many resources including manpower and All key Stakeholders considered
materials
Both Public agencies and Contracting companies suffered All key Stakeholders considered
from slow-decision mechanism and ill-defined duties
Delays relevant to inadequate design work, frequent All key Stakeholders considered
change orders and large quantities of extra work 
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Table 3.5: Literature Review summary of key project delay factors identified in various construction industries in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
Researchers Country Project Type Time Overrun Cost Overrun Key Stakeholders Key Delay Factors Delay factor importance accoding to: Additional notes
AlKharashi Saudi Arabia Public Construction NA NA Public owner, Lack of finance to complete the work by the owner All key Stakeholders Owner-related
and Contractors Non-payment of contractor claim Owners and Contractors factors were 
Skitmore and Consultants Delay in progress payments by owners Owners and Consultants with the greatest 
(2009) Late revision and approval of design documents Contractors and Consultants effect delay 
Delay in approving sample materials Contractors and Consultants causes
Slow decision making by the owner Owner
Uncooperative owner with contractors complicating Owner Lowest bidder 
contract administration selection basis
Suspension of work by owner Contractor
Delay to furnish and deliver the site to the contractor Consultant
Assaf and Saudi Arabia Large Construction NA NA Public owner, Delay in progress payments by owners Contractors and Consultants Lowest bidder 
Al-Hejji Projects Contractors Difficulties in financing projects by contractors Contractors and Consultants selection basis
(2006) and Consultants Shortage and unproductive labours Owners and Consultants
Change orders by owner during construction All key Stakeholders considered
Al-Khalil Saudi Arabia Public Construction Overall NA Public owner Cash flow problem faced by contractors All key Stakeholders Lowest bidder 
and average (Water and Delay in progress payments by owners Contractors selection basis
Al-Ghafly extent of Sewage Authority Difficulties in financing projects by contractors Owners and Consultants
(1999) delay was 39% in 10 different Government tendering system reuirement of selecting All key Stakeholders
of original regions), the lowest bidder
contract Contractors Difficulties in obtaining work permits Owners and Contractors
duration and Consultants
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3.10.1   Hong Kong 
Hong Kong experienced a boom period in its construction industry in the early 1990s.  
Therefore, it was deemed necessary to determine and identify the significant factors 
causing delay in Hong Kong construction projects in order to propose practical 
strategies which suitably addressed these factors (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, 
Kumaraswamy and Chan, 1998).   The studies were confined to construction projects 
completed between 1990 and 1993.  83 different delay causes were considered, and 
these were grouped into categories relevant to the following: a project‟s main 
stakeholders (i.e. project owner, contractor and consultant), a project‟s resources 
(labour, material and equipment), a project‟s nature and characteristics (type and size) 
and external factors influencing the project (such as weather concerns and 
restrictions).  The overall key PDFs relating to the main stakeholders involved were 
poor site management and supervision, unforeseen ground conditions, low speed of 
decision making involving all project teams, client initiated variations, and necessary 
variations in the work.  
  
Project site management and supervision showed concerns relevant to project 
execution practice.  These activities required project team members with a certain set 
of skills and who were equipped with adequate project management tools and 
techniques to keep track of progress and, hence, were able to control the project and 
prevent unwanted slippage.  This was evident when project owners and consultants 
ranked the contractor-related delay causes group highest, as the indicated contractors 
were lacking experience to adequately plan for the activities and monitor the site.  This 
inevitably caused project cost overruns to levels which probably sparked disputes.  On 
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the other hand, slow decision making by project owners and consultants in addition to 
client initiated work variations contributed to a contractors‟ project management 
performance.  This was evident when contractors ranked the inadequate design 
experience of consultants as the main cause of project delay in Hong Kong 
construction projects. 
 
3.10.2   Indonesia 
Kaming et al. (1997) surveyed 31 high-rise projects in Indonesia and identified eleven 
different PDFs.  The predominant PDFs in these projects were mainly related to 
human resource skills since many design changes and poor labour productivity were 
noticed.  Other key PDFs identified were also relevant to inadequate planning and 
material and equipment resource shortages (Kaming et al., 1997).        
 
3.10.3   Jordan 
Jordan shares a southern border with Saudi Arabia and an eastern border with Iraq.  
Several studies were conducted to identify PDFs in the Jordanian construction industry 
(Al-Momani, 2000, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Sweis et al., 2008).  There was a 
general agreement that PDFs caused by financial issues were the most frequent.  
These PDFs were mainly caused by a weak Jordanian economic climate which also 
had an impact on material resource availability.   While public project owners identified 
PDFs as stemming from contractors having inadequate planning and scheduling 
abilities (Sweis et al., 2008), thus demonstrating a lack of experience in conducting 
these projects (Odeh and Battaineh, 2002), contractors considered the initiation of too 
many project change orders (Sweis et al., 2008), the lack of project ownership (Al-
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Momani, 2000), and inappropriate interference from project owners as the most 
important PDFs in the Jordanian construction industry.   
 
3.10.4   Kuwait 
The construction of private residential projects in Kuwait noticeably accelerated after 
the Iraqi invasion of 1990-1991.  After this destructive war, the construction of private 
residences boomed as a result of Kuwait‟s general wealth.  These projects were 
smaller in size (in terms of cost) and, therefore, they were less complex than those 
investigated in the literature.  Yet, some of these projects were also delayed, causing 
cost overruns. A study by Koushki et al. (2005) used personal interviews to survey 450 
private residential project owners and developers in order to determine the causes of 
time and cost overruns.  It was proven that private residence owners who allocated 
more time and financial resources to the planning and design phases issued less 
change orders (identified as a delay cause).  The selection of more experienced 
contractors, and the hiring of supervising engineers to independently monitor the 
progress of work and to ensure the delivery of required materials, were identified as 
contributors to better project progress with less time delay and cost overrun during the 
construction period  (Koushki et al., 2005). 
 
3.10.5   Lebanon 
Lebanon experienced a civil war between 1975 and 1990 which resulted in severe 
damage to buildings, with many being completely destroyed.  Since the reconstruction 
process started in 1992, it was observed that many construction projects have not 
been delivered on time, putting at risk an opportunity for the national economy to gain 
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confidence.  Therefore, it was necessary to identify the most important PDFs in the 
Lebanese construction industry projects in order to take appropriate action (Mezher 
and Tawil, 1998).  Research focused on projects that cost over US $10 million and 
showed a strong agreement between the three sets of respondents (project owners, 
contractors and consultants) as to what constituted significant PDFs.  Financial 
aspects, including delayed progress payments by public owners to contractors and 
financing difficulties by contractors, were the most important PDFs in the investigated 
industry. Poor planning and estimation coupled with contractors‟ lack of skilled project 
staff were also identified in the study.  Contractors also suffered from having 
contractual relationship problems with project owners who were uncooperative, slow 
with their decision making and poor communicators. 
 
3.10.6   Malaysia  
The role of the construction industry has increasingly grown in Malaysia as it 
progresses towards being a developed industrial society.  Therefore, many studies 
have strived to address the most important PDFs in an effort to draw roadmaps for 
better project delivery performance in the Malaysian construction industry (Alaghbari et 
al., 2007, Lim and Mohamed, 2000, Sambasivan and Soon, 2007).  Owners‟ 
inadequate financing of projects and the delay of progress payments to contractors 
were found to be the most significant PDFs (Alaghbari et al., 2007, Sambasivan and 
Soon, 2007).  Contractors‟ lack of experience was reflected in their poor planning 
abilities, poor site management during project execution (Sambasivan and Soon, 
2007) and coordination problems with relevant stakeholders (Alaghbari et al., 2007).  
Lim and Mohamed (2000) note that a “Projects were completed anyway” attitude 
prevailed in the Malaysian power transmission projects, which indicated there were no 
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initiatives to properly review project lessons after projects were delivered.  Such loss of 
captured knowledge prevented contractors from being provided with proper 
experience that could have improved their planning and site management qualities.         
  
3.10.7   Thailand 
The Thai construction industry experienced an unexpected boom between 1988 and 
1992.  The industry, however, was not adequately prepared for such growth since 
project management discipline was struggling to mature.  Consequently, 
understanding the most significant PDFs was used as a means to improve project 
management practice.  It was noted that resource supply problems were the most 
acute PDFs, especially shortages in the cement supply which caused severe project 
delays.  Construction project owners frequently demanded changes that created 
coordination problems which affected project activity sequences and, as a 
consequence, caused disruption and additional project time extensions.  Contractors 
also lacked personnel with adequate technical and managerial skills (Ogunlana and 
Promkuntong, 1996). 
3.10.8   Turkey 
One of the earliest research studies concerned with identifying reasons for project 
delay in public construction projects in a developing country was conducted in Turkey 
(Arditi et al., 1985).  However, it presents a very similar set of significant PDFs when 
compared to more recent PDF studies.  At the time of the study, financial difficulties 
faced by both public agencies (project owners) and project contractors were highly 
considered in Turkey.  Shortages of essential resources such as qualified manpower, 
materials and equipment were among the significant PDFs.  These were reflected in 
having slow decision-making mechanisms and ill-defined duties and responsibilities in 
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both organisations (public agencies and contractors).  Moreover, frequent change 
orders for inadequately designed work and large quantities of extra work were 
common in the investigated projects.    
 
3.10.9   United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The United Arab Emirates has gained world recognition with its construction growth 
and activity.  Great emphasis has always been placed on construction projects being 
completed within the specified delivery time.  However, in one study around half of the 
UAE construction projects were reported as being delayed (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 
2006).   The study only considered contractors and consultants, while the number of 
participating project owners was insignificant.  Shortages of productive and skilled 
manpower were reflected in inadequate early planning, and this was considered to be 
among the most important PDFs.  Late design approval by consultants and slow 
decision making by owners also represented very important PDFs.  Financing 
problems, although considered significant, were limited to contractors during 
construction.  Although project owners were not considered in the survey, late 
progress payments for completed work by project owners were not considered to be 
as significant as they were in other studies.   
 
3.10.10   Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Arabian construction industry has been the largest recipient of Saudi 
government petrodollars spending.  For example, the expenditure in its development 
plans in the period 1970-1985 ranged between 30-50% of government spending 
(Assaf et al., 1995).  In the latter part of the decade, government expenditure on basic 
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infrastructure declined sharply in response to the severe decline in oil revenues 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s.  However, when oil prices increased 
significantly between 2003 and 2008, the government initiated huge plans to continue 
building the national infrastructure, including the building of new cities from scratch 
(SAGIA, 2010).  At present, while the world is still facing the worst global economic 
downturn for many decades, and most countries around the world are adopting huge 
cuts in their spending levels, the Saudi government is among those who have 
maximised their spending as a stimulus package to boost their internal national 
economies.  This was in an effort to minimise the adverse effects of the weak global 
economy by injecting substantial financial resources into local private businesses 
(Table 1.3).        
 
It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia has continuously faced criticism of its public 
projects.  Extensive research by Niblock and Malik (2007) revealed the situation in 
Saudi Arabia towards the latter part of the decade:  
Many interviewees (Saudi businessmen from different backgrounds) noted that 
when the government was building the infrastructure they missed out some key 
elements, and that the infrastructure created was now a substantial burden on 
the economy.  Massive spending was needed both to maintain the existing 
infrastructure and to build new infrastructure to keep up with the demands of the 
economy.  
   
In the years following the tragic events of 9/11, the Saudi Arabian media have been 
open to active criticism of public services and projects.  In addition, the local media 
has recently developed into a project stakeholder where newspapers track official 
announcements of figures and promises and compare these with their relevant project 
progress.      
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Apart from the quality level of the delivered projects, various studies have focused on 
identifying PDFs in the Saudi construction industry.  The wealth of the Saudi 
government was thought to place project financial factors among the least of the 
delaying factors, especially in public projects.  Surprisingly, this was not the case since 
financial PDFs have been considered as the most significant ones across all relevant 
studies (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999a, Al-Kharashi 
and Skitmore, 2009, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Assaf et al., 1995).  In studies 
conducted between 1995 and 2009, lack of financial resources to complete project 
work, and delay in progress payments by public entities to contractors, were observed 
as being very common in Saudi public projects.  This was strongly related to the 
extreme bureaucratic measures that Ministries and public agencies require for project 
budgets to be approved.  The procedure for allocating most of the public project 
budgets is highly centralised and is controlled by the Ministry of Finance.  Approving 
inadequate project budgets (i.e. the lowest bidder offer is higher than the approved 
and allocated budget) has become a phenomenon in Saudi public projects.  This, of 
course, lengthens the procedure where re-enforcement provision is required.  
Normally, such re-enforcement could take up to several months and, in some cases, a 
few years.  
    
Contractor payments for some public projects are also required to be processed 
through the Ministry of Finance.  This has serious consequences for many contracting 
businesses, with the most serious being the apparent reluctance of contractors to bid 
for some public projects.  Although PDF studies in Saudi Arabia were conducted 
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between 1995 and 2009 (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 
1999a, Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Assaf et al., 1995), 
PDFs relevant to financial factors were still persistent, demonstrating resistance to 
change.   
 
Contractors, especially of small and medium size, also suffer in the financing of public 
projects.  The banking industry has been facing criticism since banks are focusing on 
the provision of financial facilities to corporate (large) size contractors (contractor size 
definitions differ from one bank to another).  Although government contracts are 
considered safe investments for banks, where the provision of financial facilities to 
contractors will have high returns, these banks are complaining of a lack of 
comprehensive and well-developed legislation that protects their interests (BMI, 
2010a).   
 
Shortages of manpower and unproductive manpower in projects have also been 
considered common in Saudi public projects (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Assaf et al., 
1995).  Many compounding reasons surround this particular PDF.  The Saudi Ministry 
of Labour announced a reduction in the unemployment rate from 11.2% in 2007 to 
9.8% in 2008 (MOL, 2010), while other sources (including the World Bank) have 
criticised the figure as it does not consider unemployed females; with the inclusion of 
the female unemployed figures, the estimate could have reached up to 25% (CIA, 
2010).  In general, the business sector in Saudi Arabia has criticised the education 
system which has failed to provide graduates with proper and useful skills (Niblock and 
Malik, 2007).  On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour, which regulates the issuing of 
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work permits for the non-Saudi workforce, has criticised the business sector‟s 
tendency to employ non-local graduates.  A non-local, averagely skilled workforce is, 
generally, perceived to be more productive with less cost involved.  Therefore, 
authorising substantial projects in such a restrictive and difficult business climate will 
definitely be affected by manpower shortages and an unproductive workforce, 
contributing to poor project performance.      
Public projects in Saudi Arabia are almost always awarded to the lowest bidder in an 
open competitive climate.  The selection process of the „government tendering system 
requirement of selecting the lowest bidder‟ was considered among the most important 
PDFs as indicated by all main stakeholders of project public owners, contractors and 
consultants (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b).  The main criticism was centred on the 
lack of having an established pre-qualification system where only capable contractors 
were selected.  This allowed inexperienced and incompetent contractors to execute 
public projects.   
The following content analysis is based on references available in the literature and, 
although it may appear to be a random selection of developing countries, these 
studies have actually been referenced frequently.  Moreover, the literature review has 
focused solely on developing countries since Saudi Arabia is also identified as 
belonging to this category.   
3.11 Discussion of Key Project Delay Factors  
Tables 3.3 – 3.5 have confirmed that project delay occurred in all construction 
industries with varying degrees.  The factors which contribute to project delay are 
complex and highly interconnected with each other (Sweis et al., 2008).  However, 
researchers have strived to simplify the complexity of these delay causes by reducing 
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their structures to manageable factors to enable further analyses.  These studies, 
although conducted in different parts of the world, managed to identify an emergent 
pattern of project problems that impeded project progress.  Project delay factors were 
caused by all stakeholders (project owners, contractors, consultants) and, if not by 
these, then by external forces.  The contribution level of each towards project delay 
depended on a countless number of factors, especially those relevant to project 
resources.  The following presents the frequent project delay factors identified in 
Tables 3.3 - 3.5 with thorough discussions: 
 Resource constraints (financial, human, materials and equipment) 
The most problematic project delay factors impeding project progress were those 
relevant to financial aspects, such as owners‟ delayed payments to contractors for 
completed work; as a result of such a delay, contractors faced difficulties in financing 
their awarded projects during construction (Sweis et al., 2008, Sambasivan and Soon, 
2007, Kaming et al., 1997, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Arditi et al., 1985, Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999b, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Alaghbari et al., 
2007, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006).  Another important problematic area of project 
resource was the manpower involved in these projects, as they were either perceived 
as unproductive with low skills (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 1997) or as 
being unavailable, whether skilled or otherwise.  This presented pressures on 
contractors, especially these who were awarded projects based on being the lowest 
bidders (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).(Faridi and El-
Sayegh, 2006, Sweis et al., 2008).  This particular problem  has most probably caused 
the contractors‟ project planning and scheduling ineffectiveness, and this was also 
identified as one of the major factors contributing to project delay (Chan and 
Kumaraswamy, 1997, Kaming et al., 1997, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Sambasivan and 
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Soon, 2007, Sweis et al., 2008).  Project planning and scheduling were identified as 
key processes since these specified sets of decisions are concerned with how project 
resources (financial, manpower, material and equipment etc.) are managed during 
project execution (Zwikael and Globerson, 2006).  However, the studies showed that 
contractors were either not experienced enough to formulate sound planning (Chan 
and Kumaraswamy, 1997, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Sambasivan and Soon, 2007) 
or were interrupted by uncooperative project owners (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, 
Mezher and Tawil, 1998) or slow project consultants who delayed necessary drawings 
or design approvals (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006).   
All the above contributed to poor site management (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, 
Sambasivan and Soon, 2007) which led to adverse contractual relationships between 
the three stakeholders (project owner, contractor and consultants), and this became 
acute when poor communication between the three accumulated (Mezher and Tawil, 
1998).  Therefore, both timely decision making by the project owner (Arditi et al., 1985, 
Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Mezher and Tawil, 1998) and adequate early planning 
conducted by the contractor during construction (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, 
Kaming et al., 1997, Sweis et al., 2008, Koushki et al., 2005) were crucial for project 
progress.  These, however, were not easily achieved, especially in public projects 
where slow decision-making mechanisms (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Mezher and 
Tawil, 1998) and ill-defined project duties were common (Arditi et al., 1985); 
consequently, these caused coordination problems (Alaghbari et al., 2007) with 
internal stakeholders, where project ownership was vague (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 
2009), and with external stakeholders, such as government authorities, which delayed 
the issuance of necessary project work permits (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b).   
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 Key project stakeholders’ contractual commitments 
Strong project commitment by the project owner was identified as one of the most 
important factors for project success (Anderson et al., 2006).  However the resource-
relevant project delay factors discussed above increased resource management 
pressures on the key stakeholders, especially contractors who were awarded projects 
based on being the lowest bidders (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Odeh and 
Battaineh, 2002).  Most of the PDF studies confirmed the persistent delay in the 
progress payments made by the owners to the Contractors (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 
2009, Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).  This 
led to significant delays and prolonged disputes between Project Owners and 
Contractors when their payments were due.  This could be resulted from a slow 
decision-making process in addition to the rigid requirements (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 
2006, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Arditi et al., 1985, Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009).    
The delay in the settlement of Contractor claims by project Owners was also common 
in the PDF studies (Zaneldin, 2006, Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Faridi and El-
Sayegh, 2006).  Rejecting claims, especially the justifiable ones, led to Contractors 
perceiving project owners to be uncooperative, which complicated the contract 
administration (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and 
Battaineh, 2002).  Suspension of project works by project Owners was also a serious 
factor contributing to project delay (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Chan and 
Kumaraswamy, 1997).  The literature also showed the importance of securing public 
acceptance at the project planning stage, as detailed in Loring‟s study (Loring, 2007).   
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Project Owners were also delaying the delivery of the project site to the awarded 
Contractors (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997).  
Change orders were also very serious and common PDFs in several construction 
industries (Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 
1997, Sweis et al., 2008, Koushki et al., 2005).  The above indicated that maintaining 
the key project stakeholders‟ contractual commitments was of great concerns in most 
projects.   
 
 Lack of essential information and effective communication   
Contracts were usually of a developing nature.  Therefore, not all project deliverables 
were specified.  This serious flaw motivated both the Project Owners and Contractors 
to interpret the contract differently based on their interests which to placing change 
orders for additional deliverables.  This was besides the noticeable lack of required 
information with regards to the technical limitations of the project site.  Information 
availability was proven to be a serious problem in the reviewed studies.  Contractors 
needed reliable information concerned with the project in a timely manner.  But the 
information provided to the Contractor was, in many cases, inaccurate.  For example, 
the site conditions differed from those described in the bidding packages (Arditi et al., 
1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, Kaming et al., 1997, 
Sweis et al., 2008, Koushki et al., 2005).  Bidding package arrangement is the most 
critical stage in projects (Ling and Poh, 2008) and therefore it was crucial to provide 
accurate information in this stage.    
Maintaining effective communication and coordination with the relevant project 
stakeholders is an essential means for minimising project uncertainties (Jha and Iyer, 
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2007, Bentley and Rafferty, 1992).  However the PDF studies proved this was an 
apparent and persisting challenge (Alaghbari et al., 2007, Arditi et al., 1985, Mezher 
and Tawil, 1998, Clarke, 1999, Pinto, 1990). Project communication represented the 
generation, collection, distribution and retrieval of project information (PMI, 2004), and 
project coordination indicated the harmonizing and integrating of project activities or 
requirements between the project parties (Jha and Iyer, 2006).  However the lack of 
maintain effective communication between these parties led to difficulties during 
project construction.  This could be reasoned to the fact that most of the Project 
Owners considered were public entities and that had rigid and highly centralised 
organisational structure.  
 
3.12 Knowledge Gaps and Research Contributions  
All project delay issues mentioned above varied from one industry to another.  
Significant project delay factors identified in an industry could be of less significance in 
another.  In fact, the perception of the significance of project delay factors has, in 
some cases, varied within the same project industry.  For instance, project owners, in 
some of these cases, were critical of their contractors‟ level of experience while 
contractors were complaining about, for example, project owners‟ contractual 
commitment.  However, the conclusion was that project delays did exist and their 
effect must be minimised as much as possible.  These delay factors occurred although 
project management was an established discipline with mature and specific steps, 
procedures and practices to manage and perform a project (Crowe, 2006).  However, 
besides the unique nature of projects, the fact these projects were performed in 
different contexts suggests that the dynamic nature of a project continuously presents 
new challenges for project management researchers to address.  This project will, 
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therefore, explore the delay factors which represent and form the key challenges to 
project implementation in the Saudi Arabian electricity supply industry.     
 
Since this study is more concerned with the use of projects to bridge the growing gap 
between electricity supply and demand in Saudi Arabia, then, obviously, time is of the 
essence since electricity projects are urgently required to be delivered within the 
decided time schedule to reduce any further widening of the gap.  Substantial amounts 
of money are being invested in the industry, which has led to the authorisation of 
hundreds of projects seen as the most urgent means of addressing the growing 
challenges of meeting the accelerating electricity demand requirements.  Therefore, it 
is of great concern that the delivery and operation of these authorised projects is 
achieved as soon as possible and without any delay.  This is especially true due to the 
fact that the Saudi government announced its largest expenditure budget in its history 
at the end of 2010, authorising many more public projects requiring proper, basic 
infrastructure including electricity.  Unfortunately, there is no available source of 
information or direct quotes on the extent to which projects are delayed in Saudi 
Arabia.  However, a recent study (Alhilali, 2011) revealed that 65% of public projects in 
Saudi Arabia are being managed without established project schedules.  The 
remaining 35% of public projects are being managed with project schedules; however, 
this fact does not indicate that these projects are progressing according to plan. 
From this foundation, and given the political visibility of the Saudi Arabian power 
supply industry, this study sought to identify the project implementation challenges.  
This area has not been thoroughly addressed before.  In fact, project delay has 
already become an accepted phenomenon in the investigated industry and, therefore, 
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this research will investigate which of these project delay factors are of greater 
concern.  It is argued that a holistic outlook and a comprehensive understanding of 
project delay factors will result in authoritative recommendations that seek to reduce 
the unwanted effects of the project implementation challenges. 
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4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the methodologies and methods adopted to answer the 
research questions and meet the study‟s objectives.  After describing the adopted 
research philosophy, which states how this study views the world, a review of research 
approaches and strategies is provided with justifications for those employed.  The 
research design is then explicated - both data collection methods and data analysis 
procedures are described in a chronological manner.  Describing the data collection 
methods and data analysis procedures in a chronological style was necessary since 
this research was progressive.  This will benefit researchers who aim to replicate the 
study in other contexts.  Figure 4.1 presents a flowchart of this chapter‟s layout.    
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Figure 4.1: Research Methodology’s chapter layout 
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4.2   Research Philosophy 
It is clear from the literature that the project management discipline is challenged by 
various aspects.  Meeting a construction project‟s iron triangle of scope, budget and 
time is proven not easily achievable.  Countless constraints and forces influence how 
projects are managed and delivered in different parts of the world.  The research 
philosophy adopted in this study is influenced by practical considerations.  The main 
consideration that influenced important assumptions of how the world is viewed in this 
study is expressed by Hofstede (Hofstede, 1983): 
management in general, and project management in particular, can be related 
to differences in national cultures and these differences may become one of the 
most crucial problems for management, particularly in multi-national 
organizations whether public or private … the major real obstacles in the field of 
transfer of project management practices and know-how are the socio-cultural 
factors. 
cited in (Al-Saqer, 2001)                      
From this ground, where the researcher has aimed to conceptualise project 
implementation challenges as perceived by various social actors in the Saudi Arabian 
electricity industry, social constructionism philosophy advocates the purpose of this 
research and, hence, is adopted.   
 
Social constructionism follows from the interpretivist position that asserts the necessity 
to understand differences between humans and their roles as social actors (Saunders 
et al., 2007).  Unlike the positivist position, where the research is isolated from, and 
independent of, the research social actors‟ thoughts, interpretivism is highly reliant on 
social actors‟ feelings and interpretations.     
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“Social constructionism views reality as being socially constructed” (Saunders et al., 
2007).  It explores the subjective meanings motivating the actions of various social 
actors (or project stakeholders in this research case) in order to understand the 
collective behaviours.  These may result in many different perceptions and 
interpretations as a consequence of each individual viewing the world differently.  
Having a wide range of influential project stakeholders, these different perceptions and 
interpretations are likely to affect their actions and the nature of their interactions with 
other project stakeholders.  Therefore, the research seeks to understand the 
subjective reality of project stakeholders‟ actions to make sense of the reasons behind 
the creation of project challenges and their management.  On this basis, the study 
aims to explore the reality, which is socially constructed, behind project challenges in 
the investigated industry (Remenyi et al., 1998).   
 
The research has also embraced „pragmatism‟, an approach which implies that the 
most important determinant of the research philosophy adopted is the research 
question.  The value of answering the research question is believed to have a tangible 
impact on the investigated project industry in Saudi Arabia.  According to Tashakkori 
and Teddlie (1998, cited in Saunders et al., 2007), pragmatism is intuitively appealing 
since, in their view, a researcher should “study what is of value to [the researcher], and 
use the results in ways that can bring about positive consequences within [the 
researcher‟s] value system”.  This is portrayed in the researcher‟s desire to influence 
existing policies surrounding and affecting the widening electricity supply-demand gap 
in Saudi Arabia.  This also includes, albeit indirectly, rectifying domestic energy 
consumption behaviour.  The adopted policies are collectively believed to contribute to 
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the creation of the identified project implementation challenges, as will be examined 
later (see Appendixes A and B).  These challenges, in turn, have a direct impact on 
project management practice and performance in the very same investigated industry, 
and these are the main focus of this study.           
4.3 Research Approaches 
The process of developing theories in research involves either the adoption of a 
deductive approach, in which the research design tests the hypothesis, or an inductive 
approach, in which the theory is developed after the data are collected and analysed.  
The next two sections describe the difference between the two approaches.        
4.3.1 Deductive approach 
This approach “involves the development of a theory that is subjected to a rigorous 
test” called testing theory.  It is usually used in the natural sciences where it predicts 
the occurrence of phenomena and allows their prediction (Collis and Hussey, 2003) 
Normally there are five sequential stages in this research approach: 
- Deduce a hypothesis from a theory through testing a proposition about the 
relationship between concepts 
- Express the hypothesis in operational terms that explains the relationships 
between the concepts  
- Test the formulated hypothesis using one or more strategies  
- Examine the specific outcome of the test 
- Conclude whether the theory needs modification in the light of the hypothesis 
test outcomes (Robson, 2002) 
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4.3.2 Inductive approach 
This approach, otherwise described as “building theory”, is an alternative approach to 
deduction in which theory follows data rather than vice versa  (Saunders et al., 2007).  
In contrast to the rigid methods of the deductive approach, the inductive approach 
tends to permit a flexible methodology to allow a feel for what is going on and to better 
understand the nature of the problem.  Research using this approach may use a small 
sample of subjects when compared to deductive approach studies since it is likely to 
be concerned with more specific and narrowed contexts.    
4.4 Research Strategies 
This section is concerned with the selection of research strategies employed to answer 
the research questions.  Choosing between various strategies was influenced by the 
research philosophy and approaches adopted in this study.  Some common research 
strategies considered were the following:  
4.4.1 Experiment  
This strategy is usually used to uncover causal links between the investigated 
variables and aspects in both exploratory and explanatory research to answer „how‟ 
and „why‟ questions.  This strategy typically involves the definition of a theoretical 
hypothesis and selection of samples of individuals from known populations.  However, 
the restrictive design requirements of experiments make this strategy more applicable 
to the natural sciences, particularly psychology, when compared to this study‟s social 
science orientation.  Therefore, this strategy was viewed as not being appropriate for 
pursuing answers to this study‟s research questions and objectives (Saunders et al., 
2007).   
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4.4.2 Survey 
This popular strategy is usually associated with the deductive approach and is most 
frequently used to answer „who‟, „what‟, „where‟, „how much‟ and „how many‟ 
questions.  It allows the collection of a large amount of data and tends to be used for 
exploratory and descriptive research (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  This strategy is 
appropriate for this study since, by focusing on a large sample of project managers 
(this study‟s social actors), this research seeks to explore the degree of importance 
they assigned to the identified project delay factors. This is followed by a description of 
the existing literature and a comparison of similarities and differences with the data 
collected for this study (Robson, 2002). 
4.4.3 Case Study 
This strategy is useful for gaining a rich understanding of a research context through 
generating answers to considerable numbers of „why‟, „what‟ and „how‟ questions.  It is 
defined as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources 
of evidence” (Robson, 2002).  This strategy is employed in this research through the 
use of multiple sources of data.  The use of different data collection techniques within 
one study ensures the analysis results in what is known as “triangulation”.  This study 
used documentary, semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaire analysis, as 
will be seen below, to look for and establish consistency in the results of the data 
analysis.   
4.4.4 Action research 
This strategy motivates the involvement of the practitioners in the study with the 
researchers who are concerned with the resolution of organisational issues.  It 
requires a collaborative working climate between both the practitioners and the 
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researchers for best outcomes (Saunders et al., 2007).  It normally goes through spiral 
cycles of iterative processes of diagnosing, planning, taking action and evaluating.  
Starting with a clear research purpose and specific context, the diagnosis process 
refers to fact finding followed by thorough analysis to enable action planning, which 
means a decision about the necessary actions.  The evaluation of these actions 
concludes the first cycle before the next cycle commences to diagnose, plan and take 
action for another research problem.  This strategy was viewed as being highly 
appropriate for this study; unfortunately, however, the reluctant nature of the research 
subjects prevented the use of this strategy.   
4.4.5 Grounded theory 
This strategy is particularly helpful for predicting and explaining behaviour by 
developing and building theories (Goulding, 2002).  It is useful for the exploration of a 
range of business and management issues.  In this study, grounded theory is 
considered one of the main research strategies since data were collected without the 
formation of an initial theoretical framework.  Theory is then developed from the 
collected data with the assistance of a series of observations and predictions that are 
tested in further investigations (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Charmaz, 2008).   
 
4.4.6 Ethnography 
This time consuming strategy is used to describe and explain the social world the 
research subjects inhabit in the way in which the world describe and explain it 
(Saunders et al., 2007).  It is time consuming because the researcher needs to live in 
the social world of the research subjects for as long as possible; in addition, the 
research process needs to respond to changes in a timely manner.  This research 
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strategy is not common in the business field but it might have been appropriate if the 
research objective was to gain insights about a specific context from the social actors‟ 
perspectives.        
4.4.7 Archival Research  
This strategy mainly allows the answering of research questions that focus on aspects 
that change over time.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand the past of these 
aspects through accessing historical records and documents as principal sources of 
data.  However, it is important to note that these historical data could be stored and 
recorded for purposes different from those of the research main objectives (Saunders 
et al., 2007).  For example, there were useful documents describing the historical 
development of the Saudi Arabian power supply industry.  However, since these 
documents were published by the government, the presented facts and data flourished 
the government‟s roles and achievements in the development of the industry.  
Therefore, by interviewing experts in the field, the researcher faced the challenge of 
understanding how the problematic issues developed in the industry, which is a 
different context from that found in the examined documents.     
 
4.5 Research design 
This section focuses on detailing the strategies adopted for addressing and answering 
the research question.  These strategies entailed methods of gathering data and the 
analysis procedures.  Therefore, a clear set of research objectives derived from the 
original research question is used as a guideline to justify all decisions relevant to 
methods answering the main enquiry.  The challenges surrounding projects in the 
investigated industry were never thoroughly addressed before this research project.  
Therefore, it was important to first explore what was happening in the industry to seek 
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the most valuable and relevant questions.  The purpose of the enquiry, for this reason, 
is progressive (Robson, 2002), where the focus is initially broad before it narrows as 
the research progresses (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
4.5.1   Methods of gathering data  
This study had a progressive nature where one step informed the next.  This entailed 
the employment of several methods for gathering data.  This inductive approach, 
where a theory is built after analysing the collected data (Saunders et al., 2007), 
adopted mixed and non-rigid methods, and these are listed in a chronological manner 
(see Table 4.1).  It was necessary to place brief presentations of data analysis results 
in the following sections to justify why each data-collection method was utilised.  The 
research setting and demographics of the social actors who participated in this 
research are demonstrated in the following sections below. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of data-collection phases 
 
Focus level 
and context notes
Explore research problem Broad Government
Review of relevant literature and significance Global oil market Local Authorities
Semi-structured interviews Formulate research questions Saudi Arabian domestic Electricity users 
 and objectives political and social forces Private investors
Semi-structured interviews Describe the most important PDFs* In-depth SEC
Review of relevant literature Form a conceptual model of PICs** Key stakeholders relationship Contractor
Questionnaire survey Consultants
Explain PDFs interrelationships In-depth SEC
Validate PICs conceptual model Key stakeholders relationship Contractor
Semi-structured interviews Consultants
Review of relevant literature Suggest possible reforms Broad Government
and applicable recommendations Saudi Arabian economy Electricity users
and relevant policies Private investors 
International oil 
market stability 
In-depth SEC
Project management practice
*Project Delay Factors
**Project Implementation Challenges
Key stakeholders
I
II
III
RationaleData collection-methodPhase
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4.5.1.1   Review of relevant literature I  
The initial step aimed to review how electricity has become an indispensable element 
in human society (to those who are blessed with access) and its role in global 
economic growth.  This was followed by an identification of the challenges facing the 
sufficient provision of electricity and its potential impact on both economic and 
environmental wellbeing.  Particular focus was confined to the challenges facing the 
Saudi Arabian electricity industry.  The review also included an understanding of the 
role of project management in various industries through the examination of text 
books, academic journals and conference papers.  A focused attention at this stage 
was given to comprehension of project success and its relevant factors.  This stage 
also included a review of sources relevant to the Saudi electricity supply industry, such 
as government publications and local and international media, in addition to the SEC 
annual reports.   
 
4.5.1.2   Semi-structured interviews Phase I 
In this concise stage phase of gathering primary data, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted to broadly explore the challenges surrounding the electricity supply industry 
in Saudi Arabia.  Formal letters were sent to four different authoritative figures in the 
industry in which the general purposes of the research were explained.  These letters 
presented the need to address the existing challenges and their role in impeding 
project progress.  These potential participants were close to the decision-makers in the 
industry and, therefore, their influential roles meant their beliefs and thoughts would 
shape valued research questions and objectives.  These targeted figures were: 
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1) Mahmoud Taibah (Mercy be upon him), engineer, Vice Chairman of the Shura 
Council (which was always described as an equivalent to Parliament but with no 
authority) and Chairman of the Saudi Electricity Company Board of Directors. 
2) Dr. Saleh Al-Awaji, Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs and Vice Chairman of 
the Saudi Electricity Company Board of Directors at the time (currently he is the 
Chairman of the Board). 
3) Dr. Bakr Khoshaim, ex-Managing Director of SCECO West, power consultant 
and member of the Shura Council. 
4) BASH, engineer and Executive Vice President of the Saudi Electricity Company 
(Western Operating Area).    
 
Engineer Taibah kindly accepted an invitation to be interviewed in order to address 
and tackle the challenges surrounding the industry but, at the time, he was sick and 
the interview did not take place. His eventual death was considered an unbearable 
loss for the industry.  The remaining three respondents took part in this phase.  All 
three interviews immediately started without any kick-off question, which indicated 
that the previously sent letter (Appendix C) had properly addressed the research 
scope.  This also indicated that the participants wanted to take the lead to uncover 
what they valued as urgent aspects. 
 
The first respondent was Dr. Saleh Al-Awaji, Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs, 
who mainly thought that the current challenges facing the electricity supply industry 
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at present resulted from relevant historical decisions and of adopted policies 
through time.  He was the one who most expressed a genuine concern about the 
supply projects not being able to cope with the increasing demand for electricity.  
The analysis of the results will explore this issue in detail in the following chapter.   
 
The second participant was Dr. Bakr Khoshaim, ex-Managing Director of the 
previously called Saudi Consolidated Electricity Company in the Western Region 
(SCECO West), who retired just before forming the SEC.  He also expressed 
concern about not applying necessary industrial and regulatory reforms in a timely 
manner, but he was highly reluctant to elaborate on these reforms.  Rather, he 
focused on project operational level problems, which was very useful as it gave a 
brief comparison between project management practice in the past and present 
and whether any change had taken place.  The interview contributed to an 
understanding of why projects lacked clarity of deliverables requirements, a 
challenge that had a negative influence on maintaining a healthy owner-contractor 
project relationship, especially during construction.  He also expressed concern, as 
did Dr. Al-Awaji, about projects not being able to cope with the increasing demand 
of electricity through timely project authorisation (project budget allocation) and 
delivery (project closure for those under construction). 
 
The third participant was BASH, engineer and Executive Vice President of the 
SEC.  The main outcome of the interview was his belief that the project industry is 
not privileged with [fully] successful projects.  He explicitly indicated that power 
projects were unsuccessful due to their not being operated on time and that project 
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delay was an accepted phenomenon in the industry.  The participant preferred not 
to record the interview.            
 
4.5.1.3   Semi-structured interviews Phase II 
The research had progressed by the end of „semi-structured interviews Phase I‟ to 
where the context was narrowed to identify relevant project problems rather than 
government policy challenges.   This phase focused on authorised projects (i.e. those 
where relevant budgets were allocated and SEC top management approved the 
tendering of these investigated projects).  The main objective of semi-structured 
interviews in this phase was to have a closer look at the daily operational life in the 
electricity supply industry projects and to identify problems that impeded their 
progress.  A letter was written to the SEC Executive Vice President (Western 
Operating Area) to request permission and access to collect necessary data from the 
targeted social actors in the Company.  However, the researcher was notified that the 
SEC CEO and President was the only figure who was authorised to provide such 
permission and approval.  The CEO and President (Engineer Ali Al-Barrak) did, 
thankfully, provide access permission in a letter within two days of the request and 
expressed his wish to successfully meet the research objectives (Appendix B).   
 
Copies were made of the approval letter along with consent forms that briefly 
described the research topic, objectives and confidentiality agreement (Appendix C).  
These were necessary, especially since the researcher sought to record the interviews 
for thorough analysis.  The main social actors targeted were project team members 
representing the owner (the Saudi Electricity Company - Western Operating Area) and 
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their relevant contractor and consultant project managers.  The researcher had 
available resources to best conduct the research in the Western Operating Area as he 
mainly lived there and had established a network of friends and colleagues working in 
the investigated industry.  Western Operating Area accounted for 30.9% of total 
electricity consumption in the Kingdom, which was the highest when compared to 
other operating areas (30.7% in the Eastern areas, 30.6% in the Central areas and 
only 7.7% in the Southern Operating Areas) (ECRA, 2008).   
 
The chosen social actors were believed to be involved in key phases of the project 
lifecycle, from inception to closure (Table 4.2 below).  Therefore, they were more 
aware of specific problems and could describe what was happening in the project 
area.  Semi-structured interviews contained a predetermined list of questions relevant 
to the participant‟s tasks and his department‟s roles in projects (Appendix F).  These 
questions were followed by open questions which sought to discover what the 
common and important problems were based on the participant‟s experience with 
projects.  Participants were given the opportunity to talk freely about events, 
behaviours and beliefs where their observations were prioritised.  Their thoughts were 
followed by other non-determined questions which were immediately formed based on 
their answers as a means to pursue more in-depth investigation.  The process of data 
gathering in this phase, however, was not a linear process as many challenges were 
faced that threatened the ability to achieve the research objectives.  These challenges 
were evidence of cultural barriers where participants in general were not willing to 
discuss project problems.    
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Table 4.2: Participant profiles for the recorded semi-structured interviews  
 
 
The questions considered for the semi-structured interviews were directly derived from 
the research questions and objectives.  The questions in Appendix D were classified 
into three groups.  The first group was described as “warm-up” questions which the 
researcher used to establish a relaxing questioning mode with the subjects and which 
allowed for an understanding of their personal interests in the ongoing projects.  These 
questions were mainly focussed on the job description and their department roles in 
the managed projects.  The second group was described as “exploration” questions.  
These questions were directly derived from the research objective seeking to identify 
the project delay factors in the investigated industry.  Questions such as “Can you give 
examples of reasons contributing to the delay of your projects?” and “What are the 
most common project delay factors you faced in your projects?” have served to 
Participant Organizational Project 
PG PT PD role role Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
1 AJ - X X Contractor PM + Sales - X -
2 ASAL X - - SEC PM - - X
3 ABAB X - - SEC PM - X X
4 Awaji X X X SEC/Gov Gov. X - X
5 BARAK - X - SEC PM - X X
6 GARA - X X Contractor PM - X X
7 HM - - X SEC PM - X X
8 Khushaim X X X SEC/Gov Executive X - -
9 ABADI - - X SEC PM - X X
10 NAF - X - SEC Planning - X -
11 ORFA - X - SEC PM - X X
12 SAF X - - SEC PM - - X
13 SAR - X - SEC Contract Mgr - X X
14 JAWI - X - SEC PM - X X
15 WALA - X - SEC PM - X X
Specifications
and Design
17 MAKI X - - SEC Planning - X -
18 MASHI - X X Contractor Planning - X -
Total 2 14 12
28
PG: Power Generation, PT: Power Transmission, PD: Power Distribution
PM: Project Manager
Gov.: Government
16 NABA X - - SEC - X -
Semi-structured interviewProject Industry
Total recorded interviews
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achieve the research objectives.  The third group of questions were “sharpening” 
questions.  Subjects were asked these questions in order to understand what actions 
and measures have been taken to mitigate the effect of the project delay factors they 
have identified by themselves.  The fourth group of questions were described as the 
“revising” questions.  These were asked to the subjects after revealing the 
questionnaire survey analysis results to confirm these results matched the subjects‟ 
opinions. Questions such as the following were used: Do you think that the tendering 
system adopted by the SEC should be ranked as the most important PDF? Why do 
you think so? 
As can be seen in Table 4.2, only two contractor project managers agreed to 
participate in the research and record the interview.  The researcher had a close 
working relationship with these two managers and trust was established.  The 
contractors generally felt that addressing project problems with the researcher could 
cause unnecessary problems with their client (SEC).  Consultants were even more 
difficult to approach and only a single conversation rather than an interview was 
conducted.  It was thought that uncertainty towards how the research findings would 
be presented was the main reason for their reluctant and minimal participation.  This 
was the fact even though the researcher had arranged approval letters from their 
seniors to take part in the interviews.   
Surprisingly, the researcher also faced great resistance from the Power Transmission 
Project Execution Department Manager, although the researcher had already secured 
written approval from the SEC President and CEO Engineer to access necessary 
information and data for the research.  Yet, the Department Manager resisted the 
collection of data through recording of the interviews.  The researcher placed high 
value on the recording of interviews where „rich‟ data could be captured.  It was 
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eventually discovered that the resistance was due to a recent act by one of his 
subordinates who, secretly, had passed a few documents to a local newspaper.  
Publication of the contents of these documents had had a negative impact on the 
Company‟s public image.  He conducted a series of investigations to identify the 
employee guilty of this misconduct.  The Manager, therefore, thought that the 
researcher, as an outsider, was capable of publishing the interviews, especially when 
the research was about identifying project-relevant problems and the fact that such 
problems were topical for the Saudi media.  Therefore, in this phase only twelve 
recorded interviews were conducted along with many unrecorded conversations.  
These assisted in the emergence of valuable themes.   
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the severe challenges faced by the 
researcher in trying to uncover the root causes of project problems in the investigated 
industry.    
 
4.5.1.4   Review of relevant literature II 
During analysis of the interviews, several themes immediately emerged, as did more 
questions which needed to be tackled.  Project delay was noticed to be not only a 
major problem in the industry but also an accepted phenomenon.  Participants also 
referred to many reasons and factors contributing to project delay, and these have 
formed the ground for further and more focused investigations.  Literature concerned 
with project delay factors in the utilities and construction industry was thoroughly 
examined.  Factors contributing to project delay revealed by the conducted interviews 
were very similar in nature to those documented in the literature, which also guided 
how project delay factors could be classified and examined for further analysis and 
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insights.  Table 4.3 presents several data gathering methodologies in various 
construction PDF studies.   
Table 4.3: Summary of PDF data collection methods in the literature 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.3 above, researchers have rarely relied solely on interviews 
to collect data, as was done in (Lim and Mohamed, 2000, Ogunlana and 
Promkuntong, 1996).  The number of identified project problems and relevant delay 
factors was vast, and this required the focus to be narrowed to the most important 
Table 5.2: Summary of PDF data collection methods in the literature
Study Country
Interviews Questionnaire Survey
Shehu and Akintoye
(2010)
AlKharashi and
Skitmore (2009)
Sweis et al.
(2008)
Alaghbari et al.
(2007)
Faridi and
El-Sayegh (2006)
Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2006)
Long et al.
(2004)
Odeh and Battaineh
(2002)
Lim and Mohamed
(2000)
Al-Khalil and
Al-Ghafly (1999)
Mezher and
Tawil (1998)
Chan and Hong
Kumarswamy (1997) Kong
Kaming et al. Indon-
(1997) nesia
Ogunlana et al.
(1996)
Assaf et al.
(1995)
x x
- x
x x
x -
x
- x
x -
x x
x x
Methods of Collecting PDF data
x x
- x
- x
Jordan
Malaysia
- x
Lebanon
- x
- x
-
Thailand
Saudi
UK
Saudi
Jordan
Malaysia
UAE
Saudi
Vietnam
Saudi
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ones.  Therefore, it was necessary to employ a questionnaire survey to capture the 
most important PDFs for further understanding and analysis.       
  
4.5.1.5   Questionnaire survey 
Having the data representing a broad sample of social actors will provide more 
authoritative conclusions.  Many PDFs were identified during the semi-structured 
interview analysis. Since PDFs were caused by various project stakeholders, and 
some were even caused by external forces, a questionnaire survey was employed to 
identify which of these were of greater concern.  Previous studies have considered 
different numbers of PDFs.  One study listed as many as 112 PDFs for further 
examination (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009), while another considered as little as 11 
PDFs (Kaming et al., 1997) (Table 4.4).  However, the content of all PDFs considered 
in previous studies were similar and repetitive and the differences were merely in how 
these were considered significant. 
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Table 4.4: Summary of PDF categories considered in previous research 
questionnaire surveys 
 
 
The researcher carefully reviewed the PDF contents in the literature and compared 
these with the ones identified in the semi-structured interview analysis.  The 
questionnaire survey used in (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b) was identified as the 
Study Country Number of 
PDFs considered O C E ME MP PM External
Shehu and Akintoye
(2010)
AlKharashi and
Skitmore (2009)
Sweis et al.
(2008)
Alaghbari et al.
(2007)
Faridi and
El-Sayegh (2006)
Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2006)
Long et al.
(2004)
Odeh and Battaineh
(2002)
Lim and Mohamed
(2000)
Al-Khalil and
Al-Ghafly (1999)
Mezher and
Tawil (1998)
Chan and Hong
Kumarswamy (1997) Kong
Kaming et al. Indon-
(1997) nesia
Ogunlana et al.
(1996)
Assaf et al.
(1995)
O: Project owner, C: Project Contractor, E: Consultant Engineer
ME: Materials and equipments, MP: Manpower, PM: Project Management 
UK
Saudi
Jordan
Malaysia
UAE
Saudi
Vietnam
Jordan
Malaysia
Saudi
Lebanon
Thailand
Saudi
Categories of PDF considered
28 - - - - x x -
112 x x x x x x x
40 x x x x x x x
31 x x x - - - x
43 x x x x x x x
73 x x x x x x x
62 x x x x x x x
28 x x x x x x x
28 x x - - - x -
60 x x x x x x x
64 x x x x x x x
83 x x x x x x x
11 - - - x x x x
26 x x x x x x x
56 x x x x x x x
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most suitable questionnaire design on which to base the questionnaire for this project.  
This was because most of the analysed PDFs in the interviews conducted for this 
study were found in their questionnaire survey.  Out of the 60 PDFs considered in (Al-
Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b), 56 of these were used for the purpose of this research 
questionnaire survey (Table 4.5).   
Table 4.4 also showed that PDFs were also classified into several groups in the 
literature.  These were either classified explicitly into the categories shown in Table 
4.4, as done by the following researchers: (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Sweis et 
al., 2008, Alaghbari et al., 2007, Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 
2006, Assaf et al., 1995, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, Field, 2009, Long et al., 
2004, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Ogunlana and 
Promkuntong, 1996), or based on the researcher‟s judgment since the examined 
PDFs were dealt with individually without any classification, as done by (Shehu and 
Akintoye, 2010, Lim and Mohamed, 2000, Kaming et al., 1997).  The categories shown 
in Table 4.4 were the ones commonly identified in the literature (except for the PM – 
Project Management category which was less common).  As the titles suggest, each 
project delay group is relevant to the given name.  For example, project owner PDFs 
are those caused by an individual or a department which represented the project 
owner, as will be elaborated later.  The same applies for project contractor and 
consultant PDF groups, where each of these PDFs indicates the root cause of delay is 
more relevant to either of these two.  To an extent, key project stakeholders (project 
owner, contractor and consultant) contribute to project delay through facing problems, 
for example, in procuring adequate human and non-human resources that are 
essential for project progress.  However, many of the identified PDFs are beyond any 
of the key project stakeholders‟ direct control.  Therefore, these PDFs are categorised 
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in either the Manpower PDF group or the Material and Equipment PDF group rather 
than grouping these under any of the key project stakeholder‟s groups.      
There were other categories of PDF groups in the literature such as contract-
related and contractual relationship-related PDF groups(Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 
2009, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Odeh and Battaineh, 
2002), financial-related PDF groups (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006), coordination-
related PDFs (Long et al., 2004) as well as other groups that were addressed and 
examined separately.  These were subjectively grouped under the „Project 
Management‟ PDF group in Table 4.4 since „Project Management‟ is a holistic 
discipline where it comprises all these PDF groups.   
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Table 4.5: List of the PDFs considered in the study 
Project Delay Factor description 
PDF 1 Shortage of materials required (e.g. cement, steel, bricks, etc.)
PDF 2 Delay in materials delivery
PDF 3 Changes in materials prices
PDF 4 Changes in materials specifications
PDF 5 Shortage of equipment required (transformers, drillers, switchgears, etc)
PDF 6 Failure of equipment
PDF 7 Inadequate equipment used for the works
PDF 8 Shortage of manpower
PDF 9 Low skill of manpower
PDF 10 Shortage of contractor‟s administrative personnel
PDF 11 Shortage of technical professionals in the contractor‟s organization 
PDF 12 Poor communication by the contractor with the parties involved in the project
PDF 13 Contractor‟s poor coordination with the parties involved in the project
PDF 14 Slow preparation of change orders requests by the contractor
PDF 15 Ineffective contractor head office involvement in the project
PDF 16 Delay in mobilization
PDF 17 Loose safety rules and regulations within the contractor‟s organization
PDF 18 Poor qualification of the contractor‟s technical staff assigned to the project
PDF 19 Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
PDF 20 Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
PDF 21 There are no effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
PDF 22 Delay of field survey by the contractor
PDF 23 Ineffective control of the project progress by the contractor
PDF 24 Inefficient quality control by the contractor
PDF 25 Delay in the preparation of contractor submissions
PDF 26 Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
PDF 27 Cash flow problems faced by the contractor
PDF 28 Problems between the contractor and his subcontractors with regards to payments
PDF 29 Delay to furnish and deliver the site to the contractor by the owner
PDF 30 Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
PDF 31 Suspension of work by the owner
PDF 32 Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
PDF 33 Slow decision making by the owner
PDF 34 Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
PDF 35 Delay in progress payments by the owner
PDF 36 Owner‟s poor communication with related government authorities
PDF 37 Owner‟s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
PDF 38 Owner‟s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
PDF 39 Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
PDF 40 Changes in the scope of project
PDF 41 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
PDF 42 Site conditions materially differing from contract documents
PDF 43 Original contract duration is too short
PDF 44 Ineffective delay penalty
PDF 45 Difficulties in obtaining work permits
PDF 46 Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
PDF 47 Changes in government regulations and laws
PDF 48 Severe weather conditions on the job site
PDF 49 Effects of subsurface conditions (type of soil, other utility lines)
PDF 50 Traffic control and restrictions on the job site (difficulties to reach the site)
PDF 51 Effects of social and cultural conditions (Locals behavior and/or manpower different backgrounds)
PDF 52 Work interference between various contractors
PDF 53 Poor qualification of consultant engineer‟s staff assigned to the project
PDF 54 Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
PDF 55 Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved
PDF 56 Poor coordination by the consultant engineer with other parties involved
PDF 57 Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
PDF 58 Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
Serial
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4.5.1.5.1   Questionnaire survey design 
Demographic questions 
The first part of the questionnaire (Appendix G) was concerned with the participants‟ 
demographic information.  Specifically, this information related to the following:  
1) The participant‟s job (i.e. project manager, department/division manager, 
project engineer, or consultant engineer).  This was used to describe the 
different tasks the research survey sample participants were responsible for 
and the level of involvement they had with day-to-day project details.  
2) The participant‟s organisational role (i.e. project owner, contractor or 
consultant).  This was used to examine whether the importance level of the 
surveyed PDFs was perceived differently or otherwise in order to establish 
further investigations and explanations for why these differences or similarities 
in perceptions were observed.   
3) The participant‟s project experience (in years if applicable). This was used to 
illustrate the collective time experience the sample‟s findings were based on.  
The longer the sample‟s experience the more reliability could be awarded to 
their judgment of the findings.     
4) The project type the participant has been involved in managing (i.e. power 
generation, transmission and/or distribution projects).  Each of these project 
types were also broken down into gas turbine plants, steam turbine plants, 
CCGT plants (combined cycle generating turbine), substations, overhead 
transmission lines, underground cables, load dispatch centres and SCADA 
systems (supervisory control and data acquisition), distribution networks, diesel 
plants and rural electrification projects.  These presented all project types and 
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divisions in the SEC.  The researcher hoped to identify whether differences 
occurred in project management practices in these projects.  Given the limited 
number of participants and coupled with the fact that each could have 
participated in more than one project type, differences tests were limited to the 
three main project activities of power generation, transmission and distribution 
projects.     
 
Most important PDFs 
The next section of the questionnaire was concerned with selecting the most important 
PDFs.  PDFs in the literature were given several descriptions (Table 4.6).  For 
example, (Sweis et al., 2008) and (Lim and Mohamed, 2000)identified PDFs in their 
studies and described these as “frequent”, while (Ogunlana and Promkuntong, 1996) 
described their addressed PDFs as “problems”.  Similarly, this study‟s participants 
described PDFs differently in the interviews that were conducted.  For example, some 
were described as significant problems, some were described as frequent and some 
were described as having great influence and impact.  All studies, including this one, 
strived to pinpoint which of the PDFs were sources of great concern to enable more 
practical remedies through consistent prioritisation of these PDFs.  Therefore, to be 
firmly consistent and for the purpose of this study, the research sought to identify the 
“most important” PDFs in the Saudi Arabian electricity project supply industry.  The 
most important PDFs are those likely to have a greater adverse impact on a project‟s 
progress in the investigated industry.  As can be seen in Table 4.6, most of the 
reviewed literature has described their identified PDFs as “important”.  Following (Al-
Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 1997) (Table 4.6), 
an important PDF was comprised of two characteristics: frequency of occurrence (i.e. 
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a measure of how often a PDF occurred in the investigated industry), and severity of 
impact (i.e. a measure of the extent to which a delay factor has actually contributed to 
a project).    
Table 4.6: Summary of project delay factor descriptions in the literature  
 
 
  
Table 5 5: Sum ary of project d lay factor des riptions 
 in the literature
Study Country
Frequent Severe Important
Shehu and Akintoye
(2010)
AlKharashi and
Skitmore (2009)
Sweis et al.
(2008)
Alaghbari et al.
(2007)
Faridi and
El-Sayegh (2006)
Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2006)
Long et al.
(2004)
Odeh and Battaineh
(2002)
Lim and Mohamed
(2000)
Al-Khalil and
Al-Ghafly (1999)
Mezher and
Tawil (1998)
Chan and Hong
Kumarswamy (1997) Kong
Kaming et al. Indon-
(1997) nesia
Ogunlana et al.
(1996)
Assaf et al.
(1995)
UK
Saudi
Jordan
Malaysia
UAE
Saudi
Vietnam
Jordan
Malaysia
Saudi
Lebanon
Thailand
Saudi
PDF Descriptions
Challenges
PDF with effect
x
x
x
x x x
x
and PDF with
influence
x
x
x x x
x
x
x x x
Problems
x
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Table 4.7: Frequency of occurrence and severity of impact weighting scales 
 
Pilot Study 
The questionnaire was prepared and written in two languages, Arabic and English.  
The English version was already established and was used as a reference to prepare 
the Arabic version.  To avoid any misinterpretation, the researcher outsourced a 
translation service in Saudi Arabia which was approved by the British Embassy.  The 
service provider was experienced in translating official documents from Arabic to 
English and vice versa.  Five copies (three in Arabic and two in English) were 
distributed to participants in order to examine the clarity and completeness of the 
designed questionnaire survey.  Two of the copies represented contractor project 
managers (English version) and three represented the SEC (Arabic version).  The 
researcher was able to personally observe the filling in of four of these questionnaires.  
Among the useful comments given was the necessity to include PDF 21 („No effective 
or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget‟), 
as was mentioned in section 4.5.1.5.  Moreover, the Project Execution Department 
Manager of SEC (Power Generation) suggested corrections for the demographic 
question part relevant to project types in all three sectors (i.e. Power Generation, 
Power Transmission and Power Distribution).  Project types represented activities that 
were the basis of forming several Divisions working under the main Project Execution 
Department.  The noticed mistakes were attributed to the lack of having a documented 
organisational chart in the SEC with sufficient details (i.e. the available documented 
information was limited with regard to an organisational chart in SEC where divisions 
under the Project Execution Department in each sector of Power Generation, Power 
Always Often Sometimes Never Extermely Severe Somewhat No effect
severe severe
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1
Severity scaleFrequency scale
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Transmission and Power Distribution were not documented).  The pilot study surveys 
were not included in the analysis and three out of the five participants completed the 
final version of the questionnaire.      
Final survey and collection 
After considering all useful comments, the questionnaire was ready for official 
distribution for data collection (Appendix G).  The pilot study was also used to 
calculate the average time required to complete the questionnaire, which was found to 
be 15 minutes.  According to the pilot study participants, this was realistic, especially 
because the questionnaire was easy to understand and avoided the use of open 
questions.   In general, participants were either cooperative in completing the survey 
or not at all.  Some returned incomplete questionnaires.  Incomplete questionnaires 
with up to five unanswered questions were returned to the participants to complete.  It 
would be illuminating to understand why questions were not completed, but the 
researcher avoided asking the participants as this might, without being intentional, 
have caused embarrassment to the participants.  The researcher had to write down 
the participant‟s name in the questionnaire cover page to return the ones with missing 
answers to the corresponding participant.  But, in most cases, the researcher reviewed 
the questionnaires a few steps away from the participant, when convenient, to 
immediately return it if there was a missing answer.  Incomplete questionnaires with 
more than five unanswered questions were disregarded.     
The above table also showed that PDFs were also classified into several groups in the 
literature.  These were either classified explicitly into the categories shown in Table 
4.4, as done by the following researchers: (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Sweis et 
al., 2008, Alaghbari et al., 2007, Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 
2006, Assaf et al., 1995, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, Field, 2009, Long et al., 
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2004, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Ogunlana and 
Promkuntong, 1996), or based on the researcher‟s judgment since the examined 
PDFs were dealt with individually without any classification, as done by (Shehu and 
Akintoye, 2010, Lim and Mohamed, 2000, Kaming et al., 1997).  The categories shown 
in Table 4.4 were the ones commonly identified in the literature (except for the PM – 
Project Management category which was less common).  As the titles suggest, each 
project delay group is relevant to the given name.  For example, project owner PDFs 
are those caused by an individual or a department which represented the project 
owner, as will be elaborated later.  The same applies for project contractor and 
consultant PDF groups, where each of these PDFs indicates the root cause of delay is 
more relevant to either of these two.  To an extent, key project stakeholders (project 
owner, contractor and consultant) contribute to project delay through facing problems, 
for example, in procuring adequate human and non-human resources that are 
essential for project progress.  However, many of the identified PDFs are beyond any 
of the key project stakeholders‟ direct control.  Therefore, these PDFs are categorised 
in either the Manpower PDF group or the Material and Equipment PDF group rather 
than grouping these under any of the key project stakeholder‟s groups.      
There were other categories of PDF groups in the literature such as contract-related 
and contractual relationship-related PDF groups(Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, 
Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002), 
financial-related PDF groups (Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006), coordination-related PDFs 
(Long et al., 2004) as well as other groups that were addressed and examined 
separately.  These were subjectively grouped under the „Project Management‟ PDF 
group in Table 4.4 since „Project Management‟ is a holistic discipline where it 
comprises all these PDF groups.  
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4.5.1.6   Semi-structured interviews III 
Quantitative analyses were conducted on the collected data to distinguish which of the 
surveyed PDFs were more important in the investigated industry.  As will be explained 
next in more detail, ranking analysis was employed to identify the most important 
PDFs.  After deciding which of these PDFs were “most important”, Factor Analysis 
(Field, 2009, Shehu and Akintoye, 2010) was employed using the most important 
PDFs as the input variables to produce a model of the Project Implementation 
Challenges (PICs) in the investigated industry, which was this study‟s aim. The semi- 
structured interviews, which took place before distribution of the questionnaire survey, 
were full of rich data but were not able to reveal which of the identified PDFs were of 
more importance.  Therefore, after applying the quantitative analyses, these previously 
conducted interviews were revisited with a more structured analysis plan (section 
4.5.2.1) to improve the PICs model construct derived by Factor Analysis.  Moreover, to 
gain more focused insights on the progressively constructed PIC model and its 
elements (the most important PDFs selected for this purpose), eleven additional semi-
structured interviews (phase III) were conducted (Table 4.3).  There were pre-
determined questions to achieve this objective (Appendix H).  There were also non-
determined questions which were immediately formed on the spot based on the 
participants‟ answers to gain even further in-depth insights.  Nine of the eleven 
participants who were interviewed in Phase III had been previously interviewed in 
either Phase I or Phase II (Table 4.3).  Time limitations forced the selection of 
participants who took part in the previous phases as they were more likely to accept 
recording of the interviews.  This presented a convenient opportunity to examine the 
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consistency of the participants‟ responses in terms of whether or not they presented 
new perceptions and insights when compared to the previous interviews.    
4.5.1.7   Review of relevant literature III 
Both the energy industry and the project management discipline are fast developing 
areas.  Therefore, it was necessary to keep the research as current as possible to 
maintain its value.  For example, in the Saudi Arabian domestic energy policy context, 
an important amendment was recently applied to the highly subsidised electricity tariff 
in May 2010.  This will have an impact on the relevant analysis conducted in the 
following chapter where the focus was on domestic energy policies and the impact of 
these on project management practice.    
 
4.5.2 Analysis procedures 
4.5.2.1 Interview analysis procedure 
All conducted interviews in which participants agreed to be recorded were saved on a 
digital voice recorder (OLYMPUS WS-450S).  The recorder was equipped with a USB 
memory stick and all saved interviews were uploaded to several PCs.  The advantage 
of this voice recorder was that the uploaded files could be operated in any normal 
media player application (such as real player, Windows media player etc.) rather than 
a specific player application.      
Since all interviews (except for one) were conducted in Arabic, these were transcribed 
in Arabic and then translated into English.  The translation was a challenging process, 
as „literal‟ translation would give the data irrelevant meaning.  The translated 
transcripts were hand written.  Most of the hand written transcripts were typed using 
143 
 
“Dragon Naturally Speaking 9.0” software.  The software enabled the researcher to 
dictate the transcripts into Word documents and saved time.   
NVivo 8 was used to analyze the interviews (QSR, 2009).  This „Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software Package‟ was equipped with administrative functions that arranged, 
ordered and sorted qualitative data in a manner that maximised the insights gained 
from the conducted interviews. 
Listening closely to respondents and thoroughly reading the transcripts was 
challenging.  The challenge was in condensing and conceptualising each of the 
respondent‟s statements to make their tacit understandings explicit (Charmaz, 2008).  
This comprised attending closely to the respondent‟s views through listening to their 
audio files and reading their transcripts repeatedly.  One of the useful features of the 
semi-structured interview was the ability to adapt the interview questions to fit the 
respondent‟s language and experience.  This minimised the making of false 
assumptions about their meanings.  Another challenge arose when noticing a series of 
contradictions in a participant‟s statements.  For example, statements relevant to 
criticising the top management of the SEC fluctuated from being supportive (i.e. the 
top management is helpful) to being ignorant (i.e. the top management is not fully 
aware of what is happening) in the very same interview for the very same context but 
in different intervals.  These needed careful and intuitive decisions to be made 
regarding what interpretations should be considered.  Cultural factors and the fact 
these interviews were being recorded were taken as reasons for such contradictions.  
For example, it would be understandable in Saudi Arabia, as in many organisational 
cultures, to applaud top management performance even if the participant personally 
believes otherwise.  For longer interviews, however, participants felt more relaxed as 
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formality transformed into a friendlier, non-rigid chat in the later parts of the interviews.  
These later parts of the interviews were then interpreted more easily than the very first 
parts.     
Data coding was an iterative process.  Charmaz (2008) states that “Coding is the 
process of defining what the data are about”.  Data were first coded line-by-line in 
order to gain distance from the participant‟s taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
material.  This helped seeing the familiar anew where analytic sense started to spark.  
Line-by-line coding also steered the research into unforeseen areas and new 
questions arose that needed to be addressed in the following interview phases.  This 
comprised giving the scripts (sentences and paragraphs) initial codes, and this was 
the starting point where the data were classified into themes.  The initial coding was 
completed through functions known in NVivo 8 as „free nodes‟.  A node is a collection 
of interrelated verbatim about a specific theme.  For example, for interview 
transcription such as the following the researcher decided to initially code the line as 
„Authority perception‟ and „Top Management‟: 
Researcher: Is there any lack of authority? 
ASAL (SEC PM): No, everyone here has the required authority.  In fact, 
sometimes when we escalate problems to the Top Management they ask us to 
handle the situation ourselves.  
 
When the researcher goes through other similar verbatim, whether by the same 
participant or by other participants, these lines (i.e. scripts with given codes of 
„Authority Perceptions‟ and „Top Management‟) can be collected in a manageable 
manner for more in-depth analysis in the later stages.  Therefore, “free nodes” in Nvivo 
8 were used as containers to catalogue relevant ideas behind the data and gather 
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verbatim under specific themes for easier access.  The researcher, therefore, was 
required to make careful decisions when describing these codes.  Selective examples 
of initial coding are provided in Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8: Examples of initial codes considered during interview analysis 
 
 
Charmaz (2008) notes that “line-by-line coding gives [the researcher] leads to pursue”.  
Therefore, these initial codes were revised several times to prepare for focused coding 
and to pursue more in-depth analysis.  It was decided that some initial codes had 
similar characteristics and, therefore, these codes were merged into more refined 
description and, as a consequence, the total number of „initial codes‟ was decreased.  
This partially described focused coding, which also comprised stepping up the 
analytical process where the materials were categorised more accurately.  Arranging 
the materials into categories utilised the „tree nodes‟ function in NVivo 8.  Tree nodes 
Participant Organiza- Project 
tional role role
1 AJ Contractor Project Manager Project lifecycle
and Project learning 
Sales Contractor's project planning 
control effectiveness
SEC behavior
2 Dr. Awaji SEC/Gov Gov. Research importance
Electricity supply industry development
Electricity users behavior
Project success and factors
3 SAR SEC Contract Mgr Tendering system
Project contract and contractual relationships
Financial delay factors
Project specifications and design
4 JAWI SEC Project Manager Project communication and coordination
Project scope changes
Delay responsibility perception
SEC planning processes
5 MAKI SEC Planning SEC policy and culture
SEC top management
Project partnership
Organizational and personal development
6 NABA SEC Specs & Design Materials and equipment
Project tendering and awarding process
Trust
Project contract and contractual relationships
 using 'Nodes Most Coding' tool in Nvivo 8
Examples of initial codes (free nodes) 
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were used to group the initial codes (free nodes) with mutual characteristics under a 
parent node (focused code).  This was an essential step since it moved the analysis 
forward to the study of the relationships between the categories which had emerged.  
This process also comprised writing memos where each category‟s properties were 
described and the conditions under which these categories arose were explained 
along with their consequences (Charmaz, 2008).   
 
Memo-writing, using NVivo 8, was about capturing and recording ideas about, for 
example, the emerged data categories.  The collective evolution of these ideas was 
developed in a narrative form, as will be seen in the analysis where categories (Project 
Implementation Challenges) were defined by giving each its analytical properties (the 
most important PDFs which were the basic elements that formed the final Project 
Implementation Challenges conceptual model).  Memos were also used as a means to 
provide sufficient empirical evidence to support the categories‟ definitions and analytic 
claims.  This systematic procedure enabled the researcher to demonstrate the 
connection between all relevant elements (data, codes, categories, memos etc.) by 
providing sufficient verbatim and, therefore, concepts were derived from these 
connections.  These concepts, collectively, developed into grounded theory with the 
collaboration of the quantitative analysis.        
 
4.5.2.2   Quantitative analysis procedures 
Interviews provided rich data where the interrelations between project problems were 
better understood.  However, these project problems were addressed based on 
participants‟ experience and project role, which varied from person to person.  For 
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example, an executive figure like Dr. Al-Awaji, Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs, 
was concerned with the policy-relevant aspect which had a serious effect on financing 
projects.  Table 5.8 presents his interview transcript‟s most recurring initial codes (i.e. 
the initial codes in which most of his verbatim materials belonged to).  Similarly, one of 
AJ‟s (Contractor PM) concerns was „SEC project behaviour‟ (Table 5.8), where he 
addressed both the lack of project ownership and the very slow decision-making 
mechanism adopted in his client‟s organisation (SEC).  Therefore, each of the 
interviewed participants was concerned with a different set of problems based on his 
project role and experience.  In addition to this, projects were widely known for their 
uniqueness, meaning each presented a different set of troubles and was impeded by 
various sets of PDFs.  These differences, however, collectively created unwanted 
project practice patterns and trends.  Uncovering these patterns and trends that 
represented the wider project industry practice has provided the study authoritative 
decisions in which relevant practice improvements were suggested and prioritised.  
This was achieved through collecting data using the designed questionnaire survey 
previously described in which it represented a broad population of project practitioners.     
 
The questionnaire survey was entirely restricted to those who were described as 
project managers representing the key stakeholders of the SEC, Contractors and 
Consultants.  Project managers (PMs) are believed to spend most of their times on the 
project phases, especially during construction where a contract has already been 
awarded to a contractor and all three key stakeholder PMs are keen to execute its 
terms promptly.  For project phases where PMs were not entirely involved (i.e. before 
the project award and construction phase), these PMs were still able to identify how 
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these phases‟ PDFs evolved (i.e. occurred in project planning or design phases, for 
example, rather than construction).  Restricting data-collection using the questionnaire 
survey to only PMs enabled a more focused understanding of how important PDFs 
were perceived from a definite distance.  Methods for quantitatively analysing PDFs in 
the construction industry are summarised in Table 5.9 below (next page). 
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Table 4.9: Quantitative analysis procedures in previous research 
 
 
4.5.2.2.1   Sampling issues 
The questionnaire survey was confined to project managers who worked in the Saudi 
electricity supply projects in the Western Operating Area.  The SEC was the owner of 
the entire national grid (power transmission network) and the only licensed entity that 
distributed and delivered electricity to end users (except for a few negligible cases in 
Test applied to determine 
level of agreement between
participant groups 
Shehu and Akintoye
(2010)
AlKharashi and
Skitmore (2009)
Sweis et al.
(2008)
Alaghbari et al.
(2007)
Faridi and
El-Sayegh (2006)
Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2006)
Long et al.
(2004)
Odeh and Battaineh
(2002)
Lim and Mohamed
(2000)
Al-Khalil and
Al-Ghafly (1999)
Mezher and
Tawil (1998)
Chan and
Kumarswamy (1997)
Kaming et al.
(1997)
Ogunlana et al.
(1996)
Assaf et al.
(1995)
Study
Ranking Factor Analysis
-
- -
- -
x
-
-
- x
- x
x
-
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
- -
-
-
x
x
x
-
- -
- -
-
x
PDF importance test method
x
-
-
x
x
x
x
x
-
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remote areas).  The SEC also had the major share of electricity generation, accounting 
for 81% of the Kingdom‟s total generation.  In terms of number of power generation 
plants, the SEC fully owns 50 plants out of the 79 operating plants in the Kingdom.  
This is besides the shares it has in some of the remaining 29 plants and those under 
construction.  Therefore, the SEC definitely has a majority of the project managers 
representing the „owner‟ population.  However, there was a difficulty in identifying how 
many project managers were working for the SEC.  The SEC PMs official title in the 
Company was not entirely rigid.  For example, the job title for the SEC PMs who 
worked, for example, in the Power Transmission sector was „power transmission 
engineer‟.  Power transmission engineers also included project planning and project 
specifications and design engineers who worked in different divisions with a different 
project role.  The following questions were asked to participant ORFA (SEC PM): 
Researcher: Can I know what your job title is and how long have you worked in 
this position?  
ORFA: Three years.  Power transmission engineer but to the contractors we are 
known as project managers or project engineers at least. 
 
This apparently suggested that the title “Project Manager” is, to some extent, not 
officially recognised.  In other words, project management was not embraced as a 
professional and determined career.  To illustrate, engineers who are supposedly 
„project managers‟ could have assignments that require them to be relocated into 
entirely different jobs.  For example, the Power Transmission Project Execution 
Manager (direct boss of project managers) had to re-assign project managers from 
managing projects into reviewing contractors‟ submitted invoices to progress their 
delayed payments.   
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The questionnaire survey also targeted main contractors who were awarded projects 
by the SEC.  There was a list of qualified contractors who were allowed to bid for the 
SEC projects.  In addition to this list being updated periodically, where existing 
contractors might be either disqualified for poor performance or new contractors might 
be recently qualified, the list was not accessible.  However, even if the researcher had 
had access to the list of qualified contractors, it would not have been possible to 
estimate how many project managers were working in each contractor‟s organisation.   
 
For the reasons mentioned above, convenience sampling using snowball strategy was 
adopted as it was the only viable option to gain as useful a sample of data as possible.  
As the name implied, sample elements were identified by convenience, whether 
through university colleagues, friends and through referral networks who were at the 
time working in the investigated industry.  Snowball strategy suggests that the sample 
size grows like a rolling snowball.  This sampling strategy is the preferred method to 
obtain responses when the random selection method has proven difficult (Sekaran, 
2000, cited in (Sambasivan and Soon, 2007).  Table 4.10 (next page) presents the 
number of respondents in the previous PDF studies and Table 4.11 (next page) 
demonstrates how many participants returned usable questionnaires for this research.   
153 
 
Table 4.10: Summary of number of participants recognised in the literature  
 
 
Table 4.11: Research participants’ roles  
  
 
Table 5.9: Summary of number of participants recognised in the literature
Study Country
Owner Contractor Consultant Total
Shehu and Akintoye
(2010)
AlKharashi and
Skitmore (2009)
Sweis et al.
(2008)
Alaghbari et al.
(2007)
Faridi and
El-Sayegh (2006)
Assaf and Al-Hejji 
(2006)
Long et al.
(2004)
Odeh and Battaineh
(2002)
Lim and Mohamed
(2000)
Al-Khalil and
Al-Ghafly (1999)
Mezher and
Tawil (1998)
Chan and Hong
Kumarswamy (1997) Kong
Kaming et al. Indon-
(1997) nesia
Ogunlana et al.
(1996)
Assaf et al.
(1995)
* As reported
Lebanon
Thailand
UK
Saudi
Jordan
Malaysia
UAE
Saudi
Number of Participants
na na na 119
Saudi
Vietnam
Jordan
Malaysia
Saudi
26 36 29 91
24% 40% 36% 86*
0 52 46 93
23% 37% 40% 78*
36 46 27 109
15 23 19 57
10 30 0 40
0 82 19 101
11 15 10 36
10 23 12 45
na na na 31
50 48 49 147
9 24 15 48
na na na 30
Project Organisation Total
Stakeholder Project Manager Dept/Div Manager
SEC 27 6 33
Contractor 42 9 51
Consultant 20 1 21
Total 89 16 105
Research Participant's Role
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4.5.2.2.2   Respondent Groups 
Research respondents were classified according to their organisational project roles 
and according to the project industry they worked in.  The project main stakeholders 
(the SEC as the project owner, project contractors and project consultants) had 
different priorities in the investigated industry.  However, all were keen to deliver 
projects on time.  It was argued that each of these organisations‟ representatives (PMs 
in this study‟s case) had different perceptions towards which of the surveyed PDFs 
were identified as more important.  These different perceptions were driven by their 
employer organisational differences and interests in these projects.  In other words, 
although each PM, representing either the SEC, contractors or consultants, had 
different project experience and hence different personal perceptions towards a PDF‟s 
importance level, the collective perceptions of these PMs could be greatly affected by 
their organisational project role.  Therefore, research respondents were divided into 
the SEC PMs, contractor PMs and consultant PMs in order to examine the emergent 
perceptions of each group and examine why these perceptions were different, if 
indeed they were, between these PM groups.   
 
The electricity supply industry is large in size and the SEC is conveniently divided into 
three main business activities: power generation, power transmission and power 
distribution businesses.  These activities, up to the time of writing, have been 
managed under a single entity by the same CEO and President, but each has been 
sufficiently large enough to be dealt with as a business sector with a distinguished 
Executive Vice President.  The investigated projects under each of these sectors (i.e. 
power generation, power transmission and power distribution sectors) contained, to 
some extent, different characteristics.  The size of power generation (PG) projects was 
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much larger (in terms of number of activities in a single project and hence the value of 
contract) than those in power transmission (PT) projects and in power distribution (PD) 
projects.  Although PT projects varied from very large projects, such as Extra High 
Voltage Transmission overhead line projects, to smaller substation construction 
projects, these were generally much larger than PD network projects.  The number of 
projects in each sector was also different.  There were more PT and PD projects than 
there were PG projects.  The research was concerned with providing a holistic view of 
the PDFs surrounding the Saudi electricity supply projects.  Given the varying 
characteristics of projects belonging to each business sector, they might have an 
effect on the importance level of each PDF.  Therefore, the study took this fact into 
account and divided PM respondents according to their project industrial experience 
into PG, PT and PD project industries, as will be seen in detail in Chapter 5.   
 
4.5.2.2.3   PDF Perspectives  
The surveyed PDFs will serve as ingredients to construct the conceptual model of the 
Project Implementation Challenges.  However, the 58 selected PDFs identified in the 
semi-structured interviews and in the literature were in simplified form and each was 
given a brief description in the questionnaire survey, as in Table 4.5.  In the 
questionnaire survey, a PDF broadly indicated a specific event, circumstance, force, or 
constraint that contributed to project delay.  In reality, however, each PDF was far 
more complex than the given description in the survey.  One source of complexity was 
when attempting to find the root causes and origins of these PDFs.  Another source of 
complexity is the interdependencies that exist between several PDFs, making it even 
more challenging to capture their dynamic interactions.     
 
156 
 
Finding the root causes which prompted these PDFs to develop is an essential step to 
take if practical and relevant recommendations are to be made.  Therefore, the next 
rational step was to comprehend the complexities of these PDFs and select which of 
these could compose a Project Implementation Challenge in a manageable manner.  
One method for understanding the nature of these PDFs was to combine these 
individual factors into a meaningful set of groups to pursue further analysis.   
 
It was observed that the 58 PDFs considered in this study had various attributes.  
Those with common attributes could form a group of factors with meaningful and 
common characteristics.  Grouping PDFs into distinguished sets adopted an intuitive 
and subjective approach in this study.  As was mentioned in section 4.5.1.5, the PDFs 
identified in the literature were either classified into one of the categories shown in 
Table 4.4 or based on the researcher‟s subjective judgment when the relevant studies 
did not group their identified PDFs.  For its subjective nature, there was an apparent 
absence of a systematic approach as to how the surveyed PDFs could be grouped.  
There are, however, common categories which can be recognised repeatedly in the 
literature and most of these were identified in Table 4.4.              
 
This research study adopted two different approaches in which the 58 surveyed PDFs 
were perceived and then grouped.  The motivation was to examine whether any 
insights could be gained from analysing the PDF groups from different perspectives.  
The first was the most common approach in the literature where the main theme of 
establishing the PDF groups was the organisation responsible for causing the relevant 
PDFs.  Groups under this approach to classification (C1) obviously included the 
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following: Owner (16 PDFs), Contractor (17 PDFs) and Consultant Engineer (7 PDFs) 
(see Table 4.12).  The remaining groups under this classification approach (C1) were 
of an even more subjective nature.  Human and non-human resources are the main 
elements of any project and the three key project stakeholders were to some extent 
responsible for procuring suitable and relevant resources.  However, understanding 
the climate surrounding the project environment in Saudi Arabia motivated the 
researcher to group PDFs relevant to human and non-human issues into Manpower (4 
PDFs) and Material and Equipment (7 PDFs) groups rather than grouping these 
directly under either of the three key project stakeholders.  Manpower PDFs were 
influenced more by cultural and political forces and these were beyond any of the key 
project stakeholder‟s control.  Material and Equipment PDFs were also, to a great 
extent, linked with external suppliers and manufacturers and with volatile supply-and-
demand conditions.  Therefore, these PDFs were addressed independently from the 
key project stakeholders.  This was similar for the External PDFs group (7 PDFs), 
where these, as the name suggests, considered forces contributing to project delay 
but were not directly relevant to any of the other previously referred groups.   
 
The other adopted approach to PDF grouping was less common in the literature.  In 
fact, the only reviewed study that considered grouping the surveyed PDFs but did not 
consider grouping these directly under an organisation‟s responsibility was (Mezher 
and Tawil, 1998).  Their 64 PDFs were grouped into the following 10 sets: Material, 
Manpower, Equipment, Financing, Changes, Government relations, Project 
Management, Site conditions, Environment and Contractual Relationships.  In this 
study, groups under the adopted approach of classification (C2), where PDFs were 
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classified regardless of which project key stakeholder organisation was responsible,  
included the following: Material and Equipment group (7 PDFs), Manpower group (6 
PDFs), Contract/Contractual relationship group (4 PDFs), Communication group (9 
PDFs), Planning group (5 PDFs), Execution group (9 PDFs), Monitoring and 
Controlling group (5 PDFs), Financial aspects group (4 PDFs), Stakeholder regulations 
group (5 PDFs) and External group (4 PDFs).  The Material and Equipment PDFs 
group used the same rationale in (C1).  The Manpower PDFs group, on the other 
hand, included 6 PDFs compared to 4 PDFs in (C1).  The difference was the inclusion 
of both PDF 18 („Poor qualification of the contractor‟s technical staff assigned to the 
project‟) and PDF 53 („Poor qualification of consultant engineer‟s staff assigned to the 
project‟) in this (C2) Manpower PDFs group.  In the previous PDF grouping approach - 
(C1) approach - where the main classification was based on the organisation‟s 
responsibility, these two PDFs (i.e. PDF 18 and PDF 53) clearly indicated direct flaws 
in the contractor‟s and consultant‟s hiring process criteria.  Therefore, these two PDFs 
(PDF 18 and PDF 53) belonged to Contractor and Consultant PDFs groups 
respectively in the (C1) classification approach, while these also belonged to 
Manpower PDFs group in the (C2) classification approach (Table 4.12).   
 
The Contract/Contractual relationship PDFs group included, as the name suggests, 
factors relevant to flaws or ineffective contractual terms such as PDF 42 („Site 
conditions materially differing from contract documents‟), PDF 43 („Original contract 
duration is too short‟) and PDF 44 („Ineffective delay penalty‟).  It also included the 
factor contributing to the uncooperative attitude of the owner (SEC) leading to a 
deteriorating contractual relationship with the contractor as in PDF 34 („Uncooperative 
159 
 
owner with the contractor complicating contract administration‟).   Similarly, the 
Communication PDFs group included relevant issues where poor communication 
contributed to the delay.  All PDFs under this group were self-explanatory except for 
PDF 52 („Work interference between various contractors‟).  It was intuitively decided to 
relate this PDF with the Communication PDFs group since this factor could have been 
avoided or at least minimised if there was effective communication between the 
relevant parties.  The example presented an example of the subjective nature of how 
these PDFs were grouped, whether using (C1) or (C2) approaches.                        
 
As was mentioned above, the intention was to examine whether any insights could be 
gained from analysing the PDF groups from different perspectives.  Doing this would 
allow project management practitioners and academics to further investigate methods 
to improve the current practice in a more authoritative style, assuming new insights 
were captured.   
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Table 4.12: List of PDFs grouped using two approaches of classifications (C1) and (C2)  
 
 
No. C1 C2 Cause of delay 
1 ME ME Shortage of materials required (e.g. cement, steel, bricks, etc.)
2 ME ME Delay in materials delivery
3 ME ME Changes in materials prices
4 ME ME Changes in materials specifications
5 ME ME Shortage of equipment required (transformers, dril lers, switchgears, etc)
6 ME ME Failure of equipment
7 ME ME Inadequate equipment used for the works
8 M M Shortage of manpower
9 M M Low skil l  of manpower
10 M M Shortage of contractor’s administrative personnel
11 M M Shortage of technical professionals in the contractor’s organization 
12 C Com Poor communication by the contractor with the parties involved in the project
13 C Com Contractor’s poor coordination with the parties involved in the project
14 C Exec Slow preparation of change orders requests by the contractor
15 C MC Ineffective contractor head office involvement in the project
16 C Exec Delay in mobilization
17 C SR Loose safety rules and regulations within the contractor’s organization
18 C M Poor qualification of the contractor’s technical staff assigned to the project
19 C P Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
20 C P Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
21 C P There are no effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
22 C P Delay of field survey by the contractor
23 C MC Ineffective control of the project progress by the contractor
24 C MC Inefficient quality control by the contractor
25 C Exec Delay in the preparation of contractor submissions
26 C Fin Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
27 C Fin Cash flow problems faced by the contractor
28 C Fin Problems between the contractor and his subcontractors with regards to payments
29 O Exec Delay to furnish and deliver the site to the contractor by the owner
30 O Exec Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
31 O SR Suspension of work by the owner
32 O Exec Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
33 O Exec Slow decision making by the owner
34 O CCR Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
35 O Fin Delay in progress payments by the owner
36 O Com Owner’s poor communication with related government authorities
37 O Com Owner’s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
38 O Com Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
39 O Com Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
40 O P Changes in the scope of project
41 E MC Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
42 O CCR Site conditions materially differing from contract documents
43 O CCR Original contract duration is too short
44 O CCR Ineffective delay penalty
45 Ex SR Difficulties in obtaining work permits
46 O SR Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
47 Ex SR Changes in government regulations and laws
48 Ex Ex Severe weather conditions on the job site
49 Ex Ex Effects of subsurface conditions (type of soil, other util ity l ines)
50 Ex Ex Traffic control and restrictions on the job site (difficulties to reach the site)
51 Ex Ex Effects of social and cultural conditions (Locals behavior and/or manpower different backgrounds)
52 Ex Com Work interference between various contractors
53 E M Poor qualification of consultant engineer’s staff assigned to the project
54 E Exec Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
55 E Com Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved
56 E Com Poor coordination by the consultant engineer with other parties involved
57 E MC Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
58 E Exec Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
C:Contractor   CCR:Contract/Contractual relationship   Com: Communication Processes  E:Consultant Engineer   Ex: External      
Exec: Excecution Processes    Fin: Financial aspects     M:Manpower      MC: Monitoring & Controlling Processes
ME:Material and equipment    O: Owner        P: Planning Processes    
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4.5.2.2.4   PDF ranking 
PDF ranking was the most common method used where more important PDFs were 
distinguished from those less important (Table 5.9).  As was previously mentioned, 
following (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 
1997), a PDF was comprised of the following two distinguishing characteristics: 
frequency of occurrence (i.e. how often a PDF occurred in the investigated project 
industry) and severity of impact (i.e. how much delay a factor has actually contributed 
to a project).  The importance of each PDF was, therefore, measured in terms of the 
following:  
a) Frequency index 
Each participant was asked to rate each PDF according to its frequency of occurrence, 
which was classified from „always‟ to „never‟ on a four point scale (Table 4.13).  The 
collected data were then analysed to calculate the frequency index of each PDF 
according to the participant group (i.e. SEC, Contractor, Consultant, PG, PT and PD 
project managers).  The formula used was that used by (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 
1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 1997): 
Frequency Index (F.I.) (%) = ∑ a (n/N) * 100/A  
where (a) was the constant expressing the weighting given to each response (range 
from 1 to 4), n was the frequency of the response, N was the total number of 
responses, and A was the highest weight (i.e. 4 in this case).  To illustrate, contractor 
project managers assigned the following weights to the PDF „changes in materials 
specifications‟: Always (2 participants); Often (7 participants); Sometimes (37 
participants); and Never (5 participants).  Therefore, the F.I. of the PDF according to 
the total of 51 contractor project managers was calculated as follows: 
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 F.I. (%) = {[(4*2) + (3*7) + (2*37) + (1*5)] / 51} * 100/4 = 52.94     
 
The same procedure was applied to the remaining PDFs where frequency indexes 
were derived according to SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  The frequency index 
for a PDF group was also determined as the average of the frequency indexes of all 
the PDFs in the group (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, 
Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).  For example, the frequency 
indexes of Consultant-related delay causes according to the SEC project managers 
were 60.61, 56.82, 56.06, 48.48, 56.06, 53.03 and 58.33 with respect to Table 4.12‟s 
PDFs (i.e. PDF number 41 and 53-58 respectively).  Therefore, the frequency index of 
consultant-related factors according to the SEC project managers is the average of all 
frequency indexes in the group, which was 55.63.  All the above were applied in the 
same manner to PMs according to their project industry type (i.e. PG, PT and PD 
project industries).  
Table 4.13: Frequency of occurrence weighting scale (1-4)  
 
b) Severity of impact index 
Severity of impact (how much delay a PDF has actually contributed to a project) was 
classified from „very severe‟ to „no effect‟ on a four point scale (Table 4.14).  The 
collected data were then analysed to calculate the severity of impact index of each 
PDF according to the relevant participant group (i.e. SEC, Contractor, Consultant, PG, 
Always Often Sometimes Never
4 3 2 1
Frequency scale
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PT and PD project managers).  The formula used was that used by (Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 1997): 
Severity of impact Index (S.I.) (%) = ∑ a (n/N) * 100/A  
where (a) was the constant expressing the weighting given to each response (range 
from 1 to 4), n was the frequency of the response, N was the total number of 
responses, and A was the highest weight (i.e. 4 in this case).  To illustrate, contractor 
project managers assigned the following weights to the PDF „changes in materials 
specifications‟: very severe (6 participants); severe (11 participants); somewhat severe 
(29 participants); and no effect (5 participants).  Therefore, the S.I. of the delay factor 
according to the total of 51 contractor project managers was calculated as follows: 
 S.I. (%) = { [ (4*6) + (3*11) + (2*29) + (1*5) ] / 51 } * 100/4 = 58.82      
 
The same procedure was applied to the remaining delay factors where severity of 
impact indexes were derived according to the SEC, contractor or consultant project 
managers.  The severity of impact index for a PDF group was also determined as the 
average of the severity indexes of all the causes in the group (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 
1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).  
For example, the severities of impact indexes of consultant-related factors according 
to the SEC project managers were 72.73, 62.12, 66.67, 65.91, 67.42, 65.15 and 65.91 
with respect to Table 4.12 PDFs (i.e. delay causes number 41 and 53-58 respectively).  
Therefore, the severity of impact index of consultant-related factors according to the 
SEC project managers was the average of all severity indices in the group, which was 
65.56. 
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Table 4.14: Severity of impact weighting scale (1-4)  
 
 
 
c) Importance index – two-dimensional measure 
The importance index of each individual PDF and the PDF groups were then 
calculated as a function of both frequency of occurrence and severity of impact indices 
as follows (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Kaming et al., 
1997): 
(I.I.) = [F.I. * S.I.] / 100 
 
For example, the PDF „changes in materials specifications‟ had the values of F.I. = 
52.94 and S.I. = 58.82 assigned by Contractor PMs.  Therefore, the importance index 
value of this PDF was as follows: 
I.I. = 52.94 * 58.82 / 100 = 31.14 
 
Similarly, the importance indexes of the PDF groups were obtained.  For example, the 
importance index of Consultant-related PDFs group according to the SEC project 
managers was as follows: 
I.I. = 55.63 * 65.56 = 37.02 
Extermely Severe Somewhat No effect
severe severe
4 3 2 1
Severity scale
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All delay causes were then ranked according to their importance indexes values as 
were perceived by the SEC, contractor, consultant, PG, PT and PD project managers.  
All PDF groups were also ranked as they were perceived by these project managers 
whether these PDFs were grouped according to classification approach (C1) or 
classification approach (C2). 
 
Important PDFs  
Although all PDFs must be taken seriously, each has presented a different level of 
importance.  The argument of this research project was based on the different 
perceptions towards the identified PDFs collected and described in the interviews with 
various stakeholders (executives, project managers, project planning engineers etc.).  
Ranking their importance levels, however, was restricted to project managers, whether 
representing the SEC, contractors or consultants.  These managers were believed to 
engage with everyday project details during the construction phase and, therefore, 
were able to pinpoint, based on their experience, which were of greater concern.  They 
were also able to link problems faced during the construction phase to earlier phases 
where improper practices or actions took place (such as in the planning phase or 
during tendering etc.).  To address these important problems which were described as 
PDFs, it was sensible to start with those valued as more important.  For the purpose of 
this study, a PDF was considered highly important if its importance index value lay 
within the highest 10 values to a respondent group (SEC, contractor, consultant, PG, 
PT or PD project managers) (Alaghbari et al., 2007, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Faridi 
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and El-Sayegh, 2006).  These highly important PDFs were collectively described as 
the most important PDFs in the Saudi electricity project supply industry.   
4.5.2.2.5   Agreement level test – Spearman rank correlation 
Although the questionnaire survey was confined to project managers‟ responses, it 
was expected, as was previously explained, that it would show that there were 
different perceptions towards which constituted more important PDFs as a result of 
what these project managers (PMs) have experienced.  Determining the agreement 
levels between the PMs‟ responses sought to explore what their varied perceptions 
were, if they existed, meant.  Spearman rank correlation coefficient was used to show 
the degree of agreement between the SEC, contractor and consultant project 
mangers‟ in terms of their perceptions towards the importance of the delay causes 
(Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Long et al., 2004, Mezher and 
Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).  Spearman rank correlation is a non-
parametric test where the data are not necessarily assumed to be normally distributed.  
This robust test was also applied to determine the agreement level between PG, PT 
and PD project managers towards the PDFs importance.  The correlation coefficient 
values vary between +1, which implies perfect agreement, to -1 which means perfect 
disagreement.  Values near zero indicate little or no correlation (Dancey and Reidy, 
2004).  
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Table 4.15: Illustration of the strength of positive and negative correlation 
coefficients (Dancey and Reidy, 2004)  
 
 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs is calculated by the following formula 
(Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Long et al., 2004, Mezher and 
Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002, Dancey and Reidy, 2004):   
rs = 1 – [(6 ∑ d²) / (n³ - n)]  
where d was the difference between importance indexes assigned for each PDF, and 
n was the number of pairs of rank.  The following example is based on the assumption 
there was a need to compare the ranking of three different items according to three 
different participants A, B and C.  Participant A has assigned the values 60, 50 and 40 
for items X, Y and Z respectively.  Participant B has assigned the values 70, 65 and 45 
for items X, Y and Z respectively.  Finally, participant C has assigned the values 40, 50 
and 70 for the items X, Y and Z respectively (Table 4.16). 
Perfect +1 -1
+0.9 -0.9
Strong +0.8 -0.8
+0.7 -0.7
+0.6 -0.6
Moderate +0.5 -0.5
+0.4 -0.4
+0.3 -0.3
Weak +0.2 -0.2
+0.1 -0.1
Zero 0
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Table 4.16: Ranking of items X, Y and Z as perceived by participants A, B and C 
 
 
The correlation coefficient between participant A and B was expected to be 1 because 
both have equally ranked the three items, although with different values, indicating 
perfect agreement. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between participant A 
and C is -1 since the ranking of participant A to items 1, 2 and 3 was exactly the 
opposite of participant C.  Therefore, it was expected to have a perfect disagreement 
coefficient value between the two.  The provided example shows how Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient can indicate the degree of agreement between two participants 
towards their ranking for only three items.  However, in this study the level of 
agreement between project owners and contractors, project owners and consultants, 
and project contractors and consultants towards the ranking of all 58 delay factors was 
examined.  Moreover, the agreement level between the respondent sets (SEC, 
contractor and consultant project managers) towards the ranking of the delay causes 
groups was also examined.  This procedure was repeated to determine the agreement 
between PG, PT and PD project managers.  Finally, Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient will be used to determine the level of agreement between participants 
towards the ranking of PDFs within the corresponding group, as will be seen in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
  
Item Participant A Participant B Participant C
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
X 60 1 70 1 40 3
Y 50 2 65 2 50 2
Z 40 3 45 3 70 1
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4.5.2.2.6   Factor analysis 
Applying the previously explained importance ranking analysis on the 58 PDFs 
determined which of these were more important and which were less important. For 
the purpose of this research, highly ranked PDFs were those among the highest 10 
PDF importance index values according to the SEC, Contractor, Consultant, Power 
Generation, Power Transmission or Power Distribution project managers and, 
therefore, these were considered the most important PDFs.  The total number of these 
PDFs was 28, as will be detailed in the next chapter. 
Having identified the most important PDFs, the use of ranking analyses along with 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients to understand the agreement levels between 
the research respondents were not suitable in comprehending how these highly 
ranked PDFs were arranged.  Factor Analysis was used for this purpose since it was 
able to structure these PDFs in a meaningful set of components. 
Factor analysis has been widely used to explore the structure of the correlations 
among a large number of variables.  These correlations could be arranged in a 
manner that identified common dimensions where the list of the examined variables 
would be reduced and grouped into more manageable numbers (Shehu and Akintoye, 
2010, Field, 2009, Long et al., 2004, Kaming et al., 1997).  These 28 most important 
PDFs required further investigation when the PDF ranking analysis was not entirely 
conclusive when the research sought more in-depth insights.  Therefore, factor 
analysis was applied to explore whether these PDFs could be statistically structured 
into meaningful components where a thematic construct could be achieved.  An 
important assumption made before applying factor analysis was that the sample was 
homogeneous.  Therefore, the sample was collectively treated as „Power Industry 
Project Managers in Saudi Arabia‟ without any regard or assertion as to which 
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organisations or project industry types participants have worked for.  The PDF ranking 
analysis has evidently presented, as will be shown later, that the research participants‟ 
opinions were fairly non-biased.  There was general agreement towards which 
organisation has generally accounted for most of the highly ranked PDFs.  Therefore, 
the research sample of the 105 participants could legitimately be described as „Power 
Industry Project Managers in Saudi Arabia‟. 
Factor analysis examined variance variability in the importance level of each PDF as 
measured by the participants.  This indicates that rather than giving an importance 
value of a PDF based on the collective view of a participants group, as was conducted 
previously in the ranking analysis, each PDF would now have an importance weight 
according to each participant in this procedure.  Therefore, since the importance level 
of each PDF was made of two main characteristics (i.e. frequency of occurrence level 
and severity of impact level), the value of a PDF‟s importance was the result of 
multiplying the frequency of this PDF‟s frequency of occurrence value by its severity of 
impact value.  Each characteristic was dealt with as a one-dimensional measure.  The 
multiplication of the two was equal to the value that exhibited the area between these 
two.  Assuming the frequency of occurrence level of a PDF represented the x-axis and 
the severity of impact level of the same PDF represented the y-axis, then the value of 
this particular PDF‟s importance was the area between these two coordinate values.  
For example, if participant A has rated a PDF to occur (sometimes) but with (severe) 
impact on projects, then the importance level according to this participant will be the 
multiplication of the relevant scales of both (sometimes = 2) and (severe = 3) which is 
6.    
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Sampling adequacy test        
Factor analysis was run using SPSS v.15.  Detailed steps for running the analysis 
using SPSS are described in (Field, 2009).  There are few methods to assess whether 
the data were suitable to conduct Factor Analysis.  One of the most common methods 
is Bartlett‟s test of sphericity and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) of sampling adequacy 
test (Kaming et al., 1997, Long et al., 2004, Shehu and Akintoye, 2010).  Bartlett‟s test 
of sphericity should be p < 0.05 to be significant.  KMO index ranges from 0 to 1 with 
values closer to 1 are more favourable, indicating data are suitable for Factor Analysis, 
while values below 0.5 indicate otherwise (Field, 2009).   
 
Factors (components) extract 
Factor analysis is an exploratory tool that was used in this study to make various 
decisions regarding the number of factors (or components from hereon) to retain.  
Eigenvalues and Scree Plot analyses were conducted to extract and determine the set 
of components that would form the 28 top-ranked PDFs.  The maximum possible 
number of components was the same as the number of PDF variables, which was 28.  
In other words, each PDF could form its component.  However, it is desirable to retain 
components that consisted of all 28 top-ranked PDFs with the least possible number of 
components to address these PDFs in a more manageable manner.  This was the role 
of both the Kaiser‟s test and the Scree Plot test to determine those principal 
components.  The eigenvalue rule of Kaiser‟s test is a straightforward process where 
the number of components necessary to represent the examined data was selected for 
those with eigenvalues of 1.0 or more.  Using Kaiser‟s criterion of eigenvalues of 1.0 or 
more often resulted in extracting and retaining many components (Field, 2009, Shehu 
and Akintoye, 2010).  Therefore, it was important to also test the Scree Plot which 
172 
 
involved plotting each of the component‟s eigenvalue to detect the point of inflexion.  
The point of inflexion was where the slope of the line changed dramatically to become 
horizontal.  The components on the left of the inflexion point were with highest 
eigenvalues that should be retained (without including the inflexion point itself) (Field, 
2009).  The Scree Plot in this study has presented two inflexion points (at components 
3 and 5 as in Figure 4.2, below).   
Figure 4.2: Scree Plot used to determine the number of principal components 
(Project Implementation Challenges)  
 
Factor loadings     
The PDFs in which were the elements that made up the retained principal components 
contributed differently to each.  The gauge of which each of the PDFs described its 
contribution to its principal components were called „loading factors‟.  The higher the 
loading factor value of a PDF the more it contributed to the principal component.  The 
loading factor represented the statistical significance of a correlation coefficient 
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between the PDF (as an element) and its corresponding principal component (the 
Project Implementation Challenge).  The minimum significance level of a factor loading 
depends on the sample size.  The minimum loading value where it was considered 
significant for this study‟s sample size (105 participants) was 0.512 (Field, 2009).  
4.6   Concluding Remarks 
This chapter considered how to answer the research questions and achieve the 
research objectives stated in Chapters 1 and 2.  Since the research aimed to frame a 
holistic view of the pressing Project Implementation Challenges in a specific industry 
where various forces played different roles to the contribution of their significance, 
social constructionism philosophy was adopted to pursue a comprehensive 
investigation.  This philosophy has advocated the necessity to understand the 
differences between various relevant social actors to explore the subjective meanings 
of their perceptions, actions and collective behaviours.   
 
The research study collected data in three phases.  The first phase was meant to 
initially explore what was happening in the industry since this had never thoroughly 
been addressed.  Reviews of relevant literature coupled with the conducting of semi-
structured interviews progressively refined the research questions and objectives and 
provided a better understanding of the research significance.  This was followed by 
phase II which sought to identify various PDFs by conducting semi-structured 
interviews with various practitioners in the industry.  These interviews were followed by 
a questionnaire survey to identify which of these PDFs were most important according 
to the investigated industry project managers.  Ranking analysis was employed for this 
purpose and 28 of the 58 surveyed were considered „most important‟.  Factor Analysis 
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was employed to structure these 28 most important PDFs to construct the Project 
Implementation Challenges (PICs) conceptual model. To provide a deeper insight, the 
final phase of data-collection (Phase III) sought to explain the most important PDFs 
interrelationships and validate the PICs conceptual model through conducting semi-
structured interviews and a review of relevant literature.  The investigation of these 
PDFs will lead to pragmatic recommendations that, if enacted, would minimise their 
significance. 
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5. Project Delay Factors Numerical Analysis 
 
5.1   Introduction 
The conducted interviews revealed various concerns from all respondents who 
participated in the research.  The key concern was the problem of project delay, a 
phenomenon hampering the sufficient supply of electricity capacities in a timely 
manner.  The questionnaire survey captured varying perceptions as to what 
constituted important Project Delay Factors (PDFs).  This is because participants had 
different personal experiences, represented different organisations (i.e. the SEC, 
Contractor or Consultant) and were, in addition, involved in various project types 
(Power Generation, Power Transmission and Power Distribution).  This chapter will 
present the numerical analysis results applied to the 58 surveyed PDFs which were 
explained in Chapter 4.   
 
5.2   Questionnaire Participant Profile 
A total of 105 participants completed the questionnaire survey (Table 5.1).  The 
respondents included 33 participants from the SEC (31.4% of the sample), 51 
participants from Contractor organisations (48.6% of the sample) and 21 participants 
from the outsourced Consultant engineers (20% of the sample).  There is an apparent 
lack of clarity in the SEC as to what the responsibilities of a „Project Manager‟ (PM) are 
or what the required skills set is that each PM needs to have.  However, for the 
purposes of this research project, a PM is defined as a person who represents any of 
the three key stakeholder organisations (i.e. the SEC, Contractor or Consultant) and is 
considered the first line of contact for the project.  The PM is continuously involved 
with the day-to-day project details and writes project progress reports for his superiors 
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or clients on a periodic basis.  There were 16 participants (15.2% of the sample) who 
were either Project Department or Project Division Managers (Table 5.1).  In addition 
to being fully responsible for managing projects, these managers observed and viewed 
other PMs as subordinates.  However, they can still be described as PMs.  The 
remaining 86 participants (84.8% of the sample) were PMs without responsibilities 
relevant to superiors who direct other PMs and were fully engaged in managing 
projects.   
      Table 5.1: Research participant’s roles in the key project stakeholders   
 
 
The sample consisted of six Project Department/Division Managers from the SEC 
(18.2% of the SEC sample and 6% of the total sample) (Table 5.1), nine from 
Contractors (17.6% of the Contractor sample and 9% of the total sample) and only one 
from Consultant engineers (5% of the Consultant engineer participants‟ sample).     
 
Table 5.2 shows that the average years of experience of the SEC Project Department 
or Division managers (20.3 years) was greater than those of Contractors (17.3 years) 
and Consultants (15 years).  On the other hand, Table 5.3 shows that Consultant PMs, 
who were neither Project Department nor Project Division Managers,  had more years 
of experience (14.3 years average) when compared to Contractor PMs (10.6 years) 
and the SEC PMs (9.5 years).  The overall average years of experience of PMs with 
Project Organisation Total
Stakeholder Project Manager Dept/Div Manager
SEC 27 6 33
Contractor 42 9 51
Consultant 20 1 21
Total 89 16 105
Research Participant's Role
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Departmental or Divisional responsibilities and who directed other PMs was 17.5 years 
(Table 5.2).  The overall average years of experience of PMs who were not 
Department or Division Managers was 11.6 years.  The work experience context 
specifically referred to „Project Management‟ expertise rather than general work 
experience in the industry since a participant could, for example, have worked as a 
sales engineer.  This shows that although the sample was not large enough to infer 
any generalisation to the population, the collective „Project Management‟ experience of 
the sample was substantial enough to draw sound conclusions on what was 
happening in the industry.  From here on, all 105 participants will be referred to as 
Project Managers (PMs). 
Table 5.2: Project Department/Division managers’ years of ‘Project    
Management’ experience     
 
 
Table 5.3: Project Managers’ years of ‘Project Management’ experience  
 
Table 5.4 presents in detail the project types the participants experienced.  These 
participants had experience of working on Power Generation (PG), Power 
Transmission (PT) and/or Power Distribution (PD) projects.  The PG, PT and PD 
columns in Table 7.4 show the number of PMs who had work experience in any of the 
Project Organisation Number of Project Minimum years  Maximum years  Average years  
Stakeholder Dept/Div Mgr of experience of experience of experience
SEC 6 10 31 20.3
Contractor 9 5 30 17.3
Consultant 1 15 15 15
Average NA 10 25.3 17.5
Project Organisation Number of Project Minimum years  Maximum years  Average years  
Stakeholder Managers of experience of experience of experience
SEC 27 1* 25 9.6
Contractor 42 1* 27 10.9
Consultant 20 2** 33 14.3
Average NA 1.3 28.3 11.6
* Only one project manager
** Only two project managers
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three project types.  The PG+PT+PD column in the same table shows the number of 
PMs who had work experience in all three project types.  This shows that only 2 PMs 
representing the SEC and 5 PMs from Contractors had experience of working in all 
three project types of PG, PT and PD. The PG+PT column shows the number of PMs 
who had work experience on both PG and PT projects.  It shows that 3 PMs from the 
SEC, 2 PMs from Contractors and only 1 Consultant PM had work experience on both 
PG and PT projects.  Similarly, the PG+PD column shows that only two PMs from the 
SEC had experience of work on both PG and PD projects.  The PT+PD column shows 
that 25 PMs from the sample had worked on both PT and PD projects.  Most of these 
PMs (19 PMs) represented Contractors.  This can be reasoned by the fact that some 
Contractors (such as Siemens and ABB) have business departments that deal with 
both PT and PD projects simultaneously.  The last three columns show the number of 
PMs who had work experience in either of the three project types.  These individuals 
had not had any experience other than the project type indicated in the column.  17 
PMs had only worked on PG projects, 38 PMs had only worked on PT projects and 10 
PMs had only worked on PD projects.      
 
Table 5.4: Participants’ experience according to PG, PT and PD project types 
     
 
Table 5.5 is a condensed version of Table 5.4 and shows how many PMs in each 
respondent group (SEC, Contractor and Consultant) had worked on multiple project 
Project Number of PMs PG PT PD PG+PT+PD PG+PT PG+PD PT+PD
Organisation PG PT PD
SEC 33 12 20 13 2 3 2 3 5 12 6
Contractor 51 9 45 28 5 2 Nil 19 2 19 4
Consultant 21 11 11 3 Nil 1 Nil 3 10 7 Nil
Total 105 32 76 44 7 6 2 25 17 38 10
ONLY
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types and on single project types.  It shows that 65 out of the 105 PMs had worked on 
either PG, PT or PD projects, while the remaining 40 PMs had worked on two or more 
project types.   
Table 5.5: Comparison between Project Managers who have worked in single or 
multiple industries 
 
 
 
5.3 Highly Important PDFs – Organisational Perception 
Table 5.6 below presents all 58 importance indexes according to PM groups that were 
divided into the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  These PDFs were then ranked 
according to their importance index values, as described in Chapter 4.  The higher the 
index value was the more important the PDF was according to the participant group.  
For the purpose of this research, highly ranked PDFs are those among the highest 10 
PDF importance index values according to the ranking participant group.  These highly 
ranked PDFs are distinguished by rectangular borders, as can be seen in Table 5.6.  
Collectively, these amounted to 22 PDFs, where each of these PDFs was at least 
among the 10 most important PDFs according to any of the three groups (Table 5.7).  
For example, PDF 29 was ranked 10th according to Consultant PMs and, therefore, 
was considered highly important, although it was ranked 16th and 28th by the SEC and 
Contractor PMs, respectively.   
Project Organisation Number of participants worked Number of participants worked Total
Stakeholder in multiple project types  in single project type
SEC 10 23 33
Contractor 26 25 51
Consultant 4 17 21
Total 40 65 105
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Table 5.6: Ranking of all 58 PDFs as perceived by the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.6: Ranking of all 58 PDFs as perceived by PMs - organisational roles
Owner Contractor Consultant
PDF Serial no. Imp. Index Ranking Imp. Index Ranking Imp. Index Ranking
PDF 1 34.85 39 33.04 39 42.01 41
PDF 2 47.81 2 48.48 4 40.53 44
PDF 3 29.75 56 42.48 11 38.32 49
PDF 4 35.80 32,33 31.14 47 51.01 16-19
PDF 5 35.19 37,38 30.77 49 46.83 29
PDF 6 34.47 42 32.86 40 47.66 24-26
PDF 7 32.87 48 23.52 58 51.87 12,13
PDF 8 41.71 10 48.62 3 36.11 56
PDF 9 41.78 9 35.15 31 42.09 39,40
PDF 10 31.40 55 26.11 55 39.80 46-48
PDF 11 36.64 30 33.56 35 36.85 52-54
PDF 12 31.82 54 33.05 38 43.65 34
PDF 13 34.35 44 35.22 30 36.85 52-54
PDF 14 33.98 46,47 34.89 32 39.80 46-48
PDF 15 35.19 37,38 29.66 51 47.68 23
PDF 16 39.49 17 36.83 24 36.05 57
PDF 17 37.65 23,24 34.10 34 39.81 45
PDF 18 34.40 43 31.00 48 34.72 58
PDF 19 36.78 29 42.45 12 46.85 28
PDF 20 41.84 8 42.37 13 36.85 52-54
PDF 21 44.35 4 41.96 14 38.31 50
PDF 22 40.81 11 28.71 53 51.01 16-19
PDF 23 42.42 7 32.60 42 39.80 46-48
PDF 24 40.35 12 31.66 45 37.56 51
PDF 25 37.65 23,24 34.14 33 40.56 42,43
PDF 26 34.22 45 31.37 46 55.36 5-7
PDF 27 34.55 40,41 35.30 29 46.77 30
PDF 28 37.37 25-27 37.84 19 43.62 35,36
PDF 29 39.60 16 35.36 28 53.60 10
PDF 30 33.98 46,47 42.50 10 51.70 15
PDF 31 36.93 28 29.83 50 53.57 11
PDF 32 39.77 13-15 41.52 15 47.62 27
PDF 33 39.77 13-15 44.76 6 43.62 35,36
PDF 34 35.76 34 37.58 21 45.99 32
PDF 35 37.37 25-27 43.42 8 51.87 12,13
PDF 36 39.77 13-15 36.24 27 58.93 2
PDF 37 32.68 49 33.22 37 57.14 4
PDF 38 42.83 6 37.53 22 64.57 1
PDF 39 38.38 20 33.37 36 58.04 3
PDF 40 38.22 21 36.67 25 51.01 16-19
PDF 41 44.08 5 42.95 9 42.09 39,40
PDF 42 36.16 31 37.80 20 50.14 21
PDF 43 32.58 50 40.48 17 42.86 38
PDF 44 35.30 35,36 32.80 41 47.66 24-26
PDF 45 44.39 3 45.33 5 55.36 5-7
PDF 46 54.38 1 50.43 1 50.17 20
PDF 47 27.69 57 24.36 57 47.66 24-26
PDF 48 32.28 51 27.49 54 44.44 33
PDF 49 39.06 18 32.27 43 43.57 37
PDF 50 35.80 32,33 29.05 52 46.03 31
PDF 51 26.14 58 24.71 56 40.56 42,43
PDF 52 31.85 53 32.04 44 36.14 55
PDF 53 35.30 35,36 40.77 16 51.84 14
PDF 54 37.37 25-27 49.38 2 48.50 22
PDF 55 31.96 52 36.86 23 54.46 8,9
PDF 56 37.80 22 36.58 26 51.01 16-19
PDF 57 34.55 40,41 38.56 18 55.36 5-7
PDF 58 38.45 19 44.64 7 54.46 8,9
181 
 
Table 5.7: List of the highly ranked PDFs according to the SEC, Contractor and 
Consultants PMs 
 
 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that the only PDF that was considered highly important by all 
three respondent groups (the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs) was PDF 45 
(‘Difficulties in obtaining work permits’ from the relevant authorities).  Moreover, 
both the SEC and Contractor PMs ranked PDF 46 (‘Owner’s tendering system 
requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’) 1st while it was ranked 20th by 
Consultant PMs.  The SEC and Contractor PMs both ranked three more PDFs as 
highly important while these were not ranked as highly important by Consultant PMs 
Table 7.7: List of the highly important PDFs according to the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs 
  Owner Contractor Consultant
PDF I.I Ranking PDF I.I Ranking PDF I.I Ranking
46 54.38 1 46 50.43 1 38 64.57 1
2 47.81 2 54 49.38 2 36 58.93 2
45 44.39 3 8 48.62 3 39 58.04 3
21 44.35 4 2 48.48 4 37 57.14 4
41 44.08 5 45 45.33 5 26 55.36 5-7
38 42.83 6 33 44.76 6 57 55.36 5-7
23 42.42 7 58 44.64 7 45 55.36 5-7
20 41.84 8 35 43.42 8 55 54.46 8,9
9 41.78 9 41 42.95 9 58 54.46 8,9
8 41.71 10 30 42.50 10 29 53.60 10
No. C1 C2 Cause of delay 
2 ME ME Delay in materials delivery
8 M M Shortage of manpower
9 M M Low skill of manpower
20 C P Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
21 C P No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
23 C MC Ineffective control of the project's progress by the contractor
26 C Fin Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
29 O Exec Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
30 O Exec Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
33 O Exec Slow decision making by the owner
35 O Fin Delay in progress payments by the owner
36 O Com Owner’s poor communication with related government authorities
37 O Com Owner’s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
38 O Com Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
39 O Com Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
41 E MC Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
45 Ex SR Difficulties in obtaining work permits
46 O SR Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
54 E Exec Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
55 E Com Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved
57 E MC Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
58 E Exec Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
I.I : Importance index
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(Table 5.7).  These were PDF 2 (‘Delay in materials delivery’), PDF 41 
(‘Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings’) 
and PDF 8 (‘Shortage of manpower’).  The only PDF that was ranked as being highly 
important by both the SEC and Consultant PMs, but not by the Contractor PMs, was 
PDF 38 (‘Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during 
planning’).  Similarly, the only PDF that was ranked as being highly important by both 
Contractor and Consultant PMs, but not by the SEC PMs, was PDF 58 (‘Slow 
response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries’).        
 
Agreement Level Test 
Spearman Rank Correlation was applied to test for agreement between PMs towards 
the PDFs importance rankings, as described in section 4.5.2.2.5.  First, the test was 
applied to examine the agreement levels between the SEC, Contractor and Consultant 
PMs towards all 58 PDF importance rankings.  In this study, a PDF is assumed to only 
have the effect of delaying a project.  In other words, a PDF is never assumed to 
cause a project to progress forward.  Therefore, the significance level of Spearman 
Rank Correlation is tested for 1-tailed rather than 2-tailed.  Table 4.15 can be used as 
guidance to describe the agreement level strength that can range from perfect 
agreement between two groups to perfect disagreement.       
Table 5.8 shows that the SEC and Contractor PMs presented moderate agreement (rs 
= 0.48) towards the importance rankings of all 58 PDFs, which was significant at the 
0.01 level.  The remaining two coefficients relevant to agreement levels between SEC-
Consultant and Contractor-Consultant PMs were inconclusive since both were not 
significant.  Similarly, Table 5.9 shows that when focusing on the 22 highly  important 
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PDFs ranked by the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs, Spearman Rank 
Correlation results were inconclusive since these were not significant.  Having non-
significant coefficients was expected since the sample size in this case (i.e. 22 PDFs) 
was smaller than the previous larger size of 58 PDFs, which had already produced 
non-significant coefficients.    
Table 5.8: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to all 58 PDFs between the SEC, 
Contractor and Consultant PMs               
 
 
 
Table 5.9: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to the 22 highly ranked important 
PDFs according to the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs  
 
Ta l  7.9: Spearman Rank Correlati n applied  
to all 58 PDFs between SEC, Contractor
 and Consultant PMs
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 
SEC-Contractors
SEC-Consultants
Contractors-Consultants
** Significant at 0.01 level (1-tailed)
Project Managers Groups
.48**
0.02
0.06
Table 7.10: Spearman Rank Correlation applied
to the 22 highly important PDFs accordi g to the SEC, 
Contractor and Consultant PMs 
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 
SEC-contractors
SEC-consultants
Contractors-consultants
Project Managers Groups
-.42
-.38
+.39
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5.4   Highly Important PDFs – Experienced Project Type Perception 
The electricity supply industry can be divided into the three areas of Power Generation 
(PG), Power Transmission (PT) and Power Distribution (PD).  The investigated 
projects under each of these areas did indeed have, to some extent, different 
characteristics, as described in section 4.5.2.2.2.  The research was concerned with 
providing a holistic view of the PDFs surrounding the Saudi Arabian electricity supply 
industry.  The differing characteristics of projects belonging to each industry area 
might have had an effect on the importance ranking of each PDF.  Therefore, the 
study took this fact into account and divided PM respondents according to their project 
industrial experience into PG, PT and PD PMs.  Table 5.10 (next page) presents all 
PDFs that were considered highly important by any of the three PG, PT or PD project 
manager groups.  A highly important PDF is one which has any of the highest 10 PDF 
importance index values according to the ranking respondent group.  Collectively, 
these amounted to 21 PDFs, where each is at least among the 10 most important 
PDFs according to any of the three groups.    
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Table 5.10: List of the highly ranked PDFs according to PG, PT and PD PMs 
      
 
As can be seen in Table 5.10, the only PDF that was highly ranked by all three PG, PT 
and PD PMs was PDF 54 (‘Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the 
engineer’).  Moreover, both PT and PD PMs ranked six PDFs „highly important‟ while 
these were not ranked as highly by PG PMs (Table 5.11).  These PDFs were PDF 46 
(‘Owner’s tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’), PDF 2 
(‘Delay in materials delivery’), PDF 45 (‘Difficulties in obtaining works permits’), 
PDF 8 (‘Shortage of manpower’), PDF 41 (‘Ambiguities, mistakes and 
inconsistencies in specifications and drawings’) and PDF 20 (‘Ineffective 
Power Generation Power Transmission Power Distribution
PDF I.I Ranking PDF I.I Ranking PDF I.I Ranking
35 54.99 1 46 51.14 1 46 48.35 1
58 54.49 2 2 47.65 2 35 46.69 2
29 54.38 3 45 47.16 3 2 46.52 3
33 53.88 4 54 47.11 4 8 43.99 4,5
32 53.32 5 8 45.11 5 45 43.99 4,5
57 52.21 6 41 44.67 6 41 43.46 6
30 50.45 7,8 58 44.64 7 54 43.32 7
34 50.45 7,8 38 44.14 8 20 42.64 8
31 48.88 9,10 21 44.00 9 40 42.15 9
54 48.88 9,10 19 43.43 10,11 3 41.94 10
20 43.43 10,11
No. C1 C2 Cause of delay 
2 ME ME Delay in materials delivery
3 ME ME Changes in materials prices
8 M M Shortage of manpower
19 C P Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
20 C P Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
21 C P No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
29 O Exec Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
30 O Exec Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
31 O SR Suspension of work by the owner
32 O Exec Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
33 O Exec Slow decision making by the owner
34 O CCR Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
35 O Fin Delay in progress payments by the owner
38 O Com Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
40 O P Changes in the scope of project
41 E MC Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
45 Ex SR Difficulties in obtaining work permits
46 O SR Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
54 E Exec Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
57 E MC Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
58 E Exec Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
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planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor’).  For example, PDF 46 
(‘Owner’s tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’) was 
ranked highest by both PT and PD PMs, while it was ranked 28th by PG PMs.   
   Table 5.11: PDFs considered highly important by PT and PD PMs  
 
 
PDF 35 (‘Delay in progress payments by the owner’) was ranked „highly important‟ 
by both PG and PD PMs (ranked 1st and 2nd respectively), while this PDF was not 
ranked as being highly important by PT PMs (ranked 17th) (Table 5.12).  PG and PT 
PMs both ranked PDF 58 (‘Slow response from the consultant engineer to 
contractor inquiries’) „highly important‟ (ranked 2nd and 7th respectively), while this 
PDF was not ranked as highly by PD PMs (ranked 13th) (Table 5.13).  
Table 5.12: PDFs considered highly important by PG and PD PMs  
 
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
46 28 1 1
2 18 2 3
45 26 3 4
8 32 5 4
41 21 6 6
20 56 10 8
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
46 O SR Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
2 ME ME Delay in materials delivery
45 Ex SR Difficulties in obtaining work permits
8 M M Shortage of manpower
41 E MC Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
20 C P Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
PDF
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
35 1 17 2
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
35 O Fin Delay in progress payments by the owner
PDF
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 Table 5.13: PDFs considered highly important by PG and PT PMs 
     
 
In terms of PDFs that were ranked „highly important‟ only by PG PMs, these were 
caused by the SEC (except for PDF 57) (Table 5.14).  These were PDF 29 (‘Delay in 
furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner’) (ranked 3rd), 
PDF 33 (‘Slow decision making by the owner’) (ranked 4th), PDF 32 (‘Delay 
issuance of change orders by the owner’) (ranked 5th), PDF 57 (‘Delay in 
performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer’) (ranked 6th), PDF 
30 (‘Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner’) (ranked 7th), PDF 
34 (‘Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract 
administration’) (ranked 7th), and PDF 31 (‘Suspension of work by the owner’).    
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
58 2 7 13
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
58 E Exec Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
PDF
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Table 5.14: PDFs considered highly important by only PG PMs  
 
 
PT PMs ranked only three PDFs „highly important‟, while neither PG nor PD PMs 
ranked these as important (Table 5.15).  These PDFs were PDF 38 (‘Owner’s failure 
to coordinate with government authorities during planning’) (ranked 8th), PDF 21 
(‘No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind 
schedule or over budget’) (ranked 9th) and PDF 19 (‘Improper technical study by 
the contractor during the bidding stage’) (ranked 10th).  PD PMs ranked two PDFs 
as „highly important‟ while neither PG nor PT PMs ranked these as important (Table 
5.16).  These were PDF 40 (‘Changes in the project scope’) and PDF 3 (‘Changes 
in materials prices’).  These PDFs were ranked 9th and 10th, respectively.  
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
29 3 32 36
33 4 12 15
32 5 14 13
57 6 17 43
30 7 16 11
34 7 30 19
31 9 46 42
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
29 O Exec Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
33 O Exec Slow decision making by the owner
32 O Exec Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
57 E MC Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
30 O Exec Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
34 O CCR Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
31 O SR Suspension of work by the owner
PDF
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Table 5.15: PDFs considered highly important only by PT PMs  
 
 
Table 5.16: PDFs considered highly important only by PD PMs  
 
 
Agreement Level Test 
Spearman Rank Correlation was applied to test for agreement between PMs towards 
the PDFs importance rankings, as described in section 4.5.2.2.5.  Table 5.17 shows 
the agreement levels between PG, PT and PD PMs towards the importance rankings 
of all 58 PDFs.  PT and PD PMs present a strong agreement level (rs = 0.75), which is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The strong agreement was expected since 25 PMs had 
worked on both PT and PD projects and, therefore, the PDF rankings of these PMs 
were considered the same.  In other words, 25 responses out of both the 76 PT PM 
responses and out of the 44 PD PM responses were exactly the same (see column 
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
38 15 8 27
21 45 9 12
19 35 10 20
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
38 O Com Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
21 C P No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
19 C P Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
PDF
PG PT PD
ranking ranking ranking
40 21 24 9
3 43 39 10
PDF C1 C2 Cause of delay 
40 O P Changes in the scope of project
3 ME ME Changes in materials prices
PDF
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PT, PD and (PT+PD) in Table 5.4).  A response from a PM who experienced more 
than one project type will be replicated in all experienced project types.      
Table 5.17: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to all 58 PDFs between Power 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution PMs  
 
 
There is a moderate agreement between PG and PT PMs (rs = 0.43) towards the 
rankings of all 58 PDFs.  There is also a weak agreement between PG and PD PMs 
(rs = 0.33).  The agreement levels towards the rankings of the 21 „highly important‟ 
PDFs are different than those presented in Table 5.17.  Table 5.18 shows that the only 
significant Rank Correlation Coefficient is the one between PT and PD PMs.  This 
moderate agreement (rs = 0.6) is significant at the 0.01 level.  The agreement levels 
between PG-PT and PG-PD PMs were inconclusive since the coefficient results were 
not significant.       
Table 5.18: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to the 21 highly important PDFs 
according Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution PMs 
 
 
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 
PG-PT
PG-PD
PT-PD
** Significant at 0.01 level (1-tailed)
Project Manager Groups
.43**
.33**
.75**
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 
PG-PT
PG-PD
PT-PD
** Significant at 0.01 level (1-tailed)
-.32
.6**
-.30
Project Manager Groups
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5.5   PDF Groups Ranking  
It was stated in Chapter 4 that the PDFs considered in this study had various 
attributes. Those with common attributes could form a group of factors with meaningful 
and common characteristics.  This study adopted two grouping approaches where the 
58 PDFs were divided into several groups (see section 4.5.2.2.3 for more details).  
Evaluating the importance of these groups of PDFs provided some useful insights and 
conclusions.   
5.5.1 Important PDF Groups – C1 grouping approach   
The first PDF grouping approach (C1) classified PDFs based on the organisations 
responsible for causing these relevant PDFs.  The importance ranking analysis was 
applied to these groups according to the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  The 
most appealing results were those ranked by both the SEC and Consultant PMs 
(Table 5.19 and Table 5.21).  The SEC PMs admitted that SEC-related PDFs were the 
most important ones in the investigated industry.  However, it must be noted that the 
importance index was a function of both characteristics of ‘Frequency of occurrence’ 
and ‘Degree of severity.  The SEC PMs ranked their PDFs (i.e. caused by the SEC) 
highest in terms of ‘Degree of severity’ (Table 5.19).  In terms of ‘Frequency of 
occurrence’, on the other hand, the SEC-related PDF group was ranked 4th.  The 
combination of these two resulted in having an importance index with the highest 
value.  This observation proved that both the ‘Frequency of occurrence’ and 
‘Degree of severity’ features of a PDF were rated differently by the SEC PMs when 
other PM respondent groups tended to rate these features similarly.  
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Table 5.19: Ranking of PDF groups by the SEC PMs – C1 grouping approach   
 
 
Table 5.20: Ranking of PDF groups by the Contractor PMs – C1 grouping 
approach  
 
 
Table 5.21: Ranking of PDF groups by Consultant PMs – C1 grouping approach   
 
 
The other interesting result was that the Consultant PMs ranked the SEC-related 
PDFs highest followed by Consultant-related PDFs (Table 5.21).  Contractor PMs, on 
the other hand, ranked Consultant-related highest followed by SEC-related PDFs 
(Table 5.20).  Spearman Rank Correlation was then applied to examine the agreement 
levels between the three respondent PMs towards the importance rankings of these 
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment factors 56.39 5 63.31 5 35.70 5
Manpower-related factors 58.14 1 64.96 4 37.77 2
Contractor-related factors 57.26 3 65.42 3 37.46 3
SEC-related factors 57.15 4 67.05 1 38.32 1
Consultant-related factors 55.63 6 66.56 2 37.02 4
External factors 57.36 2 58.66 6 33.65 6
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment factors 53.36 6 64.29 5 34.30 5
Manpower-related factors 54.66 3 64.83 3 35.43 3
Contractor-related factors 54.09 4 64.39 4 34.83 4
SEC-related factors 57.75 2 66.27 2 38.27 2
Consultant-related factors 60.36 1 68.42 1 41.30 1
External factors 53.57 5 56.86 6 30.46 6
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment factors 65.99 4 68.71 3 45.34 3
Manpower-related factors 62.80 6 61.61 6 38.69 6
Contractor-related factors 64.92 5 64.57 5 41.91 5
SEC-related factors 71.06 1 72.69 1 51.65 1
Consultant-related factors 70.92 2 71.94 2 51.02 2
External factors 67.86 3 65.82 4 44.66 4
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PDF groups (Table 5.22).  All coefficients were not significant and, therefore, the 
results were inconclusive.   
Table 5.22: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to all 6 PDF groups – C1 
grouping approach 
   
 
A respondent group (i.e. the SEC, Contractor or Consultant PMs) may have agreed 
with another group to highly rank a PDF group.  However, these two groups may have 
disagreed as to which PDFs belonging to this particular group were more or less 
important.  Spearman Rank Correlation was applied for this purpose (see Table 5.23).  
Focusing on the significant coefficients, Table 5.23 shows that although both 
Contractor and Consultant PMs ranked the SEC-related PDFs as „highly important‟ 
(ranked 2nd and 1st respectively), Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient reveals 
moderate disagreement between the PMs as to which of the PDFs within the SEC-
related PDFs group were more important (rs = - 0.47).  
Moreover, both Contractor and Consultant PMs ranked Material and Equipment PDFs 
5th and 3rd respectively, while they strongly disagreed as to which of the PDFs within 
the Material and Equipment PDF group were more important (rs = -0.86).  Both the 
SEC and Contractor PMs ranked the External PDFs group lowest (both ranked it 6th) 
and strongly agreed as to which of the PDFs within the External PDFs group were 
more important (rs = 0.86).    
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient
SEC-contractors
SEC-consultants
Contractors-consultants
Project Manager Groups
0.66
0.09
0.43
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Table 5.23: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to PDFs groups – C1 grouping 
approach 
 
 
5.5.2 Important PDF Groups – C2 grouping approach  
PDFs were also classified regardless of which project key stakeholder organisation 
was responsible (C2).  Importance ranking analysis was also applied to (C2) PDF 
groups according to the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs (Tables 5.24 – 5.26 
respectively).    
Table 5.24: Ranking of PDF groups by the SEC PMs – C2 grouping approach  
 
 
 
Sources (groups) of delay      SEC-Contractor     SEC-Consultant Contractor-Consultant
Material & Equipment factors 0.18 0.00 -0.86**
Manpower-related factors 0.80 0.20 -0.40
Contractor-related factors 0.18 -0.24 -0.27
SEC-related factors 0.28 0.28 (-0.47)
Consultant-related factors 0.43 -0.63 -0.32
External factors 0.86** 0.46 0.07
Note: **Significant at 0.01 level
( ) Significant at 0.05 level
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment 56.39 7 63.31 9 35.82 7
Manpower 57.58 5 63.89 8 36.87 5
Communication processes 54.97 8 64.90 6 35.72 8
Planning processes 59.09 2 68.33 1 40.40 1
Executuion processes 58.00 3 65.15 5 37.78 4
Monitoring & Controlling processes 57.42 6 68.33 2 39.32 3
Financial delay causes 53.98 10 66.48 3 35.88 6
Stakeholder regulations 60.76 1 65.91 4 40.21 2
Contract/contractual relationship 54.17 9 64.58 7 34.95 9
External delay causes 57.58 4 57.58 10 33.32 10
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Table 5.25: Ranking of PDF groups by the SEC PMs – C2 grouping approach  
 
 
Table 5.26: Ranking of PDF groups by the SEC PMs – C2 grouping approach  
  
 
The first observation was that the Planning processes-related PDFs group was ranked 
highest by the SEC PMs, 2nd by Contractor PMs and 7th by Consultant PMs.  The 
second observation was that the Execution processes-related PDFs group was ranked 
4th by the SEC PMs, 1st by Contractor PMs and 5th by Consultant PMs.  Consultant 
PMs, unlike the other two, ranked the Communication PDFs group highest, while the 
SEC and Contractor PMs both ranked this PDFs group 8th.  Spearman Rank 
Correlation was applied to examine the agreement levels between the three 
respondent PMs towards the importance rankings of these PDF groups (Table 5.27).  
All coefficients were not significant and, therefore, the results were inconclusive. 
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment 53.36 9 64.29 5 34.61 9
Manpower 54.17 8 65.60 4 35.87 6
Communication processes 54.74 6 63.78 8 34.90 8
Planning processes 55.20 5 69.31 1 38.43 2
Executuion processes 60.89 1 66.23 3 40.45 1
Monitoring & Controlling processes 54.41 7 64.22 6 35.09 7
Financial delay causes 57.48 2 64.22 6 36.98 4
Stakeholder regulations 57.06 3 63.63 9 36.81 5
Contract/contractual relationship 55.27 4 67.16 2 37.17 3
External delay causes 52.45 10 54.04 10 28.38 10
Sources (groups) of delay Frequency of occurrence Degree of severity Importance index
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Material & Equipment 65.99 8 68.71 4 45.46 6
Manpower 64.09 10 62.50 10 40.24 10
Communication processes 70.63 2 71.83 1 51.20 1
Planning processes 65.95 9 67.62 7 44.80 7
Executuion processes 67.06 6 68.65 5 46.21 5
Monitoring & Controlling processes 66.19 7 66.90 8 44.50 8
Financial delay causes 70.54 3 69.94 2 49.40 2
Stakeholder regulations 70.95 1 69.29 3 49.31 3
Contract/contractual relationship 68.15 4 68.45 6 46.66 4
External delay causes 67.26 5 64.88 9 43.65 9
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Table 5.27: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to all 10 PDF groups – C2 
grouping approach 
 
 
As was previously observed in section 5.5.1, individuals within a respondent group 
may have agreed with another group to highly rank a PDF group, but these two groups 
may have disagreed as to which PDFs belonging to this particular group were more or 
less important.  Spearman Rank Correlation was applied for this purpose (see Table 
5.28).  For example, Table 5.28 shows that Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients 
present moderate to strong agreement levels towards the rankings of PDFs within the 
Communication-related group.  This is despite the fact that PMs ranked the 
Communication PDF group differently.  Both the SEC and Contractor PMs ranked the 
Communication PDF group 8th, while Consultant PMs ranked it as the most important 
group.    
 
 
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient
SEC-contractors
SEC-consultants
Contractors-consultants
Project Manager Groups
-0.1
0.24
0.52
197 
 
Table 5.28: Spearman Rank Correlation applied to PDFs groups – C2 grouping 
approach 
 
In the search for the Project Implementation Challenges Model in the Saudi Arabian 
electricity industry, this chapter applied some numerical analysis to the 58 surveyed 
PDFs.  After describing the research participants‟ profiles, the analysis focused on 
identifying the highly ranked PDFs as perceived by the SEC, Contractor and 
Consultant PMs.  Highly ranked PDFs were those with the highest 10 importance 
index values according to any of the three participant groups.  Collectively, there were 
22 highly ranked PDFs as perceived by the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  
This procedure was repeated with PG, PT and PD PMs, and collectively there were 21 
highly ranked PDFs.     
Spearman Rank Correlation tests were applied to both sets of respondent groups (i.e. 
the SEC, Contractor and Consultant and PG, PT and PD PMs) to test for the 
agreement levels between these groups towards the PDFs rankings.  As for the first 
set of respondent groups, the only significant result was the agreement level between 
the SEC and Contractor PMs towards the rankings of the 58 PDFs.  There was a 
moderate agreement with a coefficient value of rs = 0.48.  Having a moderate 
agreement indicates that there was, to a certain degree, a shared perception between 
Sources (groups) of delay      SEC-Contractor     SEC-Consultant Contractor-Consultant
Material & Equipment factors 0.18 0.00 -0.86**
Manpower-related factors 0.71 0.14 0.20
Communication processes (0.65) 0.78** (0.58)
Planning processes -0.20 -0.56 -0.67
Execution processes 0.14 0.03 0.43
Monitoring & Controlling processes 0.40 -0.60 0.20
Financial delay causes (0.95) -0.63 -0.40
Stakeholder regulations 1** 0.30 0.30
Contract/contractual relationship -0.20 0.80 -0.40
External delay causes 1** 0.40 0.40
Note: **Significant at p<0.01
( ) Significant at p<0.05
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the SEC and Contractor PMs as to which of the PDFs were more important.  The 
remaining Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients were not significant to incur any 
conclusions. 
A Spearman Rank Correlation test was also applied to PG, PT and PD PMs towards 
the PDFs rankings.  When applied to the rankings of the 58 PDFs, the agreement 
levels ranged from moderate to strong agreements between the PMs.  PT and PD 
PMs showed a strong agreement (rs = 0.75), PG and PT PMs showed moderate 
agreement (rs = 0.43) and, finally, PG and PD PMs showed weak agreement (rs = 
0.33) towards the rankings of the 58 PDFs.  These agreement levels indicated varying 
degrees of shared perceptions between PG, PT and PD PMs as to which PDFs were 
more important.  When Spearman Rank Correlation was applied to the 21 highly 
ranked PDFs, the only significant result was the one between PT and PD PMs.  The 
remaining coefficients were not significant to incur any conclusions.  One reason for 
having non-significant coefficients was because the sample size of the ranked PDFs 
was downsized from 58 to 21.  However, having a significant coefficient between the 
PT and PD PMs was because approximately one third of the PT PMs responses (25 
out of 76 PT PMs responses) and over half of the PD PMs responses (25 out of 44 PD 
PMs responses) were exactly the same.  Therefore, the importance rankings of the 
PDFs between the two groups were closer to each other.               
Importance Ranking Analysis was also applied to the PDFs groups as perceived by 
the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  The most apparent results were those 
relevant to organisational responsibility PDF groups.  Both the SEC and the 
Consultant PMs ranked the SEC-related PDFs group highest.  The Consultant PMs 
ranked Consultant-related PDFs group the next most important right after the SEC-
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related PDFs group.  The Contractor PMs agreed, to a great extent, with the other two 
groups of PMs.  These ranked the Consultant-related PDFs and the SEC-related 
PDFs groups the most important PDF groups (ranked 1st and 2nd respectively).  This 
showed that the respondent groups were, in general, not biased when ranking the 
PDFs.   
It is acknowledged that both importance ranking analysis and Spearman Rank 
Correlation did not reveal a great deal about how the respondent groups perceived the 
PDFs.  Many factors contributed to the limitations of these tests.  In the questionnaire 
survey, a PDF broadly indicated a specific event, circumstance, force, or constraint 
that contributed to project delay.  In reality, however, a PDF was far more complex 
than the given description in the survey.  One source of complexity was the 
interdependencies that existed between several PDFs, making it even more 
challenging to capture their dynamic interactions.  This challenge became more 
apparent when the research attempted to group these PDFs based on an objective 
measure.  Grouping these PDFs, however, was based on subjective measures using 
two different grouping approaches (C1 and C2).   
5.6 Factor Analysis – Selection of the Most Important PDFs 
One of the Ranking Analysis outcomes applied to the PDF groups was that the 
respondent groups (the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs) presented non-biased 
perceptions.  This was evident when all three PM groups ranked the SEC-related and 
Consultant-related PDFs highest, although over half of the sample were PMs from the 
SEC and Consultant organisations (33 PMs represented the SEC, 21 represented 
Consultants and 51 represented Contractors).  However, there were other outcomes 
from the conducted analyses which needed further investigation.  For example, both 
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the SEC and Contractor PMs ranked PDF 46 (‘Owner’s tendering system 
requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’) highest, while this PDF was not even 
among Consultant PMs‟ top 10 PDFs.  Instead, Consultant PMs ranked the 
Communication-related PDFs group highest when compared to the SEC and 
Contractor PMs.  This example, along with others, shows that ranking analyses and 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients were not able to provide a comprehensive 
outlook explaining these differences.  It must be noted, though, that the nature of these 
PDFs is highly complex and one form of complexity is the interrelationships between 
these PDFs, as will be discussed in this chapter.  This fact, however, will be used to 
the advantage of the research since the researcher has first selected the most 
important PDFs for further analyses. 
The most important PDFs are those highly ranked by any of the respondent groups 
(the SEC, Contractor, Consultant, Power Generation, Power Transmission and Power 
Distribution Project Managers).  The SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs highly 
ranked 22 PDFs, while the PG, PT and PD PMs highly ranked 21 PDFs.  Most of 
these PDFs were common between the two sets of respondent groups.  Uncommon 
PDFs are presented in Tables 5.29 and Table 5.30, respectively.  Collectively, all 
highly ranked and, hence, the most important PDFs, as perceived by all the PMs, 
amounted to 28 PDFs and were selected for Factor Analysis, as described earlier 
(Table 5.31).  Factor Analysis was used to explore the structure of the correlations 
among these most important PDFs.  The structure of these correlations will produce a 
meaningful set of components. These components will eventually construct the Project 
Implementation Challenges (PICs) conceptual model.  The significance of these PICs 
is in their being composed from the 28 most important PDFs identified by all PMs who 
participated in this study. 
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Table 5.29: List of the highly ranked PDFs according to the SEC, Contractor and 
Consultant PMs but not by PG, PT or PD PMs 
 
Table 5.30: List of the highly ranked PDFs according to PG, PT and PD PMs but 
not by the SEC, Contractor or Consultant PMs  
 
 
 
 
PDF No. C1 C2 Cause of delay 
PDF 9 M M Low skill of manpower
PDF 23 C MC Ineffective control of the project's progress by the contractor
PDF 26 C Fin Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
PDF 29 O Exec Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
PDF 36 O Com Owner’s poor communication with related government authorities
PDF 37 O Com Owner’s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
PDF 39 O Com Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
PDF 55 E Com Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved
PDF No. C1 C2 Cause of delay 
PDF 3 ME ME Changes in materials prices
PDF 19 C P Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
PDF 29 O Exec Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
PDF 31 O SR Suspension of work by the owner
PDF 32 O Exec Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
PDF 34 O CCR Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
PDF 40 O P Changes in the scope of project
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Table 5.31: Most important PDFs according to the SEC, Contractor, Consultant, 
Power Generation, Power Transmission and Power Distribution PMs – (28 PDFs) 
 
 
5.6.1   Sampling adequacy test  
Factor analysis was run using SPSS v.15.  Detailed steps for running the analysis 
using SPSS are described by Field (2009).  The value of the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin 
(KMO) sampling adequacy statistic was 0.857, which was satisfactorily good for the 
analysis.  The Bartlett‟s test of sphericity equalled 1730 and the associated 
Project Delay Factor Description
PDF 2 Delay in materials delivery
PDF 3 Changes in materials prices
PDF 8 Shortage of manpower
PDF 9 Low skill of manpower
PDF 19 Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage
PDF 20 Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
PDF 21 No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget 
PDF 23 Ineffective control of the project's progress by the contractor
PDF 26 Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
PDF 29 Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
PDF 30 Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
PDF 31 Suspension of work by the owner
PDF 32 Delay in issuance of change orders by the owner
PDF 33 Slow decision making by the owner
PDF 34 Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
PDF 35 Delay in progress payments by the owner
PDF 36 Owner’s poor communication with related government authorities
PDF 37 Owner’s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
PDF 38 Owner’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
PDF 39 Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
PDF 40 Changes in the scope of project
PDF 41 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
PDF 45 Difficulties in obtaining work permits
PDF 46 Owner's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
PDF 54 Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
PDF 55 Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved
PDF 57 Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer
PDF 58 Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries
No.
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significance level was (p = 0.001 < 0.05).  Therefore, the data were suitable for Factor 
Analysis to be conducted. 
 
5.6.2   Factor (components) extraction 
Eigenvalues and Scree Plot analyses were conducted to extract and determine the set 
of components that will consist of the 28 most important PDFs.  The maximum 
possible number of components could be the same number as the selected PDFs, 
which is 28.  However, it is desirable to retain components that consisted of all 28 
PDFs with the least number of components as possible.  A Kaiser‟s test, otherwise 
known as the eigenvalue rule, and a Scree Plot test were used to determine these 
„principal‟ components.   
 
The Scree Plot test involved plotting each of the components‟ eigenvalue and testing 
for the point of inflexion (Figure 5.1).  The point of inflexion is where the slope of the 
line changed dramatically to become horizontal.  The components on the left of the 
inflexion point are with highest eigenvalues that shall be retained (without including the 
inflexion point itself) (see section 4.5.2.2.6).  The Plot, however, is ambiguous since it 
shows two different inflexion points that occurred at the third and the fifth components.  
The curve began to tail off after two components but there was another drop after the 
fifth component before a horizontal line is converged.  This graph then suggests 
extracting (retaining) either two or four components.    
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Figure 5.1: Scree Plot graph output 
 
 
Using the eigenvalue rule of the Kaiser‟s test is a more straightforward process where 
the number of components necessary to represent the examined variables (the 28 
most important PDFs) was selected for components with eigenvalues of 1.0 or more.  
Seven components had eigenvalues over the Kaiser‟s criterion and in combination 
these components explained 70.05% of the variance (Table 5.32).  Therefore, it was 
decided to proceed further with the analysis using the Kaiser‟s test result where a 
definite number of the retained components was determined rather than the 
ambiguous Scree Plot.  
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Table 5.32: Initial eigenvalues of the Factor Analysis Principal Components  
 
 
5.6.3   Varimax orthogonal rotation  
The initial few components relatively explained the large amount of variance 
(especially component number 1), whereas the subsequent components explained 
only a small amount of variance.  Rotating the component matrix optimised the 
components‟ structure in which the relative significance of the extracted components 
(i.e. with eigenvalues over or equal to 1.0 as per the Kaiser‟s criterion) was spread 
over the components.  Varimax orthogonal rotation is the most common rotation 
Component Initial eigenvalues
Total Variance (%) Cumulative (%)
1 9.957 35.562 35.562
2 2.937 10.488 46.051
3 1.696 6.055 52.106
4 1.498 5.348 57.455
5 1.430 5.106 62.561
6 1.058 3.777 66.338
7 1.039 3.712 70.050
8 0.981 3.502 73.552
9 0.805 2.877 76.429
10 0.721 2.576 79.005
11 0.648 2.315 81.320
12 0.601 2.145 83.465
13 0.553 1.976 85.441
14 0.475 1.697 87.138
15 0.472 1.684 88.823
16 0.447 1.596 90.418
17 0.351 1.253 91.671
18 0.331 1.184 92.855
19 0.316 1.128 93.983
20 0.293 1.046 95.029
21 0.249 0.891 95.920
22 0.222 0.792 96.712
23 0.210 0.752 97.463
24 0.170 0.607 98.071
25 0.158 0.565 98.636
26 0.144 0.515 99.150
27 0.130 0.465 99.615
28 0.108 0.385 100.000
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method and was used for the purposes of this research.  Before rotation, component 1 
accounted for considerably more variance that the remaining six (i.e. 35.5% compared 
to 10.49%, 6.06%, 5.35%, 5.11%, 3.78% and 3.71% respectively).  After applying 
Varimax rotation, the relative significance was optimised and rearranged over these 
components.  The first component now accounted for 17.58% of variance compared to 
12.88%, 11.81%, 11.20%, 6.56%, 5.01% and 5.01% for components 2-7 respectively 
(Table 5.33).     
Table 5.33: Initial eigenvalue of the retained Principal Components and 
eigenvalues after applying Varimax orthogonal rotation  
 
 
5.6.4   Factor loadings 
The PDFs, in which were found the elements that made up the 7 retained principal 
components, contributed variably to each of these components.  The gauge of which 
of the PDFs describes its contribution level to its principal component is called the 
„Loading Factor‟.  The higher the Loading Factor value of a PDF the more it 
contributes to the retained principal component.  The Loading Factor represents the 
statistical significance of a correlation coefficient between the PDF (as an element) 
and its corresponding principal component.  The minimum significance level of a factor 
loading depends on the sample size.  The minimum loading value where it is 
Component Initial eigenvalues Rotation sums of square loadings
Total Variance (%) Cumulative (%) Total Variance (%) Cumulative (%)
1 9.957 35.562 35.562 4.921 17.575 17.575
2 2.937 10.488 46.051 3.608 12.884 30.459
3 1.696 6.055 52.106 3.308 11.814 42.273
4 1.498 5.348 57.455 3.136 11.202 53.474
5 1.430 5.106 62.561 1.837 6.561 60.036
6 1.058 3.777 66.338 1.402 5.009 65.044
7 1.039 3.712 70.050 1.402 5.005 70.050
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considered significant for this study‟s sample size (105 participants) was 0.512 (Field, 
2009).  However, when using SPSS to set the Loading Factor at 0.512, three PDFs 
(out of the 28 PDFs) were presented without Loading Factor values.  This indicated 
that these three PDFs made an insignificant contribution to their corresponding 
components.  These PDFs were PDF 26 (‘Difficulties in financing the project by 
the contractor’) in component 1, PDF 45 (‘Difficulties in obtaining work permits’) 
in component 2 and PDF 40 (‘Changes in project scope’) in component 7.  For the 
purpose of knowing the Loading Factor values of these „non-significant‟ PDFs, Factor 
Analysis was conducted repeatedly with Factor Loading values settings of less than 
0.512.  The procedure was done repeatedly until all PDFs appeared with Factor 
Loading values; the lowest value was (0.482) for PDF40 (‘Changes in project 
scope’) (Table 5.34).  
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Table 5.34: The Loading Factor values of the 28 most important PDFs within the 7 Principal Components   
 
PDF No. PDF Description Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PDF 35 Delay in progress payments by the owner 0.757
PDF 30 Delay in the settlement of contractor 0.719
claims by SEC
PDF 34 Uncooperative owner with the contractor 0.717
complicating contract administration
PDF 31 Suspension of work by the owner 0.698
PDF 29 Delay in furnishing and delivering the site 0.641
to the contractor by SEC
PDF 32 Delay in issuance of change order by SEC 0.637
PDF 33 Slow decision making by SEC 0.574
PDF 26 Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor 0.505*
PDF 38 SEC's failure to coordinate with government 0.801
authorities during planning
PDF 36 SEC's poor communication with related government 0.754
PDF 37 SEC's poor communication with contractors 0.616
and consultants during project execution
PDF 39 Poor coordination by SEC with the various parties 0.591
during project execution
PDF 45 Difficulties in obtaining work permits 0.485*
PDF 21 No effective or realistic contingency plans in case 0.795
the project is behind schedule or over budget
PDF 20 Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project 0.772
by the contractor
PDF 23 Ineffective control of the project's progress 0.757
by the contractor
PDF 19 Improper technical study by the contractor 0.607
 during the bidding stage 
PDF 2 Delay in materials delivery 0.552
PDF 54 Delay in the approval of contractor submissions 0.763
by the engineer
PDF 58 Slow response from the consultant engineer 0.727
to contractor inquiries 
PDF 57 Delay in performing inspection and testing 0.639
by the consultant engineer 
PDF 55 Poor communication between the consultant engineer 0.547
and other parties involved 
PDF 9 Low skills of manpower 0.794
PDF 3 Changes in material prices 0.577
PDF 8 Shortage of manpower 0.524
PDF 46 SEC's tendering system requirement of selecting 0.809
the lowest bidder
PDF 41 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies 0.629
 in specifications and drawings
PDF 40 Changes in project scope 0.482*
* Non-significant Loading Factor 
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5.6.5   Describing the Project Implementation Challenges 
In this research context, the retained principal components are the Project 
Implementation Challenges the study aimed to identify.  Having identified the Project 
Implementation Challenges (principal components) which comprised the most 
important PDFs identified by the SEC, Contractor, Consultant, PG, PT and PD PMs in 
the investigated industry, the next step was to suggest names that described these 
principal components.  The names should communicate the nature of the underlying 
construct by looking for patterns of similarity between PDFs that load on a component 
(Shehu and Akintoye, 2010).  Table 5.35 below presents the suggested names of the 
Principal Components after considering the nature of the contributing PDFs with 
significant loading factors.  
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Table 5.35: Suggested titles for the Project Implementation Challenges  
 
No. Component PDF description
1 SEC's Contractual Commitment Delay in progress payments by the owner
Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
Suspension of work by the owner
Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
Delay in issuance of change order by the owner 
Slow decision making by the owner
(Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor)
2 SEC's Communication and Owner's failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
Coordination Effectiveness Owner's poor communication with related government 
Owner's poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
(Difficulties in obtaining work permits)
3 Contractor's Project Planning No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget
and Controlling Effectiveness Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
Ineffective control of the project's progress by the contractor
Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage 
Delay in materials delivery
4 Consultant-related Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries 
Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer 
Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved 
5 Manpower Challenges & Low skills of manpower
Materials Uncertainty Changes in material prices
Shortage of manpower
6 SEC's Tendering System SEC's tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder
7 Lack of Project Requirements Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
Clarity (Changes in project scope)
( ) PDFs with non-significant Loading factor value (<0.512)
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6. Project Implementation Challenges – Conceptual Model 
 
6.1   Introduction 
Ranking analyses were applied to all 58 surveyed PDFs in the previous chapter.  
These were followed by applying Factor Analysis to the 28 highly ranked PDFs.  This 
chapter seeks to develop a conceptual model that provides more in-depth insights 
about the 7 Principal Components constructed with the 28 highly ranked PDFs by 
presenting supporting qualitative data.  Before presenting the conceptual model of the 
Project Implementation Challenges the study aimed to explore, an introduction of what 
constitutes conceptual modelling is presented.   
6.2 Conceptual Model Development  
Modelling is the process of developing an analogical system of relations between 
variables and entities (Willemain, 1995), and the resulting model is the structure that 
exhibits the features and characteristics of certain scenarios (Sen and Vinze, 1997 ).  
Modelling enables researchers to draw in-depth judgements about particular 
situations.  If these situations remained without modelling, they are frequently left 
implicit and unquestioned (Wilson, 2001).  Constructing models enhances the 
understanding of the scenario being modelled in addition to providing a better 
management of the scenario‟s complexities (Yoon, 2010; Williams, 1990).   
One of the most popular types of modelling is conceptual modelling.  Conceptual 
modelling is a theoretical approach that simplifies the management of data (Parent, 
2006) whereby the patterns of meanings and concepts are captured (Solomon, 1988).  
A conceptual model has well-defined elements where the relationships between 
variables are continuously evolving, allowing more in-depth understanding of the 
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modelled situations, scenarios or problems (Williamson, 1997).  In addition to the 
robust theoretical basis it offers for this particular research, the formulation of the 
conceptual model has several advantages, including the following: 
 It provides a holistic and simplified view of the project implementation 
challenges from a complex perspective 
 It enhances the understanding of the interaction between the principal 
components (Project Implementation Challenges) and the highly ranked project 
delay factors identified in the previous chapter 
 It presents a clarification of the roles of all highly ranked project delay factor 
elements and their contribution to their principal components 
 It provides a reliable construct for the key project stakeholders that prioritises 
which of these challenges are of their concern. 
6.3   SEC’s Contractual Commitment  
All stakeholders were interested in delivering the SEC‟s projects on time.  The range of 
interest, however, depended on the varying degree of involvement and stakes in these 
projects.  Example stakeholders were the SEC, Contractors, Consultants, 
manufacturers, suppliers, the government, and various end-users.  Those who were 
involved on a daily basis with the SEC projects during construction were the SEC 
Project Execution Department, Contractors and Consultants.  These three represented 
different organisations with the mutual objective of turning a project concept into a real 
operating product.  Apart from this mutual project objective, the SEC and Contractors 
had a conflict of interest over objectives.  The Contractors sought to maximise their 
profits while the SEC strived to have the best value for money projects. 
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Consultants were outsourced to protect the SEC‟s project interests, ensuring the 
Contractor‟s adherence as per the SEC‟s technical requirements.  Therefore, a 
coherent binding contract that documented the terms and conditions in which both the 
SEC and Contractors were bound was necessary to avoid or manage conflicts when 
they arose.  The contract was intended to be used as a guide to govern the SEC and 
Contractor‟s respective rights, duties and obligations for project performance.   
 
This first Principal Component of the Project Implementation Challenges (i.e. the 
SEC‟s Contractual Commitment) accounted for 17.58% of total variance explained and 
consisted of 8 PDFs.  All PDFs (except for the last PDF) were concerned with the SEC 
contractual obligations and duties as shown in Table 8.8.  Each of the PDFs under this 
Principal Component will be discussed in turn.  Qualitative data will be presented in 
the form of direct quotes and verbatim in a flow that provides in-depth insights.  These 
insights will build the conceptual model uncovering the details of the Project 
Implementation Challenges.  The names given to the participants whose direct quotes 
will be presented is consistent with Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: SEC’s Contractual Commitment PDFs 
 
PDF LF PDF Description 
35 0.757 Delay in progress payments by the owner
30 0.719 Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner
34 0.717 Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration
31 0.698 Suspension of work by the owner
29 0.641 Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the owner
32 0.637 Delay in issuance of change order by the owner 
33 0.574 Slow decision making by the owner
26 0.505* Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor
PDF: Project Delay Factor
LF: Loading Factor value
* Non-significant Loading Factor
214 
 
 
6.3.1   PDF 35 (‘Delay in progress payments by the SEC’) 
Any delay in progressing a Contractor's payment was associated with the risk of disrupting 
project work flow in many aspects.  In addition to his manpower, who expected to have their 
payments and salaries due in a timely manner, the Contractor was financially committed to 
different manufacturers, suppliers, and subcontractors.  Therefore, it was not a surprise to find 
this PDF among the Contractor's highly ranked PDFs (ranked 8th).  Not being highly ranked by 
both the SEC and the Consultant PMs was reasoned by their not being as directly affected as 
the Contractors.  Although this PDF had varying effects depending on the project size and the 
Contractor‟s financial circumstances, it had the highest Loading Factor in this principal 
component of “SEC‟s Contractual Commitment” (Sig.=0.757).     
 
 
After forming the SEC in 2000, one noticeable reform was no longer allowing it to authorise 
any project without allocating the required funds.  The Executive Vice President of the SEC 
(Western Operating Area) admitted (in a conversation rather than a recorded interview) that 
this particular PDF was a major contributor and had a significant impact on SEC project 
delivery progress.  This showed this PDF is still persistent, although it was worse before the 
SEC began operation in 2000.  At present, the challenge is in managing the SEC's cash-flow 
in a convenient manner.  Besides the contractual commitments with its Contractors and loan 
providers, the SEC has highly intensive operational and maintenance costs around the whole 
Kingdom.  Therefore, processing the payments of several Contractors in a short period is a 
concern for the SEC Finance Department.  SAF (SEC) gave an example of this particular 
PDF:   
Once, many Contractors demanded 3-4 billion Saudi Riyals in one month.  We 
received an invoice for 1100 million and another for 200-300 million etc. which made it 
difficult to manage the amount due in a short time. 
 
Moreover, several SEC PMs mentioned that Contractors usually filled in the relevant forms 
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with errors and this added to the delay.  Approving these forms and accepting the attached 
invoices was not an undisturbed process.  Some Contractors, for example, claimed for non-
completed milestones when they should not have done so.  Processing the invoices and 
relevant documents required a careful check by an SEC PM to approve who needed to state 
the technical deliverables and match these with the Contractor‟s claim and actual 
achievements.   
 
Then, there was the journey of securing the relevant signatures before the payment was 
processed.  The higher the invoice value the more signatures were required in order to release 
the payment.   
 
GARA (Contractor) described to what extent processing of the payment could be delayed: 
They waste our efforts by making us follow and track the progress of the invoice.  
When we asked the project management department where the invoice stands, they 
told us to check with the Finance Department. We are supposed to have one focal 
point to deal with and this is the Project Manager [of SEC]. I am not supposed to deal 
with anyone else. He must solve these problems himself.  But with SEC you deal with 
the PM, with the civil engineer, and with any department you require approval from. 
You deal with the secretary and follow-up with him as to whether or not he forwarded 
the submittals, and you deal with the Finance Department and whether they reviewed 
the invoice and forwarded it for other approvals or just ignored it.  
 
6.3.2   PDF 30 (‘Delay in the settlement of Contractor claims by the SEC’) 
According to the SEC Contracting Manual, a „Claim‟ is defined as “any written notice 
made by the SEC or by a Contractor to obtain monetary recovery (or time extension to 
the contract) from the other party after an attempt to resolve a dispute amicably has 
failed”.  This PDF was concerned with claims issued by Contractors to the SEC and it 
referred to the late decision taken by the SEC with any Contractor compensation 
demands as a result of project work variations.  This PDF represented the second 
highest loading of the „SEC Contractual Commitment‟ principal component (Sig. 
=0.719).  Although the „Claim‟ definition implied a tense confrontational attitude 
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between the Contractors and the SEC, it was, however, perceived as a very common 
action.   
 
Project work variations were inevitable and these were mostly associated with requiring 
additional time and extra costs resulting from the Contractor's prolonged presence on site, or 
procuring project items that were not agreed in the contract but yet requested by the SEC.  
Work variations which caused project delays were diverse and could be attributed according to 
responsibility either to the SEC, to Consultant engineers or to external forces.  Therefore, the 
timely settlement of these claims was crucial for sustaining project progress and maintaining a 
healthy relationship between project parties.  Any settlement must ensure fair outcomes and 
achieve a common understanding between all parties.  Otherwise, prolonged settlement of the 
Contractor's claims would lead to contractual disputes or, at the very least, to unwanted 
opportunistic behaviour by the Contractor throughout the project execution.  This PDF was, 
therefore, highly ranked by only Contractor PMs (ranked 10th) since its impact affected their 
organisational interests, especially when these claims were justified.    
 
The general attitude of the SEC towards Contractor claims was best described by ORFA 
(SEC):  
The Contractor mostly thinks he can fool us (SEC).  For example, he claims that we 
are liable to pay for his manpower because we delayed him for not having the project 
site ready to initiate his work.  We mostly reject such non-justifiable claims.  But most 
of the Contractors, especially the large ones like Siemens and ABB, give it a try and 
ask for financial compensation costs through these claims whether they will be settled 
or not.      
 
Consultant engineers also played a key role for Contractors claiming for time-extension.  This 
explained why Contractor PMs ranked Consultant-related PDFs highest.  SAR (SEC) explicitly 
pointed out that Consultant engineers were a delay factor in SEC projects when asked for 
evidence to support his claim:  
Because of the claims we get from them (Contractors) when we intend to apply delay 
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penalties.  They manage to prove that during the design review the Consultants 
approved their drawings late. 
 
In this case, the Contractor could at least escape from the penalty delay and secure a time-
extension approval to deliver the project, but definitely without direct financial compensation.  
SAF (SEC) thought that Contractors had their own methods to claim for time-extension by, for 
example, arranging for many inspections at the same time: 
They do that sometimes to blame the Consultants for the delay.  They have their own 
tricks (laughs) although the Contractors themselves are not ready for the inspection.  
They give us the inspection notification while we (SEC and Consultant engineers) are 
busy with other work in order to claim for time-extension.  
 
6.3.3 PDF 34 (‘Uncooperative owner with the Contractor complicating 
contract administration’) 
This PDF meant that SEC representatives were unhelpful and unsupportive, impeding steady 
project progress whether intentionally or otherwise.  This factor was with the third highest 
loading of the SEC Contractual Commitment principal component (Sig. =0.717).  In turnkey 
projects, SEC contracts with Contractors were developing and subject to change and 
amendment even after project award.  In many cases, the contract had clauses that were 
neither explicit nor clear.  As a consequence, the SEC PM would naturally have interpreted 
these clauses in a way that would have served the interests of his employer organisation: 
Well if there were grey areas it doesn't make any sense to interpret these for the 
Contractor's interests.  We (SEC) will interpret these for our interests and he would 
interpret these for his own interests.  So, there are sometimes disagreements in this 
matter.  And sometimes it (the contract) is clear enough but still (laughs) he insists on 
misinterpreting the clauses. 
 
There were cases when the researcher felt that not settling justified Contractor claims was 
common in SEC projects.  When ORFA (SEC) was specifically asked whether he thought that 
some of the change orders claimed by Contractors were justified, he replied: 
 Some of them, yes.  But not all of them! 
 
 Researcher: Do you cooperate with them and settle these justified ones? 
 
 ORFA: As I told you, we mostly do not accept change orders.  
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A different attitude by WALA (SEC) towards his organisation‟s contractual behaviour with 
Contractors was noticed: 
SEC asks for additional spare parts or even equipment while the Contractor expects 
the contract to be read thoroughly and hence honoured. 
 
GARA (Contractor) elaborated on this issue with frustration: 
SEC doesn't want to pay any additional cost. They want everything for free. If they 
wanted something urgently –an additional item that was beyond the contract - they 
threaten us using previous mistakes or delays we made in other parts of the project or 
would apply a penalty or push us backwards (by delaying an important approval) if we 
didn't fulfil their (non-contractual) demands.  
 
The above statement was narrated by a PM who worked for an international Contractor that 
had a sound presence in the Saudi electricity Contracting market.  This indicated that such 
uncooperative behaviour would have an even greater impact on smaller Contractors who 
would feel more vulnerable if they stood up against SEC wants and desires. ORFA PM (SEC) 
stated: 
We (SEC) usually receive claims from Corporate (large) Contractors.  The smaller 
ones try their best to please us. 
 
6.3.4   PDF 31 (‘Suspension of work by the SEC’) 
This PDF referred to the interruption of project activities as a result of different forces.  After 
awarding the project contract to the winner bidder, the actual project execution could be 
severely affected and delayed, as will be explained below.  This PDF represented the fourth 
highest loading factor value which contributed to the „SEC Contractual Commitment‟ principal 
component (Sig. =0.698) and was ranked 9th by PG PMs. 
 
Suspension of project work could be relatively temporary (for a few months) as a result of, for 
example, the work site not being ready to handover to the Contractor.  This can result, for 
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example, from the necessary paperwork and permits not being issued by the relevant 
authorities.  There were other extreme cases where projects were completely suspended as a 
consequence of, what would be seen as, external forces.  JAWI SEC PM stated: 
One of my colleagues had a project in Makkah which was awarded to a contractor and 
when they started execution, the Transportation Ministry (public motorways owner) 
suspended the project as they had other project plans.  Such problems are out of our 
(SEC) control.  Even if we secured the required project work approvals, after having 
these approvals the authorities could stop us.  
 
The above example showed an obvious lack of strategic planning coordination between public 
service authorities and the SEC.   This observation was noticed in several project cases and, 
as a result, the SEC had to relocate many of its projects.  ORFA (SEC) gave another example 
of when a Contractor initiated the project work to build a new substation in a high-profile urban 
area whose residents managed to rally and complain against the SEC and o prevented it from 
constructing the substation.  Their concern was relevant to the potential harm the high-voltage 
transformers could cause their health in the long-term.  The project was completely 
suspended.  At least four other similar projects were reported suspended for the very same 
reason. 
 
6.3.5   PDF 29 (‘Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the 
Contractor by the SEC’) 
This PDF referred to the late project site handover to the Contractor after the project award.  
As a result, this delayed mobilising his equipment, materials and manpower to initiate the 
project work.  This PDF came with the fifth highest loading factor for the „SEC Contractual 
Commitment‟ principal component (Sig. = 0.641). This PDF was relevant to the time-
consuming process of finalising the project site ownership with the authorities through the 
Asset Management Department in the SEC.  In a few cases, the SEC allowed its Contractors 
to initiate the project work on the site while the required ownership transfer was not completed.  
GARA (Contractor) gave an example of when the SEC approved his contracting organisation 
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to start with the project work to build a substation while the work permit was not issued from 
the Municipality (the site owner).  This led the Municipality inspector to issue a warning against 
the SEC and, as a consequence, the work was suspended for six months.  The SEC top 
management finally stepped in when it was alerted to the severe project delay.  The Executive 
Vice President of the SEC Western Operating Area managed to secure a verbal approval from 
the Mayor (head of Municipality) to continue with the project work without being bothered by 
the inspector warnings.   GARA (Contractor), who had this particular experience, gave more 
details: 
We faced that (type of Project Delay Factor), the SEC wants everything for free, 
whether from us or the Municipality or any other organisation. The substation we were 
working on was, supposedly, to be let by the Municipality for 10 years. Seven years 
have already passed and until this day the SEC has not signed the contract with the 
Municipality (project site owner) and, as a result, they have refused to issue us a permit 
that was required not only for us to commence the work, but also for specifying the 
exact borders of the site. This has delayed us for six months.  I went to the Investment 
Manager of the Municipality and he told me that the contract was sent to the SEC in 
order to get it signed and they haven't received it back yet. He told me “would they 
have it for free?” The contract went to Riyadh to get it signed.  The substation is now 
operating and the contract has not been signed yet! 
 
 
6.3.6   PDF 32 (‘Delay in change order issuance by the SEC’) 
According to the SEC Contracting Manual, a change order is a written amendment to the 
contract‟s scope of work or service.  This PDF indicated the late provision of procurement 
adjustment requests and the relevant paperwork that were essential for the Contractor to 
continue with the project work.  It represented the sixth highest loading factor of the „SEC 
Contractual Commitment‟ principal component (Sig. = 0.637).  A project change order was 
mostly incurred with additional costs on top of the SEC‟s allocated project budget.  For this 
particular reason, the process of issuing a change order was perceived as highly challenging.  
This was partially because of the slow decision making, as will be described in the following 
PDF, in addition to the excessive explanation required to secure the additional cost on top of 
the authorised budget.  However, change orders with high urgency were usually not 
considered as problematic to project progress, as ABAB (SEC) explained: 
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We sometimes don‟t have time to wait for the paperwork like when we faced the 
terrorist attacks.  For the foreigners‟ safety, we asked the Contractor to 
immediately build a fence surrounding the project site (of the power plant) with 
proper security systems and staff and we paid when the paperwork was done. 
 
Most of the change orders were mainly initiated and caused by the SEC due to the 
company being unable to foresee the relevant problem.  SAR (SEC) Contract Manager 
stated: 
I truly believe that change orders hamper the project progress. When the Contractor 
executes the project something could come up that needs to be added or modified 
which is not mentioned in the scope of work. So the contractor suspends the work (or 
the specific activity) waiting for change order issuance with proper compensation.  
Otherwise, if he delivered what we asked for without issuing the change order the 
contractor would risk not being compensated. 
 
He also stressed in the same interview that issuing change orders severely impeded 
Contractor progress and added: 
So change order is the number one reason for project delay. But sometimes our guys 
miss a few items while preparing the bidding package by not properly surveying the 
project site and examining the technical limitations.  So the scope of work is neither 
complete nor clear.  Even when the Contractor visits the site or attends the Job 
Explanation, he can miss those limitations. 
 
However, the subject mentioned an interesting point about where the balance of the political 
forces between the SEC and its Contractor would completely change.  In fact, it flipped entirely 
at the end in this particular PDF.As he expressed: 
The owner is usually in a stronger position than the Contractor. The only situation 
where the contractor gains more strength is when we change order because then he 
can control and demand any price when we establish negotiations with him. 
6.3.7   PDF 33 (‘Slow decision making by the SEC’) 
This PDF came with the seventh highest loading factor for the „SEC Contractual Commitment‟ 
principal component (Sig. = 0.574) and was ranked 6th by Contractor PMs.  AJ (Contractor) 
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pinpointed this particular PDF when asked to list some of the PDFs from his experience with 
the SEC projects: 
 And the third reason is our client Siemens (main contractor) might be very aggressive 
in moving things forward but our client (SEC) is very very slow in making decisions. 
 
AJ also elaborated on this point in another part of the interview: 
Ahh, a common problem is response time; it is a major problem with the client and lack 
(of) project ownership is also [another] problem with the client although we do have 
one identified project manager at the client-end who is responsible for the project but 
he's not the only authority to make decisions because it's a government organisation 
that has a hierarchy he needs to follow to escalate any matter and then it goes to the 
approval process in which 10 signatures are required.  So this is one area where the 
client is (considered) a bottleneck. 
 
Most of the SEC PMs agreed that the slow decision making in SEC was a noticeable PDF that 
needed to be addressed properly and solved.  This particular PDF was highly relevant to the 
lack of providing the SEC PMs with the required authority.  
 
6.3.8   PDF 26 (‘Difficulties in financing the project by the Contractor’) 
This PDF referred to Contractors facing a predicament in securing financial facilities from 
financial institutions and banks.  These financial facilities were essential to provide the 
Contractor with necessary resources.  This PDF had a non-significant loading factor value for 
the „SEC Contractual Commitment‟ principal component (Loading Factor =0.505 > 0.512).  
This PDF, however, has become more significant due to the more restrictive banking system 
as a direct result of the global financial crisis.   
 
 
6.4   SEC’s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness 
This Principal Component accounted for 12.88% of total variance explained after the Varimax 
rotation.  Maintaining effective communication and coordination could be considered as a form 
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of „SEC‟s Contractual Commitment‟.  However, applying Factor Analysis to the most important 
PDFs has resulted in grouping all Communication-and Coordination-related PDFs in a 
separate Principal Component.  This indicated that the relevant issues needed to be 
addressed thoroughly and with greater depth.  It was noticed in the previous chapter that 
Consultant PMs ranked the Communication-related PDFs group (which also included 
Coordination-related PDFs) highest, while both the SEC and Contractor PMs ranked this PDFs 
group 8th (out of 10 groups).  Five PDFs contributed to this principal component, as shown in 
Table 8.9.  The last PDF had a non-significant Loading Factor value but the qualitative data 
along with the ranking analysis result proved that this PDF had a great influence on projects.  
Therefore, this PDF will be considered as a key element in this principal component of the 
Project Implementation Challenge of „SEC‟s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness‟.      
Table 6.2: SEC’s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness PDFs  
 
 
6.4.1   PDF 38 (‘SEC’s failure to coordinate with government authorities 
during planning’) 
This PDF represented the highest loading factor which contributed to the „SEC Communication 
and Coordination Effectiveness‟ principal component (Sig. =0.801), and was highly ranked by 
both the SEC and Consultant PMs (ranked 6th and 1st respectively).  As a Project Owner, the 
SEC was expected to coordinate with several government authorities and share their project 
plans with these authorities.  Sharing the SEC‟s project intentions with these authorities was 
necessary for two reasons.  The first was that the Planning Department of the SEC needed to 
secure assurances that the selected project site was technically suitable and clear of any 
PDF LF PDF Description 
38 0.801 Owner's failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning
36 0.754 Owner's poor communication with related government 
37 0.616 Owner's poor communication with contractors and consultants during project execution
39 0.591 Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution
45 0.485* Difficulties in obtaining work permits
PDF: Project Delay Factor
LF: Loading Factor value
* Non-significant Loading Factor
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potential problem that may escalate in the near future.   
SEC coordination with the relevant government authorities was expected to take place during 
the project inception phase.  Typically, it was under the SEC‟s Project Planning Department 
list of responsibilities, while arranging for the project primary scope and during the survey of 
the potential work site, to investigate any potential limitations that were described above.  
When asked to comment about the poor coordination between the SEC and government 
authorities, the answer ORFA (SEC) gave went beyond the posed question: 
Even internally!  The coordination between the Company (SEC) and government 
authorities and even between government authorities themselves is weak.  It must 
improve.  For example, when we bought land to build a substation, we then discovered 
that the Municipality had a plan to build a bridge in the same area that will affect the 
project.  This is poor coordination.  Another example was when we started digging, we 
found large water pipes; this is lack of coordination.   
 
The issue was further investigated with JAWI (SEC) through an explicit question which asked 
whether the Project Planning Department even coordinated with government authorities.  After 
replying „No‟, he continued: 
They coordinate for two and ignore another 10 projects and I know how they think 
there.  They say leave it for the Project Execution Department to handle. 
 
However, it must be acknowledged that issuing the relevant project work permits was very 
challenging, as will be described more thoroughly in PDF 45 (‘Difficulties in obtaining work 
permits’) below.  However, a major concern surfaced when the researcher learned how the 
SEC dealt with this persistent problem.  In an attempt to do what would be seen as the SEC 
dealing with the problem effectively, the SEC shifted to the Contractors the responsibility of 
issuing these permits and, hence, coordinating with the relevant government authorities.  Not 
only was the issuing of these essential documents delayed at the project execution phase, the 
probability of having project plans interrupted by these authorities was also increased. Thus, 
Contractors were generally having a hard time issuing the required work permits in a timely 
manner.  However, SAR (SEC) Contract Manager thought there was an effective solution: 
We used to follow up with Municipalities to issue these permits but now we shift that to 
the Contractor and we just support them with letters explaining our project scope and 
its importance.  We think this is better.   
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To justify his point, the subject elaborated that the reason for shifting the responsibility to 
Contractors was because they had established long-term business relationships with these 
authorities and, therefore, the personal relationships with key personnel in these government 
authorities would have a positive influence on the issuing of the required permits without 
delays. 
 
6.4.2   PDF 36 (‘SEC’s poor communication with related government 
authorities’) 
As was mentioned in the discussion of the previous PDF 38 („SEC’s failure to coordinate 
with government authorities during planning’), the SEC shifted the responsibility for 
issuing the project work permits from government authorities to Contractors.  Yet, the SEC‟s 
cooperation as a Project Owner was crucial to many Contractors to process these work 
permits during project execution.  This PDF represented the second highest loading factor in 
the „SEC Communication and Coordination Effectiveness‟ principal component (Sig. =0.754).  
The SEC Project Execution Management Departments and Division (in all three business 
areas of the PG, PT and PD sectors) were expected to issue supporting letters for the 
Contractors and many times followed up by making phone calls to these authorities.  These 
phone calls were thought to assist Contractors in issuing the required documents faster.  
Relevant to this problem, HM (SEC) said: 
If he (the Contractor) had problems with the Municipality, we contact them to help out, 
although it's his job to do that.  
 
For the subject, this apparently presented a lack of „Project Ownership‟ tone.  GARA 
(Contractor) presented further evidence of the lack of „Project Ownership‟ problem by the SEC:  
Just through letters!  That's it. The SEC PM doesn't have the initiative to personally 
meet with them (Municipality‟s representative) or follow-up through the phone.  
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If the letters issued by the SEC or the making of phone calls contributed to the issuing of the 
required project work permits in a timely manner, then this would not even have been an 
issue.  In some cases, these initiatives (i.e. writing letters and making phone calls) were 
helping, but in many others they were not.  It must be noted, though, that this problem was 
more apparent in urban areas which were crowded with public projects and, therefore, the 
coordination between the various stakeholders was more complex.  In rural areas, on the other 
hand, government authorities were keen to have the electrification delivered without delays 
and, therefore, were supportive.   
 
6.4.3   PDF 37 (‘SEC’s poor communication with Contractors and 
Consultants during project execution’)  
This PDF represented the third highest loading factor of the „SEC Communication and 
Coordination Effectiveness‟ principal component (Sig. =0.616), and was ranked 4th by 
Consultant PMs.  The SEC required both Contractor and Consultant PMs to maintain a 
frequent flow of information in order to update the project key stakeholders (the SEC Project 
Execution Department Manager and his superiors) with the project progress and the relevant 
barriers they were facing.  ORFA (SEC) said: 
We demand progress reports once a month and we also conduct design reviews.  
They know exactly what we want in these reports.  
 
Verbal follow up was also used by SEC PMs as JAWI (SEC) explained:  
I receive verbal reports by phone, and a weekly written report from the Consultant, and 
a monthly report from the Contractor.  We also have weekly or biweekly progress 
meetings with the Contractors and Consultants to push forward any pending issue to 
deliver the project on time.  This is besides the correspondence letters I need to write 
in the office.  
 
As ORFA (SEC) said, Contractors and Consultants knew exactly what the SEC wanted in 
these reports.  The main concern was whether the reported information was useful.   For 
example, GARA (Contractor) complained about the fact that the SEC PMs were selective 
when reading the project progress reports: 
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We send monthly progress reports but they don't read them (deeply inhales cigarette 
smoke) 
 
 Researcher: 
 How did you know? 
 
 GARA (Contractor): 
They only focus on three or four points.  But (smokes) if, for example, I explicitly 
mentioned in any of these reports there will be a delay and mentioning the reason, 
after two or three months when I state the delay again they jump at me asking „why 
didn‟t you tell us‟ (SEC).  I then have to refer them to the exact report with evidence 
that the main cause of the delay was having the late approval of our submittals by their 
consultants! 
 
 
6.4.4   PDF 39 (‘Poor coordination by SEC with the various parties during 
project execution’) 
This PDF represented the fourth factor in the „SEC‟s Communication and Coordination 
Effectiveness‟ principal component (Sig. =0.591), and was ranked 3rd by the Consultant PMs.  
As was mentioned previously, the SEC was expanding its existing infrastructure by making 
substantial investments and authorising many different projects.  These projects would 
eventually interconnect with each other as a single integrated system to serve their main 
purposes (i.e. a power generation plant would be connected to a power transmission grid and 
these would, in turn, be interconnected with a distribution network).  Therefore, extensive 
coordination between the SEC‟s various project stakeholders was important to ensure the 
technical compatibilities of these projects to avoid any operational problems.  JAWI (SEC) PM 
gave an example: 
Since the cables in project (A) are going to be connected to the switchgears in the 
substation of project (B), which is being delivered by another Contractor, we have to 
conduct a coordination design review meeting to make sure that the cable will fit into 
the switchgears.  The cable Contractor (of project A) also submits his time schedule to 
the substation Contractor (of project B) to incorporate it into his time schedule, which is 
called the master time schedule, and they both need to understand the project 
requirements. 
 
The above coordination between these Contractors was organised and managed by the SEC 
PMs for these two projects.  Any lack of understanding of the project requirements could lead 
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to catastrophic consequences.  Unfortunately, JAWI‟s project example narrated above went 
horribly wrong.  There was an apparent poor level of coordination between the SEC‟s 
Specifications and Design Departments who had designed these two projects.  This was 
evident in not comprehending the project technical limitations of the two projects.  The SEC 
required the Cable Contractor to procure Fibre Optics cables while the Switchgear Contractor 
working at the other end of the site was required to procure a Switchgear type that required 
analogue cables.  Analogue cables were not brand-new like the Fibre Optics cables and, 
therefore, the SEC ordered the Fibre Optics cables.  However, the Switchgear project was an 
expansion of an existing old substation and, therefore, the Contractor was required to procure 
Switchgears in which only Analogue cables could fit.  The project descended into chaos, 
especially since the Contractor had already placed the order and the cables were 
manufactured.  This case, and many others in which projects experienced similar incidents, 
was a direct result of not conducting a diligent level of coordination between the SEC 
Departments.  In fact, the effectiveness of the coordination within the very same SEC division 
of employees could be questioned.  SAR (SEC) gave the following example: 
The Specifications and Design project team consists of three specialists:  one for 
transformers, one for SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and one for 
switchgears.  Sometimes there is a lack of coordination between the three, which is 
essential for studying the technical compatibilities between the three.   
 
    
 
6.4.5   PDF 45 (‘Difficulties in obtaining work permits’) 
Although this PDF had a non-significant loading factor value in the „SEC‟s Communication and 
Coordination Effectiveness‟ principal component (Sig. =0.485 < 0.512), it was the only PDF 
that was considered among the highly ranked ones according to all three of the SEC, 
Contractor and Consultant PMs (ranked 3rd, 5th and 5th, respectively).   
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As was previously described in PDF 38 (‘SEC’s failure to coordinate with government 
authorities during planning’), securing the required project work permits was one of the SEC 
Project Planning Department‟s roles.  A project work permit referred to any document that 
must be issued from the relevant government authority or private entity before initiating the 
project activities, otherwise project activities would be disrupted.  Indeed, many projects were 
delayed for this particular reason.  JAWI (SEC) shared the following experience:   
It always happens in overhead line projects because we need to use both private and 
public properties.  They (SEC Planning Department) should have issued all permits 
from government authorities and gained permission from the private owners and 
compensated them if required.  Not just survey the site and locate the working area 
and the next day when the Contractor starts drilling we find someone with a machine 
gun who shoots in the air to kick us out! This could have been avoided if the Planning 
Department did their job properly. 
 
As was previously stated, in an attempt to solve the problem of issuing the project work 
permits, the SEC shifted the role of issuing these permits to Contractors.  SAR (SEC) justified 
this action by noting that Contractors had established working relationships with various 
government authorities.  This, according to SAR (SEC), would ease the process of issuing 
these necessary permits.  Yet, this problem was considered the most common and persistent 
PDF.  In fact, this PDF was the only one in which all three respondent groups (the SEC, 
Contractor and Consultant PMs) agreed to rank it highly when compared to all other PDFs.  
 
The following example by JAWI (SEC) presents an extreme and rare case where indeed the 
relationship between the Contractor with the government authorities did play a key role in the 
easy issuing of almost any required permit: 
This Contractor had only one advantage -  he had a tremendous power to issue any 
work permit.  He knew the whole Baladiya (Municipality) and the Traffic Police.  He 
once worked on a motorway without any condition (when others had to only work 
during off-peak times).  It took him only a few hours to get the paperwork done without 
asking for any supporting letters!  This was the only reason why he is still listed as a 
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qualified Contractor, otherwise he should be out of the game.  He always starts 
executing in the last six months of the contract.  
 
This particular Contractor, according to the subject, was very difficult to manage.  However, 
having such powers to issue the project work permits in a very short time was considered by 
this Contractor as an asset for the SEC.  Not all Contractors were fortunate to have such a 
relationship with the government authorities.  This was especially true for Contractors who only 
focused on Electrical Contracting activities and works.  They usually have businesses that are 
limited to the SEC and other private clients rather than public clients.  Therefore, they have 
less public contracts with government authorities when compared to smaller local contractors 
who focus on project activities in addition to electrical works.     
 
The above showed that issuing the project work permits could be a significant problem.  
However, the SEC, in some cases, contributed to this problem by not coordinating with the 
government authorities in the early stages during planning.  In another extreme case, the SEC 
avoided committing contractually to the Municipality, as was previously described by GARA 
(Contractor) in PDF 29 (‘Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the Contractor by 
the SEC’ 
 
 
6.5   Contractor’s Project Planning and Controlling Effectiveness 
The Contractor was responsible for turning the SEC‟s project concept into an operating 
product.  Therefore, the Contractor needed to carefully estimate his available resources to fulfil 
the project requirements.  Project planning in this principal component referred to a 
Contractor‟s ability to forecast various variables surrounding the project, while project 
controlling was concerned with monitoring the project‟s progress and managing these various 
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variables.  This Principal Component accounted for 11.81% of total variance explained after 
Varimax rotation, and contained five PDFs, as shown in Table 6.3.      
 
Table 6.3: Contractor’s Project Planning and Controlling Effectiveness PDFs 
 
 
 
6.5.1   PDF 21 (‘No effective or realistic contingency plans in case project 
is behind schedule or over budget’) 
GARI (Contractor) claimed that 
If everything goes okay without any delay caused by any party, the project can be 
delivered in 14 months while the SEC wants it in 24 months.  Equipment delivery 
requires the longest lead time of up to 12 months from designing, manufacturing, 
testing and shipping to the site.  The remaining work for installation and commissioning 
and testing don't take long. 
 
This optimistic statement assumed the project work flow would not be disrupted by, for 
example, design reviews and approvals by Consultants, placing equipment orders, project site 
readiness, securing project work permits, performing equipment testing, etc.  However, given 
the highly dynamic nature of a project where all project stakeholders (the SEC, Contractors, 
Consultants, subcontractors, manufacturers, suppliers, government authorities, designers, 
etc.) were most probably juggling more than one project, change was inevitable.  Therefore, 
plan deviations were always there no matter how effective the original plan was.  The SEC 
PMs were generally critical of a Contractor‟s ability to forecast and adapt to plan deviations.  
PDF LF PDF Description 
21 0.795 No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or over budget
20 0.772 Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor
23 0.757 Ineffective control of the project's progress by the contractor
19 0.607 Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage 
2 0.552 Delay in materials delivery 
PDF: Project Delay Factor
LF: Loading Factor value
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This PDF contributed highly to the principal component „Contractor‟s Planning and Controlling 
Effectiveness‟ (Sig. = 0.795) and was ranked 4th by the SEC PMs.          
 
Arguably, a plan deviation existed for the following reasons: using unsound planning 
methodology (detailed in PDF 20 (‘Ineffective project planning and scheduling by 
Contractor’) (see section 8.5.2); lack of accurate project information (i.e. information used 
was false); project information flow suggest that the project requirements were of a 
progressive nature; and other forces beyond the Contractor‟s control.  This PDF referred to the 
ability to respond to any project plan deviation that required an effective identification and 
response to project risk.  A project risk was defined by the PMBOK as “an uncertain event or 
condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or a negative effect on at least one project objective, 
such as time, cost, scope, or quality.”  
 
When discussing PDF 45 (‘Difficulties in obtaining work permits’), JAWI (SEC) gave an 
example of a Contractor who was blessed with the ability to issue the required project work 
permits when all SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs agreed that the issuing of the permits 
was a great concern.  The problem with this particular Contractor was that he started the 
project activities in the last six months of the originally scheduled 24-month contract.   
 
Yet, he was described as very fast in execution when compared to other Contractors and was 
able to lay 500 meters of cable per day (out of a total 6 kilometres).  This type of project 
(Power Transmission underground cable project) was commonly known for its potential 
problem of changing the cable-routes, especially in urban areas.  In fact, the original project 
cable-route did appear to cross a private property but the Contractor had not predicted that the 
route might change.  The Contractor suggested a new shorter route and the SEC approved 
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this new route.  The project was delivered but was also followed with prolonged discussions 
between the SEC and the Contractor.  The cable price (made of copper) increased 
considerably during project execution and the Contractor claimed for price adjustment while 
the SEC was not satisfied with the delayed project execution.  The SEC‟s argument was that if 
the project had started on time rather than in the last six months of the time period scheduled 
for the project, the cable would have been purchased at the previously agreed price.  The 
example showed a flaw in the Contractor‟s practice in a project that was commonly known to 
have its cable-route changed.  Although the Contractor relied on his fast execution rate, he 
apparently ignored the probability of a cable-route change being required and failed to take 
into consideration volatile cable prices.           
 
 
6.5.2   PDF 20 (‘Ineffective project planning and scheduling by Contractor’) 
Project planning was the most critical process that had a direct impact on meeting a project‟s 
primary objectives of scope, budget and time schedule.  This PDF will describe the 
Contractor‟s ability to estimate the project work volumes and the required resources to carry 
out the project activities.  The following are the accurate project resources estimations which 
are required: the availability of reliable information from the client, which has already been 
described by ORFA (SEC) as a source of difficulty for Contractors, information flow in a timely 
manner and sound planning methodology.  Information availability and accuracy were a great 
concern for Contractors, as will be detailed in the „SEC‟s Tendering System‟ and „Lack of 
Project Requirements Clarity‟ Principal Components.  This PDF had the second highest 
loading factor value (Sig. = 0.772) and was ranked highly by the SEC PMs (ranked 8th).   
Contractor planning started from the bid/no-bid decision when the SEC called for project RFPs 
(Request for Proposals).  All details relevant to bidders conducting comprehensive technical 
studies that were based on the bidding documents will be discussed in „SEC‟s Tendering 
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System‟ Principal Component.  The chosen Contractor was required to submit a project 
schedule plan to the SEC PM who would review it and then approve the plan.  In this plan, 
major deliverables and activities were distributed over the project contract period.   
 
The general attitude towards Contractors‟ project planning ability was a point of concern.  
ORFA SEC PM was asked to comment on this particular PDF.  Although he was managing 
projects with international Contractors at the time, he said: 
Ohooo! (implying disappointment).  I have never seen a Contractor who is good at it.  
No one is good!  They don‟t have experienced people -  for example, the time 
schedule.  I have never seen a realistic schedule. 
 
BARAK (SEC) gave an example of a „nonsense‟ schedule plan: 
I had a project in Makkah and I had been discussing the time schedule for 2 to 3 weeks 
with the Contractor until the moment I decided not to approve his schedule due to it 
being nonsense.  I could find many mistakes.  For example, the installation date was 
after the testing date and many other silly mistakes.  Even the tools used in the time 
schedule were very basic.  You can‟t see a Critical Path Method for example. 
 
 
6.5.3   PDF 23 (‘Ineffective project progress control by Contractor’) 
The aim of monitoring the project progress was to ensure that the project objectives were 
being delivered on a regular basis.  The mutual project objective between the SEC and 
Contractor was delivering the project on time.  Therefore, the Contractor was obliged to 
regularly report to the SEC with a detailed project progress status.  This PDF had the third 
highest loading factor value contributing to the Principal Component “Contractor‟s Project 
Planning and Controlling Effectiveness” (Sig. = 0.757).   
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In general, SEC PMs were more critical of Contractors‟ project control effectiveness (ranked 
7th highest).  Being involved with other public projects made project priority management a 
central issue for Contractors.  This was especially true for Contractors who faced serious 
resource shortages (financial, manpower, material, etc.).  The SEC used to force a contractual 
condition where the Contractor had to assign one PM who should only manage one project at 
a time with the SEC in addition to not being involved in any other public projects.  However, 
the large number of ongoing public projects in Saudi Arabia forced the SEC to relax the 
condition and assign one site manager per project rather than a PM.  In fact, the number of 
projects that needed to be delivered for the SEC alone was very challenging and this forced 
the SEC to award project contracts to Contractors who indeed lacked adequate resources.  
ORFA (SEC) gave the following example: 
Sometimes we award a contractor 15 projects in one year though he can‟t deliver all of 
them. We shouldn't have invited him from the beginning, but if we hadn‟t then he would 
query why he wasn‟t invited (laughs). We must evaluate his capacity, I don't know how, 
but we should.   
Awarding projects beyond a Contractor‟s capacity had a direct impact on maintaining effective 
project control.  It seemed, though, that the SEC was left with no other options since the 
capacities of all qualified Contractors were limited when compared to the size of SEC‟s 
expansive ongoing projects.   
 
6.5.4   PDF 19 (‘Improper technical study by Contractor during bidding 
stage’) 
Effective planning required thorough understanding of the technical needs of the SEC projects.  
When compared to normal construction projects, the SEC projects involved highly advanced 
technologies and equipment.  Comprehending SEC project requirements was a challenging 
aspect for Contractors.  This PDF was concerned with the surrounding issues which 
contributed to the conducting of improper technical studies of the SEC project requirements 
during the bidding stage.  This PDF had the fourth highest loading factor value that contributed 
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to the „Contractor‟s Project Planning and Controlling Effectiveness‟ Principal Component (Sig. 
= 0.607).   
 
After studying the bidding documents, visiting the project site and attending the job explanation 
meetings, the lowest bidder risked not being allowed to adjust his offer price after submitting 
his official bid to the SEC Contracting Department.  Moreover, the competitive bidding climate 
squeezed the serious bidders into a compromise between achieving the desired project profit 
and being the lowest bidder to win the contract.  Therefore, careful and thorough study of SEC 
project technical requirements was crucial for better and improved project resource estimation 
and planning.   
 
The SEC research subjects generally believed that the Contractors did not thoroughly read the 
bidding package. WALA (SEC) explained why this was so:  
He (the contractor) assumes that the project is just a replication of the previous ones 
since there are few original items which are explicitly listed in the bidding documents -   
for example, additional design work or more activities in a larger site area. The problem 
is they do not read the contract thoroughly.   
 
6.5.5   PDF 2 (‘Delay in material delivery’) 
The research participants did not distinguish between materials (such as steel, cement, bricks, 
etc.) and equipment (drillers, transformers, boilers, etc.).  Therefore, equipment-related issues 
will be described alongside material-related issues.  This PDF was concerned with the issues 
that delayed the supply of both materials and equipment to the project site.  Although this PDF 
had the lowest loading factor value which contributed to the “Contractor‟s Project Planning and 
Controlling Effectiveness” Principal Component (Sig. = 0.552), it was highly ranked by both the 
SEC and Contractor PMs (ranked 2nd and 4th, respectively).   
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Supplying both materials and equipment in a timely manner proved to be very challenging in 
the investigated project industry.  The research data collection took place while the global 
economy was experiencing a period of expansion.  The global economic growth was reflected 
in the increasing demand for various materials and equipment used in a wide range of 
construction projects.  AJ (Contractor) gave an example of a materials availability problem:    
These days (2007) because of the booming market, resource (availability) is a problem 
everywhere, not only in one organisation - all organisations are having these sorts of 
problems in terms of manpower and availability of raw materials.  We had a project in 
Qatar which was cancelled because no cement was available in the country, so the 
project couldn't go through.  Let's say lack of resource problem is there these days. 
 
Equipment manufacturing was another soaring problem.  The lead time to when the equipment 
would reach the project site was increasing as a result of the growing demand for various 
types of equipment.  AJ (Contractor) gave an example of this particular problem: 
If I talked only about Siemens, the transformer manufacturer says the delivery will take 
place in two years from now while other manufacturers are quoting 18 months delay.  If 
I placed an order now I would have it in a year and a half while the project lifecycle is 
only 21 months.  So I am left with only three months to ship them from Belgium by sea 
to Saudi Arabia, unload it, take it to the site, install, test, (and) commission it, which is 
very hectic. 
 
The researcher had an informal chat with a Contractor PM who represented Alstom in Saudi 
Arabia.  Alstom was a French Contracting Company and was involved in delivering the largest 
water desalination utility in the world to date (as of 2010) and which also produced electricity 
(the Al-Shuaiba project).  He mentioned in 2007 that he tried to place an order for several gas 
turbines for the Power Generation project.  These were normally delivered in two years but the 
mother Company‟s factory in France had many orders lined up.  Therefore, it was able to 
deliver the gas turbines before 2014.  According to him, Chinese customers were ordering 
turbines in quantities that were beyond the factory‟s capacity.  In fact, the Chinese were keen 
to purchase orders at premium prices from queued customers waiting for their turbines to be 
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manufactured to have more of these gas turbines delivered before 2014.  This clearly shows 
that the global economy factor played a key role in the supply-demand gap for the required 
materials and equipment, causing delivery delay for the required items.   
6.6   Consultant-related  
The SEC outsourced Consultants mainly to review the detailed engineering designs submitted 
by the Contractors.  These Consultant engineers were also involved in monitoring the project 
site and the work progress.  They were also required to deliver written and verbal reports to 
the SEC PMs with regards to the Contractor performance.  Their presence during the 
inspection and testing of the major deliverables was important since before commissioning 
and connecting the project with the existing Power System they provided their technical 
evaluations of these deliverables.  This Principal Component accounted for 11.2% of the total 
variance explained and consisted of four PDFs, as shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4: Consultant-related PDFs  
 
 
6.6.1   PDF 54 (‘Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the 
engineer’) 
Consultant engineers in both Power Generation and Power Transmission projects were 
contracted by the SEC to review the detailed technical drawings and designs submitted by the 
Contractors.  They gave their technical decisions to approve or reject the offered specifications 
in the Contractors‟ submittals.  In Power Distribution projects, the SEC PMs were the ones 
who reviewed the Contractors‟ submittals.  The Contractors were keen to have their submittals 
reviewed and approved without delays so they could place orders for the materials and 
PDF LF PDF Description 
54 0.763 Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer
58 0.727 Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries 
57 0.639 Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer 
55 0.547 Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties involved 
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equipment with the manufacturers and suppliers. Any delay in approving the Contractor‟s 
submittals had, in many cases, a direct effect on project delivery duration. This was especially 
true for approving submittals of large equipment (such as gas turbines and transformers) that 
would normally take several months to manufacture, followed by the required inspection, 
testing, installation and commissioning. This PDF had the highest loading factor in the 
Consultant-related Principal Component (Sig. = 0.763).  It was also the Contractors‟ main 
concern, as their PMs ranked it second.  It was the only PDF that was among the top ten 
ranked PDFs according to all PG, PT and PD PMs.  This indicated that the SEC PMs in Power 
Distribution projects were also delaying the approval of Contractor submittals.   
 
Many Consultants had wide experience with the SEC projects.  Therefore, it was expected that 
having implemented similar projects within a specific field with the same client would lead to 
an improved and faster practice and better understanding of these conducted projects.  
Moreover, Contractors were keen to outsource the engineering works and services to 
Designers who were experienced with the SEC projects.  This would even reduce the chances 
of having errors in the submittals.  In practice, however, it was evident that approving (or 
rejecting) Contractors‟ submissions in a timely manner was often not possible and led instead 
to serious delays.  AJ (Contractor) did not see the matter as a phenomenon, but still 
acknowledged the existence of the problem:  
And it also depends on the individuals -people are hiring Consultants who operate in 
between us so let's say if it was (an) extension job it is simply copying the previous 
project and pasting it into the new project.  So if we submitted the same drawings for a 
project which is already being commissioned there should not be any problems but still 
we get comments from the client that this is not correct and that is not right.  The 
consultant in between us is trying to justify his position. So that depends on the 
individual who is involved in between. 
 
On the other hand, SAR (SEC) had a different view as a Contract Manager in the SEC.  He 
previously addressed the point that time extension claims by Contractors were mainly because 
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of the delay in Contractors‟ submittals approvals.  In contrast to AJ (Contractor), SAR (SEC) 
thought this PDF was a phenomenon: 
This is one of the most important factors Contractors complain about.  If they 
(Contractors and Consultants) agree to have the approvals in a month, they 
(Consultants) take two.  They (Consultants) usually ask for many adjustments.  All of 
us are bored with, for example, 110 KV substation design - we always proceed with the 
same projects and designs and if there is any change it shouldn‟t take that long.  So 
being stubborn and taking longer time is not excusable and will get on the Contractors‟ 
nerves.  It could be something personal. 
 
 
6.6.2   PDF 58 (‘Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor 
inquiries’) 
In many cases, the Contractors and their outsourced Designers had questions relevant to the 
SEC drawings and specifications in the bidding package.  For expansion projects, these 
drawings described the existing power systems. Having answers to these inquiries was critical 
for the Contractors if they wished to avoid any unnecessary reworking of designs and avoid 
having their submittals rejected by the Consultants.   
 
This PDF had the second highest loading factor value in the „Consultant-related‟ Principal 
Component (Sig. = 0.727).  It was also ranked highly by both Contractor and Consultant PMs 
(ranked 7th and 8th, respectively).The following presents an example, narrated by WALA 
(SEC), which reasons why Consultants had a slow response:  
When the (Consultant) engineer lacks the adequate experience, he fears taking risks; 
so, he prolongs the process through shocking acts such as rejecting the submissions 
because the letter format, for example, was not right.  So, he asks the Contractor to 
place the SEC logo in the middle of the line rather than on the side.   
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6.6.3   PDF 57 (‘Delay in performing inspection and testing by the 
consultant engineer’) 
After major equipment such as gas turbines, boilers, transformers, switchgears, etc. had been 
manufactured; the Contractor PM would notify the SEC PM to issue a Release of Shipment 
letter.  This would be issued after inspecting the equipment in the factory with the attendance 
of the SEC representatives and the Consultant PM.  Other tests were required in the project 
site before final commissioning and integrating of the new project into the existing power 
system. This PDF was concerned with the late execution of the necessary inspections and 
testing caused by the Consultant engineer. It had the third highest loading factor value of the 
„Consultant-related‟ Principal Component (Sig. = 0.639), and was highly ranked by Consultant 
PMs (ranked 5th).  This PDF was, to a great extent, relevant to the shortage in Consultant‟s 
manpower, as will be discussed in the Principal Component of „Manpower Challenges and 
Material Uncertainties‟.  This explained why this PDF was ranked highly by Consultant PMs 
only. Moreover, the delay in performing equipment inspections and testing was not only 
caused by the Consultant engineer since it was evident that the SEC also played a key role in 
this type of delay.  The SEC PMs repeatedly complained about the difficulty of coordinating 
with the Project Proponent representative the arrangement of a power system shutdown and 
their attendance at the test.  SAF (SEC) explained that arranging for a system shutdown was a 
sensitive matter and, therefore, the operator needed to carefully analyse the consequences on 
the grid:   
When performing the on-site testing, the delay mostly happens in expansion projects 
for existing plants when the shutdown is required but considered critical at the same 
time.  And since this would have an effect on the grid, it takes time and this delays the 
project. 
 
6.6.4   PDF 55 (‘Poor communication between the consultant engineer and 
other parties involved’) 
This PDF was ranked highly by Consultant PMs (ranked 8th).  It had the lowest loading value in 
the „Consultant-related‟ Principal Component (Sig. = 0.547).  The official means of 
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communication between Consultants, the SEC and Contractors was through written letters.  
However, it was evident that pending Contractor submittal approvals or inquiries could have 
been addressed and solved in a five minute meeting, as JAWI (SEC) described below. He 
appreciated having short meetings with Contractors and Consultants because “letters will 
result to nothing”.  These face-to-face meetings effectively resolved pending issues, but “there 
is a lack of such meetings”.  However, JAWI (SEC) presented evidence of the inefficient 
communication practice:     
There is no face-to-face contact.  What we use is internal correspondence using letters 
(between the SEC and consultants) while sometimes it's only an easy question that 
could have been addressed in a five minute meeting which would have yielded the 
answer or the relevant documents instead of the long loop that the Contractor‟s inquiry 
has to go through till it reaches the Consultant through me and then I forward it back to 
the Contractor when the Consultant replies.  
 
Clearly, this showed that the SEC PM could have a significant role to play in maximising the 
communicative efficiency of both the Consultant and Contractor PMs. 
 
6.7 Manpower Challenges and Material Uncertainties 
Projects are conceptualised, planned, designed, executed, monitored, delivered and operated 
by people.  Manpower refers to all individuals involved in the investigated project industry, 
whether they represent the SEC, Contractor or the Consultants.  Manpower and material 
fluctuating prices and availability were variables with significant challenges and uncertainties, 
as will be discussed below.  This Principal Component accounted for 6.56% of total variance 
explained and consisted of three PDFs, as shown in Table 6.5.         
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Table 6.5: Manpower Challenges and Materials Uncertainty PDFs 
 
 
6.7.1   PDF 9 (‘Low skills of manpower’) 
Projects required manpower with a specific set of skills in both technical and managerial 
aspects.  This study focused mainly on the skills of the manpower representing the three key 
project stakeholders of the SEC, Contractors and Consultants because their manpower much 
of the project from inception to closure.  This PDF had the highest loading factor value in the 
Principal Component of „Manpower Challenges and Material Uncertainty‟ (Sig. = 0.794).  The 
SEC PMs highly ranked this PDF (ranked 9th).  Starting with the owner‟s project managers, 
ABAB (SEC) admitted: 
So, basically, we must improve our employees and honestly they (the SEC Top 
Management) must consider selecting the right people to manage projects. It happens 
when there is poor project manager selection. 
 
Most of the SEC PMs were employed as fresh graduates with no prior work experience.  Their 
knowledge was limited to technical aspects learned in the academic institutions, although such 
knowledge was only of trivial technical terms.  Most of the SEC PMs who participated in this 
study admitted their need to attain managerial skills to better manage their assigned projects.  
ORFA (SEC) even sympathised with Contractor PMs as some secretly complained to him 
about his PM colleagues who represented the SEC.  He explicitly stated that some PMs 
demonstrated hostile behaviour, which suggested a Master-Slave attitude between the SEC 
PMs and the Contractors.  
 
PDF LF PDF Description 
9 0.794 Low skills of manpower
3 0.577 Changes in material prices
8 0.524 Shortage of manpower
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It could be argued that the SEC PM behaviours were reflections of their superiors‟ „bossy‟ 
attitudes.  BARAK (SEC), for example, pointed to the need to address the working relationship 
between some Project Division Managers and their PMs: 
Sometimes we had division managers with weak personalities and some had very 
strong and controlling attitudes which could kill the project team enthusiasm.  So, I 
think they (Top Management) should be aware of this point through better selection or 
better direction and guidance of this group.  
 
Therefore, he called for better project staff selection to sustain the team‟s enthusiasm, which 
was consistent with ABAB‟s (SEC) statement above.  Both subjects held the Top Management 
responsible for not selecting project members with the appropriate skills.  However, BARAK 
(SEC) expressed wider concerns about selecting members who worked in the earlier stages of 
the project: 
The Top Management may partially be responsible for selecting the right people for 
project execution.  I don't mean project execution the phase itself but I mean the whole 
process from planning, identifying the specifications  - all these are important phases in 
the project so either select the right people for the job or at least question them in case 
the project is delayed or troubled.  
 
Most participants considered the Department Manager and his superiors as Top Management.  
As could be sensed by BARAK‟s (SEC) tone in “may partially be responsible”, relating the 
flaws and mistakes of Top Management was not usually discussed openly.   
 
The Specifications and Design Department engineers were also heavily involved in the SEC 
projects.  They elaborated on the project primary scope developed by the Planning 
Department.  They specified the project requirements for major equipment and made sure the 
procured equipment and materials were technically compatible with the existing Power 
Systems.  They provided relevant designs and drawings to assist the bidders to submit offers 
with better estimations. It was previously mentioned that Specifications and Design engineers 
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showed a lack of coordination in the very same division as SAR (SEC) stated (see section 
8.4.4).This poor coordination was easily spotted by the Contract Manager, who requested 
them to carefully review the package. The transformers, SCADA and switchgears, for 
example, were not technically compatible and, therefore, the bidding stage was unnecessarily 
prolonged.  Besides the coordination downside, which represented a managerial weakness of 
the same division members, there were a few other major technical errors in the specification 
and design inside the packages submitted to the bidders.  Contractors usually spotted these 
technical errors when the Specifications and Design engineers requested non-applicable 
specifications in the bidding documents.  Therefore, the SEC Contracting Department had to 
rectify these errors by issuing Contract Addendums.  A Contract Addendum referred to major 
project scope deviations.  This indeed delayed the project award deadlines.  When SAR (SEC) 
was explicitly asked whether the technical abilities of the SEC Specifications and Design 
engineers were reasons for having more frequent Contract Addendums and, therefore, were 
the cause of project delays, he said: 
Sometimes it is the reason (acknowledgment tone).  I would say that, say in two years, 
each bid had 5 to 6 addendums but lately we have had one or two addendums.  An 
addendum means change in project scope that is a major addition or removal from the 
main project scope. 
 
Although not as usual, the SEC Top Management officers were not exempted from direct 
criticism.  SAR (SEC)gave an example of a non-constructive intervention by an Executive 
Director. Both of his subordinates, the Project Execution Department Manager and Project 
Specifications and Design Department Manager, lacked a common understanding with 
regards to procuring specific equipment during the bidding negotiation stage with the bidders.  
The Project Execution Department Manager experienced an operational flaw in the equipment 
suggested by the Specifications and Design Department Manager.  The latter, however, 
insisted on procuring the suggested equipment.  Both Department Managers were located in 
the Western Operating Area while the Executive Director (i.e. direct boss) was in Riyadh, the 
Capital (Central Operating Area).  The issue escalated and gained the attention of the 
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Executive Director in Riyadh who pulled the Project Execution Department Manager from the 
negotiation team and ceased any future involvement of the Department in bidding 
negotiations. Not being involved in such a critical project phase had negative and serious 
consequences, as will be seen in the „SEC‟s Tendering System‟ Principal Component.  
 
6.7.2   PDF 3 (‘Changes in material prices’) 
The SEC mainly used a Fixed Lump-Sum contract type for its turnkey projects.  This was an 
additional challenge for Contractors since the risk of material price increases was entirely 
shifted onto them.  Material prices were subject to change due to many external factors, 
especially those relevant to supply-demand forces.  HM SEC PM recognised several PDFs, 
but this particular PDF was his main concern: 
All projects are associated with problems whether from suppliers, contractors, 
commitment problems between contractors and manufacturers when the prices 
change.  We have experienced that many times.  Materials price change is one of the 
main problems that face our contractors. 
 
This unexpected PDF had the second highest loading factor value in the „Manpower 
Challenges and Material Uncertainties‟ principal component (Sig. = 0.577).  AJ (Contractor) 
pointed out to what extent the material prices had changed and, therefore, had an impact on 
project cost: 
Mostly cost overruns could be on account of currency exchange variations, and these 
days because of raw material price increases, copper and sheet steel is something no 
one is able to forecast prices for in the very near future.  I had a case in October (2006) 
when a cable was charged at 160 Riyals per metre.  Today (after 9 months) the cable 
is 380 Riyals per metre, so it's gone up two and half times.  Nobody expected that. 
 
This presented evidence that even those Contractors who were blessed to plan in their 
projects with the SEC even with basic methodologies, faced material price changes during 
project execution.  Therefore, these Contractors were forced to save the project budget for 
works relevant to other activities in order to recover the potential losses.  This inevitably 
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reduced the Contractors‟ work quality, which eventually led to disputes with the SEC and 
created a mistrustful working climate.   
 
AJ (Contractor) explained that manufacturers and suppliers were accepting orders that were 
beyond their capacities at the time:  
These days, because of the booming market, all manufacturers are overloaded with 
orders and some of them out of excitement and business eagerness they have taken 
projects which they are not able to fulfil.  They have huge inventories in their factories 
and they're not able to deliver in time.  So this is one cause of delay.  
 
 
6.7.3   PDF 8 (‘Shortages of manpower’) 
All three (SEC, Contractors and Consultants) had this universal project problem.  This PDF 
had the lowest loading factor value which contributed to the „Manpower Challenges and 
Material Uncertainties‟ Principal Component (Sig. = 0.524).  It was highly ranked by the SEC 
and Contractor PMs (ranked 10th and 3rd respectively).  The Kingdom was executing huge 
development projects but the SEC was struggling to provide sufficient electricity supplies.  This 
resulted in the authorisation of many projects by the SEC, and these were indeed beyond its 
human resource capacity.  This resulted in increases in the number of projects managed by 
the SEC PMs.  The researcher, for example, met ORFA (SEC) in 2007 when he was 
managing 5 projects; by 2009 he was managing 9 or 10 projects.  The subject was not sure 
whether he was managing 9 or 10 projects, which indicated the project overload needed to be 
properly addressed.   This problem worsened when the SEC faced high employee turnover in 
2008. 
 
Contractors and Consultants also suffered from this persistent problem.  Driven by the high 
unemployment rate of Saudi Arabian citizens, Labour-Supply Laws from abroad were 
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restrictive.  This prevented the Contractors and Consultants having adequate manpower for 
their awarded projects.  As a consequence, most Contractors and Consultants committed to 
deliver projects that were certainly beyond their available manpower capacities.  Contractors 
and Consultants were very eager not to lose any bid, whether with public, private or SEC 
projects.  This, consequently, caused serious project delays.  
6.8   SEC’s Tendering System 
This sixth Principal Component accounted for only 5.0% of the total attractive variance after 
applying Varimax rotation.  However, this Principal Component consisted of only one PDF, 
and this was PDF 46 (‘Owner’s tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest 
bidder’) (Sig. = 0.809).  It also had the highest loading factor value when compared to all 
other PDFs that contributed to their Principal Components.  This PDF was ranked highest by 
both the SEC and Contractor PMs but was not even among the Consultant PMs‟ highly ranked 
PDFs (ranked 20th).  It was understandable why Contractor PMs chose this PDF as the issue 
they were concerned about most.  An openly competitive bidding environment forced the 
serious bidders to lower their profit margins, leaving them with tight financial constraints in 
order to win the bid.  However, in having the SEC PMs perfectly agree with the Contractor 
PMs about the importance level of this particular PDF, it indicated there was a common 
ground between the two.  Having a common ground between the two presented the 
opportunity to narrow key project problems in the industry, but criticising the very same PDF 
by ranking it as the most important delay factor indicated there was a persistent and 
complicated phenomenon in the industry.        
 
The SEC Contracting Department perceived that adopting the policy of selecting the lowest 
bidder was a justifiable method for providing the Company with the best value for projects.  
This was because the selected qualified bidder was assumed to procure all deliverables stated 
in the bidding package arranged by the SEC with the lowest possible price. Yet, it was ranked 
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highest by the SEC PMs, who obviously completely disagreed with this adopted policy.  
Another interesting observation was that this PDF was also ranked highest by both Power 
Transmission and Power Distribution PMs, but was not even among the Power Generation 
PMs‟ highly ranked PDFs (ranked 28th).  Addressing the surrounding issues that contributed to 
selecting this PDF as being of most concern in this industry was crucial to delineate the 
Project Implementation Challenges.  It is important to remember, however, that the dynamics 
of the surveyed PDFs in this study presented complex interrelationships between these 
challenges.  This was especially true for this PDF since the tendering process could extend for 
up to two years, depending on the project type.  Therefore, having other PDFs surfacing 
during the tendering process was highly expected.     
 
Bidding package arrangement  
This research study perceived the arranging of the bidding package as the most controversial 
project phase in SEC.  This was because the package should provide the detailed engineering 
requirements and product specifications of a project, and all participating bidders should base 
their technical and financial offers on the information provided in this package.  Therefore, the 
„tendering‟ stage was considered the most „critical‟ stage in the SEC projects.  The bidding 
package which eventually developed into a binding contract between both SEC and the 
selected Contractor, proved to be a cause of continuous disputes and claims between the two.  
These complicated contract administration for both.   
Before portraying illuminating and relevant details, a crystal clear disparity is noticed between 
both SEC and Contractor PMs who ranked this PDF highest, while the same PDF was ranked 
20th by the Consultant PMs.  The main reason was that Consultant PMs were not involved in 
arranging the bidding package for the SEC.  Therefore, Consultant PMs lacked any 
understanding of the details surrounding this particular project stage since they were distant 
from it.  However, it could be argued that this PDF, for example, had a direct impact on having 
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PDF 58 (‘Slow response to Contractor inquiries from the Consultant engineer’) ranked 
highly by Consultant PMs (ranked 8th).  In other words, the lack of contract details clarity, 
which was originally formed from the bidding package, could have caused the slow response 
of these Consultant PMs to Contractor enquiries.  This showed that PDF 46 (‘Owner’s 
tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’) contributed to the 
performance of these Consultant PMs. 
 
It is interesting to note that the SEC entirely relied on its in-house engineering abilities to 
prepare the bidding package in both Power Transmission – through the Specifications and 
Design Department - and Power Distribution projects – through the Technical Support 
Division.  In Power Generation projects, however, the SEC relied on external international 
designers in collaboration with the Specifications and Design Department to arrange the 
bidding package.  The outsourced international designers were expected to have more skilful 
engineers when compared to the SEC engineers.  This partially explained why this PDF was 
not highly ranked by PG PMs compared to both PT and PD PMs (ranked highest).  This was 
despite the fact that Power Generation projects were much more complex when considering 
their size and the number of activities required to deliver the project compared to PT and PD 
projects.  Another important observation that might have contributed to it not being ranked 
highly by PG PMs was that just over one third of PG PMs were Consultants (i.e. 11 responses 
out of the total 32 PG responses were from Consultants) (Table 5.4).  These Consultant PMs 
did not highly rank this PDF (ranked 20th).  Therefore, this would be another reason explaining 
why this PDF was not highly ranked by the PG PMs. 
 
Prequalification  
“The problems we faced were with pre-qualified contractors.  Imagine how it would 
have been if we hadn‟t had the process!” Dr. Khoshaim 
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The SEC Contracting Managers were proud of the screening process that created a borderline 
between eligible Contractors who could be expected to deliver projects and meet the SEC 
requirements and those who did not have the available resources, set of skills and experience 
to qualify for being invited to bid.  However, there were noticeable threats and weaknesses 
surrounding the existing SEC prequalification requirements.  SAR (SEC) admitted:  
If I show you the list of our qualified Contractors, they are all well known.  Problems 
happen with those who just got qualified based on their experience in delivering other 
construction public projects with the Municipality, for example (undermining tone 
towards public projects).  When they start working with us, they are shocked at our 
requirements and set of specifications.  
 
The above statements and many other similar ones during conversations with the SEC PMs 
showed that their projects were perceived to have a better project delivery quality when 
compared to all other public projects.  Therefore, accepting new local Contractors to bid for 
projects with the SEC based on their project experience was not a sound measure since there 
was already a low level of expectation on the delivery of public projects.  Having a set of 
complex project requirements with the SEC compared to other public projects increased the 
risk of experiencing troubled projects during execution if these were awarded to new entrants 
who lacked any relevant project experience. 
 
The SEC PMs were, in general, concerned with the project performance of all Contractors,  
but all SEC PMs particularly expressed frustration at the newly qualified Contractors who were 
still learning to cope with the SEC project requirements.  When the researcher asked SAR 
(SEC Contracting Manager) why the SEC PMs considered this particular PDF to be their 
highest concern, he immediately replied: 
I will tell you why.  They (SEC PMs) should think of that if there was no sound 
prequalification system for contractors.  The SEC regulation states that we may allow 
those who are technically acceptable.  When we say “accepted” we implicitly judge that as 
“bad”.  But what we mean by „accepted‟ is those who are able to provide the minimum 
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requirements to execute a project.  Those who work in the Project Execution Department 
do not want those who are barely accepted, they want those who have excellent 
performance and abilities so their jobs become easier for them.  I would agree with them if 
we didn't properly qualify those contractors from the beginning.  But in Transmission 
Projects we have a sound qualification system.  Sometimes a few new small sized 
Contractors who were not properly qualified have caused troubles for the Project Execution 
Department.  They were either unproductive in terms of their labour or had weak project 
supervision. 
 
The researcher did not entirely agree with SAR (SEC) that the Company had a sound 
prequalification system since, as he claimed, the Company accepted new Contractors with 
poor performance.  It was expected that any new entrant in the Contracting business with the 
SEC would not have a sound performance at the beginning.  The problem, though, of having 
an ineffective prequalification process was deeper.  The relatively low number of qualified 
Contractors was clearly not sufficient for carrying out the SEC announced projects.  Therefore, 
the SEC seemed to be forced to qualify more Contractors who had supposedly delivered 
public projects with acceptable performance.  This observation was supported by the fact that 
the SEC was awarding projects to their qualified Contractors while being certain these projects 
were beyond their resource capacities.  Coupled with the Contractors‟ eagerness to win as 
many projects as possible, these factors have indeed contributed to project delays in the SEC.  
Relevant to this, ORFA (SEC) said:           
We must evaluate his capacity, I don't know how, but we should.  We gave a Contractor 12 
projects and all of these were delayed and some of them were delayed for over a year.  In 
addition, the problems we face with project number one we face the same problem with 
project number 11. It‟s as if you put all your eggs in one basket.  But here we all know our 
Contractors, unfortunately.  Their performance does not meet expectations. 
 
 
Bidder offer analysis by the SEC 
All bidders were supposed to submit both their financial and technical offers by a specific 
deadline for the SEC evaluation.  The main difference between PG projects and both PT and 
PD projects was the method of submitting the Contractors‟ offers.  Primarily, as was the case 
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in most PT and PD projects, the SEC used the one-envelope method that contained both the 
financial and technical offers.  These financial and technical offers were revealed together in 
the presence of all bidders.  The technical offer of the lowest bidder (i.e. with the least financial 
value) was subjected to an extensive review.  If the lowest bidder complied with SEC‟s 
technical requirements then he would be awarded the project. Otherwise, the SEC would 
conduct an extensive review of the second lowest bidder‟s technical offer.      
 
In PG projects and a very few large PT projects that were worth hundreds of millions of Riyals 
and were described in the SEC Contracting Manual as “non-repetitive projects with high 
values”, the technical offers of all bidders were first analysed while the financial offers 
remained with the bidders.  After conducting the technical evaluations, only bidders who were 
technically compliant were requested to submit their financial offers.  The bidder with the 
lowest financial offer would be awarded the project.  This was known as the „two-envelope” 
tendering method.  This method of tendering was perceived as another potential reason why 
the PG PMs did not highly rank PDF 46 (‘Owner’s tendering system requirement of 
selecting the lowest bidder’) compared to both PT and PD PMs.  Although the two-envelope 
tendering was indeed more time consuming when compared to one-envelope tendering, this 
method proved to minimise disputes between the SEC and Contractors during project 
construction.  In fact, this method was suggested by the Power Generation Project Execution 
Department and was approved by the Contracting Department.  This method replaced the 
one-envelope tendering method when it was confirmed it was the cause of prolonged disputes 
with Contractors during project execution.     
 
In PT and PD projects where the one-envelope tendering method was used, the SEC Bid 
Review Evaluation Team reviewed only one technical offer which was submitted by the lowest 
bidder.  Therefore, the offer analysis in this method was conducted in much less time when 
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compared to the offer analysis in the one-envelope tendering in PG projects.  This was 
especially true knowing that PT and PD project sizes were smaller than those in PG.  
Moreover, the SEC tended to award their projects to the lowest bidders and rarely analysed 
the second lower bidder offers.   This indicated that the offer analysis was conducted almost at 
once in PT and PD projects but was, indeed, surrounded by criticisms.     
Lowest bidder issues – one-envelope tendering 
In PT and PD projects, bidders with the lowest offers were generally seen as trouble according 
to the SEC PMs.  Unlike in PG projects, many false assumptions were in the lowest bidders‟ 
technical offers.  In all three project types, the SEC conducted Job Explanation sessions to 
clarify any ambiguity in the bidding packages.  The SEC projects, however, were complex and, 
therefore, the bidding packages were likely to have mistakes and inconsistencies.  Although 
PG projects were much larger and more complex than those in PT and PD projects, the main 
difference was having the opportunity to discuss the technical offers of all qualified bidders in 
PG projects in greater depth.  Unlike the one-envelope tendering method, PG bidders 
submitted their financial offers after each was familiarised with the likely project activities and, 
hence, could better estimate the required resources.  This highly intensive and time 
consuming process at least minimised uncertainties relevant to major changes in the project 
scope.    
 
In the one-envelope tendering method, on the other hand, the false assumptions of the lowest 
bidder‟s technical study surfaced while he was committed to the submitted financial offer.  
Therefore, the major technical deviations found in their offers more likely required additional 
resources, but they were not allowed to change the final price. The bidders‟ false technical 
assumptions were partially reasoned by the ambiguities of the SEC requirements in their 
bidding package.  However, there was a major concern about the SEC‟s conduct with the 
lowest bidders.  In several cases, Contractor PMs and the SEC PMs noted the unfair 
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behaviour of the SEC‟s Bid Review Evaluation Team who was seen to force the lowest bidders 
to procure additional deliverables without changing the price offer.  The main reason behind 
this behaviour was that the Bid Review Evaluation Team discovered the main bidding package 
was missing these essential deliverables.  Therefore, to avoid any embarrassment with the 
SEC Top Management by requesting additional financial reinforcement, the Bid Review 
Evaluation Team normally applied pressure on the lowest bidder to accept the new conditions.  
Because the lowest bidders were most likely very eager to win the project, the Bid Review 
Evaluation Team tended to establish negotiations with the second lowest bidders in case the 
lowest bidder resisted complying with the SEC‟s newly introduced requirements.  With regard 
to this, SAR (SEC) said:      
They (lowest bidders) agree especially if there is tight competition between the lowest 
and the second lowest offers.  This presents a great risk for him to lose the bid, so he 
accepts. 
 
During the bid offer analysis stage, only the major deliverables were discussed and analysed, 
and yet some of these were missed on occasion.  This represented two probable risks for 
Contractors.  The first was that the SEC would discover other missing and essential major 
deliverables during project construction after awarding the project to the Contractor.  This 
presented an opportunity for the Contractor since these new deliverables would be procured 
with a separate „change order‟, and these were normally at higher prices.  The other probable 
risk was in procuring the auxiliary parts of the project.  These non-major deliverables were 
normally approved during the project construction.      
6.9   Lack of Project Requirements Clarity 
Clarity of project requirements minimised activity assumptions and, consequently, improved 
the degree of certainty towards the essential resources.  This seventh Principal Component of 
„Lack of Project Requirements Clarity‟ accounted for only 5.0% of the total variance explained 
after Varimax rotation.  This Principal Component consisted of two PDFs (Table 6.6).  These 
PDFs were PDF 41 (‘Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and 
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drawings’) (Sig. = 0.629) and PDF 40 (‘Changes in the scope of the project’) (Sig. = 
0.482).  The latter PDF had a non-significant loading factor value (Sig. = 0.482 < 0.512).   
Table 6.6: Lack of Project Requirements Clarity PDFs 
 
 
The SEC projects focused on in this research were highly capital intensive and involved the 
use of an advanced range of technologies which aimed to generate, transmit and distribute 
electricity to different users around the Kingdom.   
 
Rapidly developing equipment technologies presented an opportunity for the SEC to support 
its aging infrastructure with innovative solutions.  This also presented an opportunity for the 
Contractors and suppliers to sell a wider range of products to the SEC with varying features.  
These developing technology products coupled with the potential depth of the contractual 
details of the required activities and the procured deliverables, made the nature of the binding 
contract between the SEC and the Contractors progressive rather than completely set and 
clear.  When asked how clear the contracts were with the SEC, AJ (Contractor) stated: 
Contracts are normally broadly clear. But when it comes to jobs of free-issue items 
from the client, what the status is of these free issue items, what the condition is of the 
free issue items becomes a question mark. Sometimes the client asks to check their 
transformer specs from their stores (to procure the same transformers) which might be 
very old, or they might not even be worth using but they still insist on using it.  So there, 
the clarity becomes a big question but with normal standard projects we know what the 
client wants. 
 
PDF LF PDF Description 
41 0.629 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings
40 0.482* Changes in the scope of the project
PDF: Project Delay Factor
LF: Loading Factor value
* Non-significant Loading Factor
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6.9.1   PDF 41 (‘Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in 
specifications and drawings’) 
Of relevance to project contract clarity, this PDF was concerned with repetitive mistakes, 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the specifications and drawings in the bidding package.  
Since the bidding package subsequently became a binding Contract between the SEC and the 
Contractor, clarity was a crucial ingredient for maintaining a contractual relationship with 
minimal disputes.  This PDF had the largest loading factor value which contributed to the „Lack 
of Project Requirements Clarity‟ Principal Component (Sig. = 0.629).  It was also ranked highly 
by the SEC and Contractor PMs (ranked 5th and 9th, respectively).   
 
HM (SEC) asserted the necessity of having a clear project contract: 
If we make our scope and specifications and drawings, quantities, approved 
manufacturers and suppliers list, if we make all these crystal-clear we make our lives in 
projects easier. The clearer we are the better. 
 
But, in reality, contract projects with the SEC were not perfectly clear, as ASAL (SEC) said: 
 The specifications can't always be clear; there must be a degree of vagueness. 
 
The researcher was concerned by the fact that, collectively, the SEC had over five decades of 
project experience and yet the problem of having ambiguous project contracts was persistent.  
It was understandable that not all project deliverables, especially the auxiliary items, could be 
addressed before the award of the project.  Doing this would have taken a very long time when 
the need to kick off the project was a matter of high urgency for the SEC.  This was in addition 
to the volatile economic conditions affecting material and equipment prices.   The SEC‟s 
behaviour towards the Contractors in requesting that they procure equipment with overly 
engineered technical features was noticeable.  Overly engineered equipment features 
indicated the choosing of desired specifications from several standards from various electrical 
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and electronics institutions and associations.  This behaviour was developing before the 
establishment of the SEC.   
 
 
6.9.2   PDF 40 (‘Changes in the scope of the project’) 
Project scope change represented a major change in project requirement (such as the addition 
of a large transformer or the replacement of an old fire fighting system, etc.).  This entailed the 
need to issue a change order to compensate the Contractor, indicating additional financial 
resources were required.   This PDF was only highly ranked by the PD PMs (ranked 9th) and 
had a non-significant loading factor which contributed to the Principal Component of „Lack of 
Project Requirements Clarity‟ (Loading Factor = 0.482 < 0.512).  Quantitatively, this PDF was 
disregarded as an element belonging to this Principal Component.  Qualitatively, changes in 
the project scope indeed had a significant impact on the project delivery progress and caused 
serious activity disruptions.   
 
6.10 Concluding Remarks – the Developed Conceptual Model 
In the search for the Project Implementation Challenges facing the electricity supply 
industry in Saudi Arabia, this chapter presented the identified PICs and their features 
and characteristics that were left implicit and unquestioned.  This section simplifies the 
exhibited conceptual model of the PICs and their main PDF elements.  The study has 
identified 7 PICs that were constructed with the 28 highly ranked PDFs.  These PICs 
and their corresponding PDFs were:  
1. SEC‟s Contractual Commitments: 
 Delay in progress payments by the SEC 
259 
 
 Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the SEC 
 SEC being uncooperative with the contractor, complicating contract 
administration 
 Suspension of work by the SEC  
 Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by the 
SEC 
 Delay in issuance of change orders by the SEC  
 Slow decision making by the SEC 
 Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor 
2.  SEC‟s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness  
 SEC‟s failure to coordinate with government authorities during 
planning 
 SEC‟s poor communication with related government authorities  
 SEC‟s poor coordination with contractors and consultants during 
project execution 
 SEC‟s poor coordination with the various parties during project 
execution 
 Difficulties in obtaining work permits  
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3. Contractor‟s Project Planning and Controlling Effectiveness 
 No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is 
behind schedule or over budget 
 Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor 
 Ineffective control of the project‟s progress by the contractor 
 Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage 
 Delay in materials delivery 
4. Consultant-related  
 Delay in the approval of contractor submission by the engineer 
 Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries 
 Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant 
engineer 
 Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other 
parties involved 
5. Manpower Challenges and Materials Uncertainties  
 Low manpower skills 
 Changes in material prices 
 Shortage of manpower 
6.  SEC‟s Tendering System  
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7. Lack of Project Requirements Clarity 
 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and 
drawings 
 Changes in the scope of the project 
After presenting the conceptually modelled PICs and describing the complexities of, 
and the relationships with, their PDFs, the next chapter will discuss the revealed 
findings in comparison with the reviewed literature.    
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7. Project Implementation Challenges in Context – 
Discussion of Findings 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter showed that the SEC, as the Project Owner, was directly 
relevant to most of the PICs identified in the investigated industry.  These PICs were 
SEC‟s Contractual Commitment, SEC‟s Communication and Coordination 
Effectiveness, SEC‟s Tendering System and Lack of Project Requirements Clarity, and 
they had 17.58%, 12.88%, 5.01% and 5.01% of total variances explained, 
respectively.  Collectively, the SEC-relevant PICs accounted for 40.48% of total 
variance explained.  The following examined how the SEC-related Project 
Implementation Challenges were interconnected and how they affected Contractor- 
and Consultant-related Project Implementation Challenges.  These will be compared 
with the literature review findings.   
7.2 SEC’s Contractual Commitment 
Strong project commitment by the project owner was identified as one of the most 
important factors for project success (Anderson et al., 2006).  In this study, SEC‟s 
Contractual Commitment represented the most significant PIC.  This PIC was 
concerned with the SEC contractual obligations and duties with various project 
shareholders.  Most of the PDF studies, including this one, confirmed the persistent 
delay in the progress payments made by the owners to the Contractors (Al-Kharashi 
and Skitmore, 2009, Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Odeh and Battaineh, 
2002).  In this study, only Contractor PMs ranked this PDF highly (ranked 8th) since it 
directly affected their organisational resource management.  The situation, however, 
was much improved since the establishment of the SEC.  Previously, the normal 
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practice in SCECOs (Saudi Consolidated Electricity Companies) was to authorise 
urgent projects without proper allocation of the required funds.  This led to significant 
delays and prolonged disputes with Contractors when their payments were due.  The 
problem was now more relevant to approving the Contractor‟s invoices in a timely 
manner since this seemed to be time-consuming.  This resulted from a slow decision-
making process in addition to the rigid requirements observed by the SEC Finance 
Department in reviewing the invoices.    
 
The delay in the settlement of Contractor claims by project Owners was also common 
in the PDF studies (Zaneldin, 2006, Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Faridi and El-
Sayegh, 2006).  In this study, only Contractor PMs highly ranked this PDF (ranked 
10th) as the SEC delayed decisions relevant to financial compensation or time-
extension requests submitted by these PMs.  Rejecting claims, especially the 
justifiable ones, led to Contractors perceiving project owners to be uncooperative, 
which complicated the contract administration (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, 
Mezher and Tawil, 1998, Odeh and Battaineh, 2002).   
Suspension of project works by project Owners was also a serious factor contributing 
to project delay (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997).  In 
this study, this PDF was in the form of, for example, not arranging necessary 
shutdowns to integrate the final project product into the SEC‟s power system, 
interruptions by public authorities with other project plans, or public neighbourhoods 
not wishing to live near to power substations equipped with high-voltage transformers.  
The latter showed the importance of securing public acceptance at the project 
planning stage, as detailed in Loring‟s study (Loring, 2007).  The real problem, though, 
264 
 
was the authorities not having in place relevant public inquiry legislation.  These 
projects were awarded to Contractors and work permits were issued and yet there 
were further interruptions led by the public.    
Delaying the delivery of the project site to the awarded Contractors was also noticed in 
the PDF studies (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997).  
The SEC also faced difficulties in handing over the project site to the awarded 
Contractor, which delayed mobilization of the procured equipment, materials and 
manpower to initiate the project works.  This was especially true when the project site 
was owned by the Municipality.  The example presented in this study was relevant to 
the avoidance of signing the tenancy contract, which caused serious project work 
interruptions by delaying the issuance of necessary project work permits.                 
 
Change orders were also very serious and common PDFs in several construction 
industries (Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 
1997, Sweis et al., 2008, Koushki et al., 2005).  In this study‟s context, change orders 
were reasons for many avoidable flaws, including the obvious lack of conducting 
comprehensive reviews of the SEC bidding package by the Specifications and Design 
Department engineers.  This also clearly reflected the poor coordination with the 
SEC‟s internal Departments.  The Project Proponent Department, for example, would 
notice that necessary deliverables were not included in the contract during the project 
construction.   Depending on their values, issuance of change orders required 
approvals from the SEC Top Management to compensate the Contractors for 
procuring the additional deliverables.  Therefore, in addition to the slow decision-
making process in the SEC, change orders implied that additional financial 
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enforcements were required.  Financial resources, however, were proven to be very 
scarce.  Therefore, the SEC representatives attempted, in some cases, to persuade 
Contractors to procure the additional deliverables at no cost.  If these additional 
deliverables were discussed during the offer analysis with the lowest bidder, the Bid 
Review and Evaluation Team members would establish negotiations with the second 
lowest bidder if the lowest bidder refused to procure these deliverables.       
 
Slow project decision making by project Owners was also highly regarded in the PDF 
studies (Al-Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009, Arditi et al., 1985, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 
1997, Faridi and El-Sayegh, 2006, Mezher and Tawil, 1998).  In addition to the many 
signatures required to validate the decision, slow decision making indicated a serious 
lack of authority by the project team members (Sense, 2008).  In this study, many SEC 
PMs complained of a lack of authority.  This was evident when some PMs mentioned 
cases where trivial issues that could have been quite easily resolved by them because 
they knew what the normal practice and action was that needed to be taken; yet, due 
to their lack of authority, however, trivial issues could escalate into more serious ones 
which, sometimes, required other departments to make decisions on.  Therefore, there 
is a genuine need to have in place a well-structured strategy to empower these PMs to 
make project decisions (Williams, 1997).   
 
Project overload referred to managing projects beyond the PM‟s capable capacity 
(Zika-Viktorsson et al., 2006).  As a result, this would minimise his project control 
abilities.  This was indeed becoming a phenomenon in the SEC.  As was mentioned 
before, the researcher interviewed ORFA (SEC), who was managing four projects 
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simultaneously.  After two years, the researcher learned from ORFA (SEC) that he 
was managing 9 or 10 projects at a time.  Five of these were in the closure phase.  
Projects under closure were described by SAR (SEC Contract Manager) as “hectic”.  
Consequently, ORFA (SEC) felt „lost‟ in many cases.  On the other hand, JAWI (SEC) 
thought that a PM should manage only one project.  In other words, he found it difficult 
to manage more than one project at a time.  Although he was managing 6 projects 
simultaneously, his claim presented the problem of comprehending the limits of project 
overload.  Clearly, maintaining the SEC‟s contractual commitments was challenging, 
not only with external organisations such as the Contractors and Municipalities, but 
also with its project employees.      
 
7.3 SEC’s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness 
Maintaining effective communication and coordination with the relevant project 
stakeholders is an essential means for minimising project uncertainties (Jha and Iyer, 
2007, Bentley and Rafferty, 1992).  The SEC dealt with various project stakeholders, 
and they needed reliable information concerned with the project in a timely manner.  
Therefore, this PIC could be considered as one form of the SEC‟s Contractual 
Commitments.  However, having the communication- and coordination-related PDFs 
grouped in one Principal Component indicated the significance of this PIC and so 
needed to be addressed separately.  This observation was consistent with the PDF 
studies that considered project communication between the stakeholders to be a 
serious concern (Alaghbari et al., 2007, Arditi et al., 1985, Mezher and Tawil, 1998, 
Clarke, 1999, Pinto, 1990).  Project communication represented the generation, 
collection, distribution and retrieval of project information (PMI, 2004), and project 
coordination indicated the harmonizing and integrating of project activities or 
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requirements between the project parties (Jha and Iyer, 2006).  The SEC Project 
Planning Department presented a serious shortcoming with regards to performing 
necessary coordination with the relevant government authorities during the project 
inception phase.  This led to difficulties during project construction.  For example, lack 
of information about the project site conditions caused the changing of the cable route 
during construction.  This was consistent with Chan and Kumaraswamy‟s study (Chan 
and Kumaraswamy, 1997).  Poor communication also contributed to the difficulty of 
obtaining project work permits during project execution, as in Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly‟s 
study (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999b).  At the time of this research study, the SEC had 
shifted the responsibility of issuing project work permits to Contractors since 
government authorities were perceived as being very difficult to manage and did not 
cooperate with the SEC in a timely manner.  Yet, even when these permits were finally 
issued, projects were interrupted by the same authorities who issued the permits in the 
first place.  Project contractors, in some cases, needed the SEC‟s support to issue the 
necessary project permits using means more effective than just writing letters.  The 
SEC PMs, on the other hand, presented a lack of project ownership attitude when a 
few PMs claimed that to personally meet the authorities‟ representatives was beyond 
their job scope.   
The project overload that each PM experienced contributed to ineffective coordination 
and less frequent communication by the SEC PMs, especially with the Contractor and 
Consultant PMs.  In fact, having frequent communication and effective coordination 
between the SEC Departments and sometimes within the same Division presented a 
central challenge for the SEC.  For example, WALA (SEC) complained about not 
having a clear project organisation structure representing the SEC, while the 
Contractor was required by the SEC itself to provide its project organisation chart.  He 
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struggled as a PM to know who he should contact in the SEC Departments or 
Divisions. The Company lacked, at the time, an internal directory.  This problem 
became acute, for example, when SEC PMs had to arrange for project equipment 
testing and commissioning with the Project Proponent Department.   
 
To a great extent, the SEC had a rigid and highly centralised organisational structure. 
For example, the Engineering and Projects business sector of the Power Generation 
activities oversaw all SEC projects, from Riyadh in the Central Operating Area to the 
Western, Eastern, and Southern Operating Areas.  Each of these operating areas had 
three departments - Project Planning, Project Specifications and Design and Project 
Execution - that reported back to the Engineering and Projects business sector.  This, 
as a consequence, played a key role in the SECs slow decision making discussed 
previously, especially those relevant to issuing project change orders when additional 
financial enforcements were normally required. 
7.4 SEC’s Tendering System  
This challenge revealed a unique and perfect agreement between the SEC and 
Contractor PMs, who both ranked this PDF highest.  In fact, this PDF was statistically 
eligible to form a Principal Component on its own.  There were a few relevant issues 
that supported the significance of this PIC, including: 
1) Although participants representing the SEC Contracting Department claimed 
to have a sound prequalification system, the adopted system was 
surrounded by noticeable weaknesses.  Prequalifying the Contractors was 
necessary to screen out Contractors with inadequate resources or relevant 
experience (Al-Reshaid and Kartam, 2005).  Therefore, not inviting such 
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Contractors was in the SEC‟s interest since it would avoid potential 
problems with these Contractors.  In general, most of the SEC qualified 
Contractors were experienced.  However, the Contracting business volumes 
were continuously growing, in the SEC, specifically, and in other public 
projects, in general.  This presented two serious risks for the SEC.  The first 
was the SEC being forced to award projects to Contractors known to have 
inadequate resources to carry out the activities.  The second risk was the 
pressure on the SEC to qualify more new Contractors whose experiences 
were in delivering public projects.  These collectively contributed to project 
delays and troubles in the industry.  Clearly, although the prequalification 
system was supposed to provide the project owner with a reliable method to 
select  contractors that were capable of carrying out the project activities (El-
Sawalhi et al., 2007), various external forces prevented the SEC from 
making efficient usage of the system.       
2) Bidding package arrangement is the most critical stage in projects (Ling and 
Poh, 2008).  This was also sensed in the SEC projects when several flaws 
at this stage evidently contributed to various forms of delay in these projects.  
The Specifications and Design engineers, for example, had poor 
coordination and did not conduct comprehensive reviews of the bidding 
packages.  This prolonged the tendering project stage and, in addition, was 
the cause of chaotic problems that appeared during project execution.  
ABAB (SEC) presented to the researcher evidence that the Specifications 
and Design Department requested that the Project Execution Department 
provide them with the lessons learned in previous projects in order to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes in their bidding packages.  SAR (SEC), on the 
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other hand, gave other evidence that these lessons were not taken 
seriously.       
3) The SEC behaviour during the bid offer analysis raised concerns.  One of 
the relevant bidding package flaws was the missing of some essential 
deliverables.  In some cases, these deliverables were noticed by the Bid 
Review Evaluation Team (BRET) during the lowest bidder offer analysis.  To 
avoid issuing a change order and perhaps the necessity to repeat the 
tendering process, the BRET tended to persuade the lowest bidder to 
accept procuring these deliverables at no additional cost.  In most cases, the 
lowest bidders accepted procuring these deliverables after strong and 
abusive pressure was applied by the BRET.  This presented an opportunity 
for the lowest bidder.  There were most likely other necessary missed 
deliverables that would be noticed during project construction.  Therefore, 
missing these deliverables would inevitably force the SEC to issue change 
orders.  In fact, Mohamed et al. (2010) argued that awarded Contractors 
might have lowered their bid prices and sacrificed any profits in the hope of 
recovering these profits when the inevitable change orders arose (Mohamed 
et al., 2010).  SAR (SEC) described how Contractors were only in a stronger 
position than the SEC when his organisation was forced to issue a change 
order.  This was true since the change order prices for the new deliverables 
were not usually negotiable.  This opportunistic behaviour could have been 
avoided, or at least minimised, if the SEC had effectively learned from 
previous projects and, more importantly, had used fair tendering behaviour.     
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7.5 Lack of Project Requirements Clarity 
This PIC was highly relevant to the flaws identified during project tendering.  These 
flaws contributed to placing change orders for additional deliverables.  The issuing of 
change orders was also identified in other construction industries as a persistent 
problem (Arditi et al., 1985, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1997, 
Kaming et al., 1997, Sweis et al., 2008, Koushki et al., 2005).  Moreover, the SEC 
contracts were of a developing nature.  Therefore, not all project deliverables were 
specified.  Both NABA (SEC) and AJ (Contractor) agreed that these non-specified 
deliverables were a source of concern during project construction.  These deliverables 
triggered both the SEC and Contractors to interpret the contract differently based on 
their interests.  This was besides the noticeable lack of required information with 
regards to the technical limitations of the project site.  Information availability was a 
serious problem, especially in expansion projects.  Even worse, the information 
provided to the Contractor was, in many cases, inaccurate.  For example, the site 
conditions differed from those described in the bidding packages.  This indicated that 
additional and necessary change orders were required.  The project site locations 
were also changing during the bidder offer analysis, while the bidders based their 
offers on a different location and, hence, with different conditions.       
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8. Research Conclusions and Implications 
8.1   Introduction 
This problem-driven research study aimed to develop a coherent understanding of the 
Project Implementation Challenges to improve the project delivery rate of the Saudi 
Arabian electricity supply industry.  The conducted study adopted both a pragmatic 
and a theoretical approach by triangulating literature, a questionnaire survey and semi-
structured interviews to formulate the factors delaying project delivery in the 
investigated industry.  These were then arranged to form the Project Implementation 
Challenges.  This chapter will present, for each research objective, what was looked 
for, what was found and the significance of these findings.  This will be followed by 
recommending remedial practices that aim to minimise the effect of the presented 
findings.  However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these recommendations are not 
necessarily offering sustainable solutions for the troubled investigated industry.  This is 
because the suggested practices are based on serious problems identified in a highly 
sensitive industry with an apparent political visibility.  Therefore, the identified 
challenges will naturally develop based on key stakeholders‟ actions which are taking 
place while this report is being written.  Thus, the presented solutions and 
recommendations are circumstantial rather than sustainable.  To provide practical 
suggestions to improve the general state of the industry in a sustainable manner, it is 
essential to devote resources coupled with sincere willingness by the key 
stakeholders, especially the government, to provide the essential sustainable solutions 
for the industry as a whole with detailed plans of actions for each stakeholder to follow 
and enforce.   
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8.2 Addressing the Saudi Arabian Power Industry Challenges – 
general view      
The first two objectives of this research were to develop a coherent understanding of 
the challenges surrounding the Saudi electricity industry as a whole, followed by 
documenting the industry-related adopted polices to assess their role in the existence 
of these identified industrial challenges.  The challenges surrounding the Saudi 
electricity industry as a whole were: 
 Acceleration of Saudi Arabian domestic demand for electricity at a very fast rate 
of 8% annually when the world electricity demand was averaged to increase at 
a rate of 2.5% annually. 
 Inefficient usage and thus wastage of electricity promoted by the heavy 
subsidies adopted by the government in addition to allowing the importing of 
cheap and inefficient electrical appliances.  
 The requirement to make substantial investments in order to secure additional 
electricity supplies in addition to the need to replace the aging infrastructure.  It 
was forecasted that by 2032 Saudi Arabia would be required to triple the 
existing generation capacity to secure sufficient supplies.  This forecast 
presented two central problems for the government.  The first was the 
projection of the likely need to burn more oil as its use as the primary fuel for 
power plants would increase significantly.  This indicated that the oil available 
for exports is likely to decline while global demand for oil is likely to increase.  
Knowing that revenue from oil exports is a fundamental source of income for 
the government presents complex political, economic and social challenges.  
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The second central problem was the lack of sufficient financial resources 
required to authorise urgent expansive projects in the Power Supply Industry. 
The second research objective overlapped in nature with the first objective described 
above.  However, this research was able to develop a thorough understanding of the 
reasons preventing the enforcement of necessary reforms.   For example, the 
government showed a reluctance to fully invest in the highly intensive industry.  It had 
already offered subsidies in the past that gradually increased, and seemed to resist an 
adjustment of the tariff that would promote both efficient electricity usage and create 
new financial channels for new investments in the Power Supply Industry.  The 
government was highly influenced by domestic socio-political forces when it reduced 
the, seemingly, commercial tariff introduced by the SEC in less than a year after the 
start of its operation in 2000. The fact that the government adjusted the tariff without 
providing a coherent compensation scheme for the SEC reduced its revenues 
significantly. The consequences of this were as follows: 
 Delay in the execution of several planned power generation, transmission and 
distribution projects, including the inability to generate reserve margins during 
peak loads and to adequately replace aged infrastructure. 
 The urgency of authorising expansive projects in the industry forced the SEC to 
rush a bid in once the financial resources were finally allocated.  This resulted in 
poor preparation of the bidding package documents due to their being arranged 
within a tight time scale.  The negative consequences could have been 
minimised if the financial resources were allocated and released in a timely 
manner.  
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 Authorisation of extremely urgent projects on „super-rush‟ bases has become 
more common in the industry.  These projects were awarded to specific 
Contractors through direct negotiation to significantly reduce the necessary 
time-consuming project tendering process.  These Contractors were chosen 
based on selective criteria.  This, however, represented additional financial 
burdens when considering the premium charges of these projects.  One of the 
recent projects was awarded to a local Contractor in January 2010 by the SEC 
for the expansion of the Al-Qassem Power Plant; the project brief was to 
supply, install and commission four gas turbines for the existing facility in just 
six months (BMI, 2010).  This followed the extreme inconvenience caused by 
the frequent electricity interruptions in the summer of 2009.  The project was 
successfully delivered on time just before the summer of 2010 when the 
demand for electricity was expected to peak again but with sufficient supplies.  
 
The main implication of the research was identifying a serious and central problem 
facing the industry, which was the lack of vision.  This basic need for any industry must 
be articulated by the government. The central purpose of the government is to protect 
and promote the economic and social well-being of its people (OECD, 1997).  
Therefore, its actions remain crucial for addressing the various challenges surrounding 
the society.  Although the consequent problems resulting from the adopted domestic 
energy policies were foreseen years before, they were not addressed until they 
became acute, leading to severe additional costs.  The slow-decision making towards 
viable solutions significantly reduced their validity because other problems were 
created.  For example, members of the Gulf Council Countries (including Saudi Arabia, 
the most influential member) discussed the integration of the countries‟ transmission 
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grid for over 20 years before the establishment of the GCC Interconnection Authority in 
April 2002.  The three-phase project is due to begin operation in 2011.  If this project 
had begun operation years earlier, peak load problems in both the Eastern and Central 
Operating Areas (since these are both interconnected) would have been better 
managed.  This is because, for example, instead of building more power plants in 
either of these two areas, electricity could have been imported from these neighbour 
states when needed.  Moreover, some relevant entities revealed a worrying level of 
ambiguity in their roles.  For example, the Ministry of Water and Electricity was, 
allegedly, responsible for establishing the overall policy plans and strategies for the 
industry.  Similarly, the Electricity Cogeneration Regulatory Authority (ECRA) was 
planning strategies for reforming the electricity industry.  However, both the MWE and 
ECRA did not have sufficient authority to implement these policies and strategies 
sustainably.  In many cases, the centralised authority of the Council of Ministers 
caused interruptions to the industrial reform plans.  Its interventions, along with the 
reluctance to phase-out the industry tariff subsidies, were not compatible with the 
industry privatisation initiative.  It is crucial, however, to acknowledge that reforming 
the industry is likely to require holistic reforms in other aspects of the economy.  
Tangible reforms in commercial and civil laws, for example, will attract the private 
sector, whether local or international, to invest in the industry.  Moreover, these holistic 
reforms will improve the incomes of individuals and enterprises, and they will, 
therefore, accept having to pay for their energy consumption with cost-reflective tariffs.   
Saudi Arabia is adopting a thermal reliant policy with intensive and increasing usage of 
its natural and depleting resources.  The recent constraints in gas supplies, coupled 
with increasing usage of Heavy Fuel Oil to power the generating plants, have raised 
some genuine concerns.  The highly subsidised electricity service has led to increases 
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in electricity demand and inefficient usage, while the investment in the industry seems 
very demanding financially when compared to its national economy contribution.  The 
electricity sector has proven to require adequate and timely but substantial 
investments in its infrastructures.  Transforming the public utility into a competitive 
market has been an option for a long time.  However, this entails a cost-reflective 
electricity price which seems a desirable but painful option.  These concerns must be 
addressed with a comprehensive and, most importantly, credible policy to rectify the 
domestic energy demand projections and secure adequate supplies.  The researcher 
is concerned that with the lack of having comprehensive and transparent plans, in 
addition to the reluctance to explicitly announce steps for the gradual phase-out of 
subsidies, the private sector will not be completely attracted to the idea of investment 
in the industry as the risks of a non-comprehensive policy remain high for the 
investors.  A comprehensive energy policy should also set clear targets and deadlines 
to meet with explicit mechanisms for how the required relevant investments would be 
financed.    
8.3   The Saudi Arabian Power Supply Project Challenges: From 
Project Delay Factors to Project Implementation Challenges 
The last research objective was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the project 
management practice in the Saudi Arabian power supply industry and present the 
significant factors contributing to project delay as perceived by the project 
practitioners.  The study was confined to authorised turnkey projects, where relevant 
funds are already allocated, which must be executed in a timely manner to meet, at 
least partially, the country‟s need for electricity.   
Fifty eight selected PDFs were surveyed to rate the importance levels of each 
according to Project Managers who had experienced managing the investigated 
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industry‟s projects.  This was achieved by assigning numerical values that represented 
the weights of the investigated PDFs‟ importance.  These weights were examined 
according to respondent groups‟ collective experiences.  Applying importance ranking 
analysis determined which of these were more important and which were less 
important.  For the purpose of this research, the highly ranked PDFs were those 
among the highest 10 PDF importance index values according to the SEC, Contractor, 
Consultant, Power Generation, Power Transmission or Power Distribution Project 
Managers.  Collectively, these amounted to 28 PDFs and were considered the most 
important PDFs.  It was noted that both the SEC and Contractor PMs considered the 
PDF ‘SEC’s tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder’ the 
most important PDF.  On the other hand, Consultant PMs had not even considered 
this PDF among their highly ranked ones (i.e. among their top ten PDFs).  The 58 
PDFs were also subjectively classified into different groups and were ranked according 
to the SEC, Contractor and Consultant PMs.  The highlighted results were those 
relevant to organisational responsibility PDF groups.  Both the SEC and Consultant 
PMs ranked the SEC-related PDFs highest.  Consultant PMs ranked Consultant-
related PDFs 2nd.  Contractor PMs also agreed with the other two PM groups who 
ranked the SEC-related PDFs 2nd.  They also ranked the Consultant-related PDFs 
group highest.  This has legitimately concluded that the three respondent groups were, 
in general, not biased, although they represented different organisations with varying 
interests in projects.  Moreover, Consultant PMs ranked the Communication-related 
PDFs group highest, while both the SEC and Contractor PMs ranked the same group 
of PDFs 8th. 
The use of Ranking analyses along with Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients to 
understand the agreement levels between the respondent groups were not sufficient to 
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comprehend how these highly ranked PDFs were perceived.  Factor Analysis was 
used for this purpose and structured these PDFs in a meaningful set of Principal 
Components.  These Principal Components eventually constructed a conceptual 
model where the Project Implementation Challenges were identified.  The significance 
of these Project Implementation Challenges (PICs) was in being composed from the 
28 most important PDFs identified previously using the conducted Ranking analyses.  
Each of these 28 PDFs was at least among the ten most important PDFs according to 
the SEC, Contractor, Consultant, Power Generation, Power Transmission or Power 
Distribution project managers.  Eventually, applying Factor Analysis to these PDFs 
suggested the following Project Implementation Challenges: 
 
8.3.1 The Saudi Electricity Company’s Contractual Commitment  
The most significant Project Implementation Challenge in the investigated industry was 
the SEC‟s ability to commit to its contractual obligations and duties with its 
Contractors.  The researcher argues that for the SEC to be able to meet its project 
contractual obligations with its Contractors and, most importantly, to its service users, 
the SEC needs to meet its obligations with its employees, the most valuable asset in 
the organisation, by providing a working environment that promotes maximum 
productivity.  There are many areas where the SEC can indeed provide even more in 
this particular aspect.      
The researcher argues that the heart of the problem which contributed to the 
development of the most significant Project Implementation Challenge identified in this 
study – SEC‟s Contractual Commitment - was project management not being treated 
as a professional and, most importantly, a strategic discipline.  A professional 
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discipline requires a well-structured and sound formal approach where official 
processes and tools are put in place for effective and efficient management.  This was 
not the case in the SEC where many PMs referred to this problem.  The lack of such 
basic infrastructure resulted in poor project management practice which, in this study‟s 
context, significantly contributed to delaying project delivery and closure.  The 
challenge is compounded by the fact that this poor project management practice 
developed continuously over many decades before the establishment of the SEC.  In 
other words, poor project management practice has become an industry trend and an 
acceptable phenomenon.  There is little indication of change occurring.   
The establishment of the Project Management Office (PMO) in the SEC is valued as 
an urgently required capital investment that would directly serve to meet the SEC‟s 
vision and mission.  A PMO is  
An organizational unit to centralize and coordinate the management of projects 
under its domain…its responsibilities can range from providing project 
management support functions in the form of training, software, standardized 
policies, and procedures, to actual direct management and responsibility for 
achieving the project objectives. 
            (PMI, 2008)   
 
Industry knowledge of PMO is still sketchy (Pellegrinelli and Garagna, 2009).  
However, the potential behind establishing a PMO in the SEC should never be 
underestimated.  In the SEC‟s context, where the culture is highly rigid, the 
establishment of a PMO would face immense resistance, and this was identified as a 
top challenge in other cultures (Singh et al., 2009).  This is especially true in a “very” 
busy organisation that is overloaded with many projects where time is of the essence.  
Therefore, any proposal for change would be perceived as a waste of the scarce 
resource of time.  The researcher strongly recommends securing the support of the 
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SEC‟s Top Management to establish a PMO managed by experienced senior project 
managers.  Its establishment should take place in the most supportive business sector 
whose executives can champion the concept while working directly under the 
Engineering and Projects Executive Director (i.e. either in Power Generation, Power 
Transmission or Power Distribution sector).  Its basic infrastructure would be 
comprised of human resources and relevant policies, standards, tools and techniques.  
It may start directing, for example, 25% of Power Transmission Projects in the 
Western Operating Area where it would dissolve the solid barriers between the Project 
Planning, Project Specifications and Design and Project Execution Departments into 
one collective team pulled from their original departments.  There should be explicit 
and clear performance indicators of the PMO to maintain its prosperity.  
 
8.3.2 The Saudi Electricity Company's Communication and Coordination  
The above recommendations would certainly improve the SEC‟s underdeveloped 
management areas across various departments.  However, the next Project 
Implementation Challenge – SEC‟s Coordination and Communication Effectiveness -
proved that the SEC was facing serious difficulties in managing its internal 
stakeholders, such as the Project Proponent Department (Generation Operations in 
the Western Operating Area, for example), Finance Department, Contracting 
Department, Industrial Security Department and other internal project stakeholders.  In 
some cases, the government authorities, and sometimes the public, also caused the 
relocation of project sites after the project had been awarded to the Contractor.  After 
conducting the lengthy tendering process, project site relocation was a source of 
severe inconvenience for both the SEC and Contractors‟ resource management. 
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An Enterprise Resource Planning system is a very powerful tool since it can provide a 
high degree of cross-functional integration across different departments.  Since late 
2007, the SEC has operated an ERP system, but it has been limited to Human 
Resource applications (SEC, 2007).  This is perceived as a convenient opportunity 
where the suggested PMO, assuming it already provided a well-structured and formal 
project approach and process that promoted rich project communications, could 
embrace an upgrade to this powerful ERP tool for project management purposes.  
This would definitely enhance the coordination effectiveness between the SEC 
departments.  
 
The SEC also needs to consider hiring and training employees to manage issues 
related to the government authorities, such as knowing about future project plans 
which could potentially disrupt or support the SEC‟s project plans in their inception 
phase.  Therefore, a well-informed decision with regards to selecting a convenient 
project site location could be made with minimal disruption and inconvenience.  There 
also needs to be management of public concern when the SEC plans to build, for 
example, a substation in a residential area and risk assessments need to be 
conducted to determine whether or not the SEC is likely to face any problems. 
 
8.3.3 SEC's Tendering System  
The research pointed out several areas where the SEC tendering system needs 
serious development.   However, applying the above recommendations would have a 
positive impact on the SEC‟s current practice. This positive impact would include the 
following:       
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 The involvement of the SEC assigned PM during the bidding package 
arrangement is crucial to minimise the level of project uncertainties.  In 
addition to being informed of all correspondence and updates during this 
critical stage, a PM‟s experience in similar projects will enable him to 
address potential problems before awarding the project to the potential 
Contractor.  
 Never tender before arranging the site location.  Contractors frequently need 
to extend the bid deadlines as a result of relocating the project site. 
 Improve the prequalification system by preventing qualified Contractors with 
stretched resources from bidding.  Although the lack of available resources 
is a phenomenon in Saudi Arabian public projects, the researcher strongly 
suggests drawing up a strategy to attract sound international Contractors to 
invest in the SEC projects.  The recently published World Investment Report 
in July 2010 by the UN Conference on Trade and Development placed the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia among the top 10 most attractive countries in the 
world for Foreign Direct Investment in 2009 (ranked 8th globally) (UN, 2010).  
This must be treated as an opportunity to attract more and sound foreign 
Contractors.  Therefore, improving the SEC‟s project management practice, 
especially towards meeting its contractual commitments and obligations, 
would minimise the business risks for these contractors. 
 Avoid forcing the lowest bidder to commit to procuring deliverables beyond 
the original bidding requirements just before awarding the project.     
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 The two-envelope tendering system adopted in the Power Generation 
projects is very time consuming since only bidders with accepted technical 
offers are requested to submit their financial offers.  However, this system 
was not perceived to be among the highly ranked PDFs by Power 
Generation PMs, which indicated its positive impact on project construction 
progress.  The researcher is concerned about the movement towards 
reinforcing the older one-envelope tendering system by the SEC Top 
Management, which was perceived by both Power Transmission and Power 
Distribution PMs as one of the most important project delay factors.  This 
indicated that although this tendering system was perceived as less time-
consuming, the overall impact was strongly considered by PMs as a main 
concern, especially in the project construction phase.  Therefore, the 
researcher recommends a thorough and holistic assessment and evaluation 
of the potential impacts of re-applying the one-envelope tendering system in 
Power Generation projects.  Submitting comprehensive reports on these 
impacts may influence the SEC Top Management decision.  
 
8.3.4 Lack of Project Requirements Clarity  
This mainly referred to changes in project scopes during execution as a result of the 
developing nature of the SEC‟s contracts since not all project deliverables were 
specified, in addition to the recurrent mistakes and inconsistencies found in the bidding 
documents.  However, the previously suggested recommendations, especially relevant 
to establishment of the PMO, would promote a learning environment and improve the 
SEC‟s Specifications and Design engineers‟ skills and practices.  Therefore, the usual 
inconsistencies, mistakes and ambiguities found in the bidding packages would be 
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minimised.  Moreover, the PMO officers would involve all relevant stakeholders, 
especially the Project Proponent, during the preparation of the bidding package and 
securing of the signed consent and approval for the project deliverables.  This would 
minimise disruption of the progress of the project as a result of placing additional 
change orders during the project execution phase.  For example, a Contractor PM was 
frustrated when the Industrial Security Department modified its fire fighting system 
specifications in 2007 after his project was awarded and began execution in 2006.  
The Industrial Security Department of the SEC insisted on applying the modifications 
on the ongoing project, which of course, had further inconvenient consequences.  This 
could be avoided through the suggested PMO, which would secure the consent of all 
relevant stakeholders not to change the project‟s specifications, at least on ongoing 
projects.  The PMO would also conduct a comprehensive project requirement study to 
distinguish between critical deliverables and nice-to-have deliverables.  This would 
certainly lead to less project change orders and indeed to more satisfied SEC Top 
Management.   
8.3.5 Impact on Contractor’s Planning and Controlling Effectiveness and 
Consultant-related Project Implementation Challenges 
The recommendations above would present the SEC with strong project commitment, 
where the internal and external stakeholders would hopefully be managed effectively 
through rich communication and coordination.  Improving the tendering system, where 
the project requirements are much more clarified, would have a positive impact on the 
project management practice in the investigated industry.  All of these 
recommendations would resolve the relevant problems of the most pressing Project 
Implementation Challenges identified in this research and would improve, therefore, 
the project delivery rate.  The SEC being more contractually committed, and with 
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effective communication and coordination initiatives in place in addition to being more 
consistent and predictable, would have a positive impact on both the Contractor and 
Consultant project practices.  The SEC PMO high standards could force the 
Contractor, for example, to provide a proactive schedule system instead of the 
traditional detailed plan prepared once at the project outset without being updated 
(Alsakini et al., 2004).  In other words, the SEC PM could demand the Contractor PM, 
as a project control procedure, to actively update the project plan during execution.  
This would allow the SEC PM to update the PMO‟s information system, which would 
flag the relevant internal stakeholders if they were required to take action through the 
ERP. 
The SEC‟s strong contractual commitment with its Contractors indicates more 
predictability with less project uncertainties.  The improved project practice would 
motivate, and probably force, Contractors to invest in their project management 
systems and project managers.  In fact, this could take the competition between 
Contractors to another challenging level where all would search for applicable and 
valuable project management tools and processes for best practice.  It was noticed in 
the study that an international Contractor in Saudi Arabia was not investing in their 
project managers‟ development.  Arguably, the Contractor was not motivated since the 
project practice was not sound enough, especially from the SEC, the most influential 
project stakeholder.  This, however, could change since the contracting market would 
be more competitive as a result of the SEC‟s improved project practice and its 
consistent prequalification system, assuming more international Contractors entered 
the market.  Moreover, improving the SEC‟s project requirements by selecting specific 
technical standards, in addition to minimising bidding package inconsistencies and 
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mistakes, would improve the Consultants‟ project practice and their response rate to 
Contractors‟ submittals and approvals.  
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Appendix A: Historical Development of the Saudi Arabian 
Electricity Industry 
Within Saudi Arabia‟s current borders, “Al-Madina” was the first city which experienced  
electricity when in 1907 the Holy Mosque of the Prophet “Mohammad” – Peace be 
upon Him - was connected with two 10-kilowatt electricity generators for lighting (MIE, 
2000).  The next place to receive electricity was the Holy Mosque of “Makkah” in 1918, 
before Saudi rule.  After the inception of Saudi rule, the “Standard Oil of California” 
company was granted oil exploration and drilling rights within Saudi Arabia which, in 
1932, was using electricity for drilling and lighting purposes.  When the Saudi Arabian 
government revenues improved as a result of the commercial trading of oil, the 
government imported electricity generators to light the King‟s and princes‟ palaces, 
VIP residences, the two Holy Mosques of Makkah and Al-Madina, governmental 
buildings and a few other mosques.  Electricity was then limited for lighting purposes 
only.  The use of electricity then slowly developed in Saudi Arabia before it became a 
social necessity (MIE, 2000).   
Phases of Electricity Development 
Phase 1 (1951-1969)  
Electricity development in Saudi Arabia can be divided into three phases (MIE, 2000). 
The first phase represents the period 1951-1969, a period which preceded the five-
year development plans of Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi government encouraged 
individuals and companies to form limited and modest electricity companies to meet 
their local demand.  Therefore, loans, facilities and fuels were provided to generate 
electricity (MIE, 2004).  The companies were located in cities and villages and, driven 
by supply and demand, the tariffs were different from one company to another.   
Technical standards also varied from one company to another (MIE, 2000).  In 1961, 
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the first Department of Electricity Affairs was established within the Ministry of 
Commerce to constitute adequate rules and regulations and to issue permits and 
licenses to electricity companies and to encourage national investment in this utility.  
Phase 2 (1970 – 2000)  
After introducing its first five-year development plan in 1970, the Department of 
Electricity Services was established in 1972 under the Ministry of Commerce.  In 
addition to its previous roles of establishing relevant rules and regulations and issuing 
permits and licenses, it was then also responsible for planning electrical services for 
the entire Kingdom in a much more coordinated manner (MIE, 2000).  In 1974, when 
oil revenues were becoming very promising and accounted for most of the 
government‟s earnings, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was established and 
divided into two main sectors: the Commerce Agency and the Industry and Electricity 
Agency.  The government then fixed the electricity tariff at standard prices which were 
at levels below their actual costs.  During this period there were 103 community 
electricity generation companies spread over the Kingdom. The government 
compensated these companies by paying the difference between revenues and actual 
operational cost plus 15% fixed profit margin (MIE, 2004).  In 1976, the government 
formed the General Electricity Corporation to undertake the task of executing the 
expansion of electricity project plans in response to the gradually increasing demand 
for electricity. The General Electricity Corporation played a vital role in conducting 
electricity infrastructure projects around the Kingdom and it represented the 
government‟s share of these projects.  Since the 103 electricity companies had varying 
revenues and performances, some had already claimed losses that were noticeably 
increasing.  These increased the financial burden on the government (MIE, 2000).  
During the period 1976 to 1981, all 103 community electricity generation companies 
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were gradually merged into ten companies and then into the following four regional 
companies: Saudi Consolidated Electricity Company-West or SCECO-West, SCECO-
Central, SCECO-East and SCECO-South.  This was mainly to control the operational 
and capital investment costs and to unify the technical and operational standards 
around the Kingdom to address the growing demand for electricity.  During this stage, 
the government was able to electrify many cities, villages and settlements with 
electricity networks extending for thousands of kilometres (MIE, 2004).  
Phase 3 (2000 – present)  
The Council of Ministers issued decision No. 169 of 11/08/1419H (dated November 
30, 1998) stating the merger of all electric companies and the electric projects of the 
General Electricity Corporation into a single company called “Saudi Electricity 
Company” (SEC, 2003).  The government evaluated this as a necessary transitional 
step to restructure the electricity sector in a style that could address the increasing 
demand for electricity (MIE, 2004).  The company became operational on April 5th, 
2000 and was established on a commercial basis where it provided affordable 
electricity.   
The Council of Ministers also issued decision No. 236 (dated December 11, 2001) 
stating the establishment of the Electricity Co-generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) 
which would report to the Minister of Water and Electricity (ECRA, 2007).  Its main 
objectives were to regulate the electricity sector and conduct comprehensive periodic 
reviews of the actual cost and tariff of the service provision.  It was also responsible for 
promoting a competitive electricity market to attract private investment in the sector 
and diminish the role of the Saudi Electricity Company.  
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The Saudi Arabian Electricity Industry at Present 
This section will outline the present structure of the Saudi Arabian electricity supply.   
 The Saudi Arabian Electricity Industry Components 
The Ministry of Water and Electricity is responsible for establishing overall policies, 
plans and strategies for the industry (ECRA, 2008).  The Electricity Cogeneration and 
Regulatory Authority (ECRA) regulates the industry and issues licenses to any entity 
engaged in any of the activities of the electricity and water desalination industry.  One 
of its main goals is to recommend an electricity tariff scheme that is both affordable for 
the consumers and attractive for the private sector to invest in the industry.  The Saudi 
Electricity Company (SEC) is the dominant player in this industry and owns and 
operates most of the Saudi electricity infrastructure.  A few Independent Power 
Producers and Independent Water and Power Producers operate alongside SEC but 
with much less generating capacity (ECRA, 2009a).  Figure 1 below shows this 
structure and the interrelationships between the different stakeholders.  The Saudi 
Arabian consumers are categorised as „residential‟, „industrial‟, „government‟, 
„commercial‟, and „others‟. 
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Figure 1: Current organisational structure of the Saudi electricity industry (ECRA, 2007) 
 
    
 The Saudi Arabian Electricity Infrastructure 
In 2010, Saudi Arabia became the largest electricity generator in the Middle East (BMI, 
2010b) (Table 1).  In its 2005 World Energy Outlook, the IEA estimated that electricity 
consumption in Saudi Arabia was equal to 7000 kWh per capita – close to the 
European Union average (IEA, 2005), and it was expected to grow further.   
Table 1: Selected Middle Eastern countries’ power generation from 2007 - 2014 
 
 
Table 2.2: Selected Middle East Power Generation, 2007 - 2014 in TWh (TWh = 10⁶ MWh)
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Bahrain 9.6 10 10.3 10.8 11.2 11.6 12.1 12.6
Iran 196 206.3 211.5 219.9 232 244.8 257 268
Iraq 60 70 80 90 100 115 129.4 145.5
Kuwait 49.3 52 53 55 59 62 65.7 69.7
Oman 10.9 11.5 12.1 12.7 13.3 14 14.5 15.1
Qatar 17.5 19.7 21.3 23.4 25.5 28.3 31.1 34.9
Saudi Arabia 185.9 193.7 206.3 224.9 241.7 256.2 270 285
UAE 71.9 77.2 76.5 80 85 92 98.9 105.3
f = BMI forecast. Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009; BMI
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 Electricity Supply Infrastructure 
The electricity supply infrastructure is conveniently divided into three areas: 
1) Power Generation 
The first step in the electricity production process is known as power generation.   The 
total generation capacity in Saudi Arabia reached 51,195 MW in 2009, with an 
increase of 11.8% compared to the 2008 generation capacity of 45,774 MW (ECRA, 
2008, ECRA, 2009a).  SEC owned 87% of the total capacity (Table 2).  In 2009, SEC 
alone increased its available generation capacity to 44.5 GW, an increase of 13.4% 
compared to its 2008 generation capacity of 39,200 MW (SEC, 2009). 
Table 2: Generation capacities of main producers in Saudi Arabia in 2009 
 
 
2) Transmission Grids 
The movement of the generated electrical power over long distances is known as 
power transmission (Shively and Ferrare, 2008).  In 2009, the generated electrical 
power was transmitted through high voltage overhead lines with a total length of 
25,146 km and through underground lines with a total length of 2,589 km.  Figure 2 
shows that in 2008 SEC‟s Eastern and Central operating areas were strongly 
 Production entity Number of plants Capacity (MW)
SEC 50 39,200*
SWCC 12 5,135
Tihama Power Generation Co. 4 1,083
Marafiq 1 1,033
Saudi Aramco 6 1,018
Saudi Cement Co. 2 266
Jubail Electricity & Water Co. 1 733
Al-Shuaiba Power Co. 1 1,191
Jubail Power Co. 1 250
Rabigh IWPP 1 120
Total 79 51,195
Source: (ECRA, 2009a)
*Source: (SEC, 2009)
301 
 
interconnected with high voltage transmission lines.  More than 26% of the peak load 
in the Central area was being served by generation in the Eastern area.  This reflected 
a significant investment saving in electric power generation projects in the Central 
operating area.  The interconnections between the remaining areas through high 
voltage transmission lines are progressing between Southern and Western operating 
areas and the Western with the Central operating areas.  Successful completion of 
these interconnections will result in a single national grid that will facilitate electricity 
transmission all over the country (ECRA, 2007, ECRA, 2008).  There is an ongoing 
project to integrate the six Gulf Corporation Council countries of Saudi Arabia (SEC 
Eastern region), Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE, which is due to be fully 
operational in 2011 (BMI, 2010b).  The project is divided into three phases: the GCC 
North Grid, which links Saudi Arabia (Eastern region), Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait with 
overhead lines and submarine cables (completed in 2009); the GCC South Grid, which 
links Oman and the UAE; the GCC North and South Grids which connect the first two 
phases (nearly completed) (Al-Asaad and Ebrahim, 2009, Al-Mohaisen, 2009).   SEC 
has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Egyptian Electricity 
Company to commission a feasibility study of a proposed transmission line which will 
connect between the two countries (using submarine cables through the Red Sea) 
(BMI, 2010c). 
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Figure 2: Saudi Electricity Company Working Operating Areas (SEC, 2008) 
 
 
 
3) Power Distribution Networks  
The movement of transmitted electrical power from the interconnection with the 
transmission system through the end-user‟s consumption meter is known as power 
distribution (Shively and Ferrare, 2008).  The SEC delivered 193,472,000 MWh of 
electrical energy in 2009, which was an increase of 6.8% compared to 2008.  The 
distribution network consisted of 171,888 km of overhead lines and 162,260 km of 
underground lines serving over 5.4 million customers, as shown in Table 3 (ECRA, 
2009a, SEC, 2009).   
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Table 3: Distribution of consumption by consumer category in 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Type Number of Subcribers Consumption (MWh) % of total consumption
Residential 4,675,554 100,832,000 52%
Government 195,876 26,232,000 14%
Commercial 753,325 23,203,000 12%
Industrial 7,289 34,654,000 18%
Other 69,472 8,551,000 4%
Total 5,420,810 193,472,000 100%
Source: (ECRA, 2009a)
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Appendix B: The Political Economy of the Saudi Arabian 
Electricity    Sector – Foundation of Project Implementation 
Challenges 
 
Introduction   
This research study is concerned with maximising the execution efficiency of 
authorised projects by the SEC (i.e. projects with relevant funds being allocated where 
these are approved to bid).  It is believed that these authorised projects play a key, 
though partial, role in increasing the supply capacity of electricity to cope with the 
growing demand for the service.  The main driver of this study, however, is to suggest 
ways to slow the acceleration of the electricity supply-demand gap, including executing 
expansion projects as efficiently as possible.  Therefore, it is necessary to lay a 
foundation where a holistic view of various challenges affecting the whole industry is 
drawn.  This study argues that this foundation will, to some extent, explain how project 
management as a discipline is practiced in the investigated industry today.  
Comprehending this foundation will be used as a departure point in which the 
searched Project Implementation Challenges (PICs) found a fertile ground to grow.  
The path needing to be taken to clarify the relevance between this foundation and the 
PICs, however, is highly challenging given the breadth and depth of the surrounding 
aspects explaining the argument.        
The PDF studies previously conducted in various construction industries around the 
world have demonstrated that one of the most influential factors which has impeded 
both project authorisation and project construction has been the shortage of financial 
resources.  The electricity industry is characterised as being highly capital intensive 
with high operational costs (Breeze, 2005, Khatib, 2003, Mazer, 2007, Victor and 
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Heller, 2008).  These characteristics will even intensify financially relevant PDFs in this 
industry and will shape, therefore, project management practice and the relationship 
between key project stakeholders in the industry.  This presents a mutual starting point 
between the holistic industry challenges as a foundation – the focus of this chapter - 
and the investigated PICs.   
Given the political visibility of the industry where any interruption of the service can 
cause a wide range of inconveniences to various users, there is a great need to 
understand the relevant forces and variables which are causing Saudi Arabia to 
struggle to keep its lights on.  The Saudi Arabian government has realised the urgency 
of the need to enhance the economic efficiency of the industry and this will be 
presented below.  Since achieving this goal takes more than realisation, this chapter 
will present what actions have been taken and whether the Kingdom has successfully 
achieved this goal.   The surrounding attributes and elements that are advancing or 
impeding the achievement of this goal are discussed below.    
Electricity Sector Reform – Trend or Necessity?  
Victor and Heller (2008) have questioned the motivation for electricity industry reforms 
in different parts of the world.  A reform in the electricity industry entails a dramatic and 
necessary shift of the government‟s role from the actual financing and operating of the 
sector into an observer and regulator.  The financing and operating functions will be 
transferred to the private sector to maximise the economic efficiency of the sector.  
Victor and Heller (2008) articulate several hypotheses as to why governments have 
sought to reform their electricity sectors.  One of these hypotheses is that reforms 
have been viewed as a trend where governments have wanted to maximise the 
operational efficiency of their infrastructures (telecommunications, airports, motorways 
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etc.) by shifting these into market-oriented organisations.  This trend has specifically 
followed the success of the England and Wales electricity industry reforms and, thus, 
policy makers have thought to apply this model to their societies as a better option 
than state control and operation.  The other end of Victor and Heller‟s spectrum of 
framed hypotheses is that the view of reform in the electricity industry has emerged 
from a crisis where free-markets were recognised as the only option to save the 
industry.  Therefore, it is sensible to examine why the Saudi Arabian electricity industry 
is undergoing a type of reform, if in fact it is, and the potential forces advancing or 
impeding the reform process. 
Electricity Sector Development – Historical Critical Review 
It is necessary to critically review the relevant events mentioned in Chapter 2 because 
this will serve as the basis for what motivated the Saudi Arabian government to 
introduce necessary reforms in the electricity industry.  The earliest model of the 
electric power industry in Saudi Arabia was known as „regulated franchises‟.  Following 
this model, there were 103 community electricity generation companies spread over 
the Kingdom that earned commercial and profitable returns on their investments and 
were subject to the oversight of the government (MIE, 2004).  The government then 
intervened several times (see Chapter 2 for more details) to control the retail prices of 
the service by providing each of these companies guaranteed returns.  The 
government‟s interventions, however, suffered from many deep flaws.  To name one, 
controlling retail prices by offering guaranteed profits  obviously invited inefficient 
companies to not improve their operation management since the profits were 
guaranteed without any regard to performance (Farsi, 2009).  Reducing tariffs 
significantly increased the demand for electricity and, therefore, there was greater 
need to increase the supplies by authorising expansion projects.  As a result, the 
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government provided these companies with large loans to expand the infrastructure 
and, therefore, the private investors‟ equities diminished as these loans represented 
the government‟s shares.        
 
The fluctuation in government income due to the volatile oil prices, coupled with the 
fact that many of the 103 electricity providers claimed losses, increased the financial 
burdens on the government.  As a result, the government merged the 103 community 
companies into 10 companies which gradually became 4 principal regional companies 
in the period 1976 to 1981 (MIE, 2000).  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, oil 
revenues dropped significantly and this consequently severely affected the 
government‟s budget.  The second Gulf War, which occurred between August 1990 
and February 1991, was an unexpected event and ultimately very costly.  These 
collectively contributed to the government‟s failure to maintain the provision of the 15% 
fixed profit margin to the private shareholders; this was then further decreased to 10%, 
followed by another reduction to 7% until the financially demanding industry 
deteriorated to its current situation.  At present, there is uncertainty over the securing 
of more than a third of the required financial resources to authorise necessary supply 
projects in the period 2009-2018 (SEC, 2009).       
Reforming the Electricity Sector: Restructuring Plans 
The electricity industry in Saudi Arabia has proven to be a very demanding one since 
various resources must be deployed in a timely manner to secure a reliable provision 
of the service.  Meeting the industry‟s demands, however, is crucial for maintaining the 
economic growth of the Kingdom‟s private sector and sustaining its social wellbeing.  
In 1995, The Ministry of Industry and Electricity suggested, with the Council of 
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Ministers‟ approval, the necessity for a restructuring of the entire industry to save it 
from the worsening crisis.  Because there is no widely accepted typology of reform 
strategies, it is to be expected that Saudi Arabia, like any other country, has followed 
its idiosyncratic patterns in the reform process (Victor and Heller, 2008).  Electricity 
Cogeneration Regulatory Authority has articulated a long-term goal that aims to 
introduce a free-electricity market model (ECRA, 2008, ECRA, 2009a) that is similar to 
the England and Wales electricity market model at present.  Although this model 
indicated that further restructuring of the industry is required where the private sector 
will play a greater role, it is clear that the main motivation for the government to 
approve the free-market model was to reduce the financial burdens on its spending.  In 
other words, approval of the reform plans emerged at a time when the electricity sector 
was experiencing both a financial and a technical crisis, as will be detailed below.     
 
Figure 1 in Appendix A depicts the current (2010) organisational structure of the Saudi 
Arabian electricity industry.  It shows that the SEC remains the dominant player in the 
industry since it owns and operates all transmission grids, distribution networks and 
87% of the total generation capacity.  Introducing private generators known as 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Independent Water and Power Producers 
(IWPPs) that sell electricity to the grid (i.e. purchased by the SEC) is considered as a 
part of the reform process (Victor and Heller, 2008).  The government has hosted 
private investors and offered attractive terms to build a few power generation plants.  
By doing this, the aim has been to reduce the intensive capital budgets allocated by 
the SEC – mainly with the government‟s support - to construct these plants.   
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ECRA has proposed a three-phase plan to fully implement its long-term free-electricity 
market model (SAMA, 2010, ECRA, 2008, ECRA, 2009a).  The first phase entails 
unbundling the three main activities of generation, transmission and distribution into 
subsidiaries owned by the SEC as a holding Company.  This will result in establishing 
competing entities in generation, an independent entity for transmission, and several 
entities for distribution (ECRA, 2008, ECRA, 2009a).  Implementation of the 
unbundling process will start by early 2011 (SAMA, 2010).  This phase also focuses on 
institutional development such as establishing a wheeling tariff and installing digital 
meters for heavy use consumers.  A wheeling tariff sets the “amount charged by one 
electrical system to transmit the energy of, and for, another system or systems” 
(SAMA, 2010).  Installing digital meters for large consumers will increase the billing 
efficiency.  Figure 1 (next page) depicts the structure of the electricity industry after 
completion of Phase 1 of the restructuring plan.   
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Figure 1: Structure of the electricity industry after completion of Phase 1        
(ECRA, 2008) 
 
 
Phase 2 focuses on implementing further institutional development laying the 
foundations for a competitive electricity market.  Competition in this phase is limited on 
large consumers market to examine how successful the applied framework is (SAMA, 
2010, ECRA, 2008, ECRA, 2009a).  The successful implementation of Phase 2 will 
lead to the creation of an electricity wholesale market (Phase 3) where prices are 
determined through the free market forces of supply and demand, as shown in Figure 
2.  
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Figure 0.1: Electricity industry structure after full implementation of the plan (ECRA, 2008) 
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Barriers to Consistent and Stable Reform 
It is accepted that the Council of Ministers sought to save the Kingdom‟s electricity 
sector from a deepening crisis.  This section will point to key attributes that are 
observed as being serious barriers or, at least, potential threats to the successful 
implementation of the reform plans mentioned earlier.  In order to overcome these 
complex and overlapping barriers, as will be examined below, an innovative set of 
solutions is required. 
 
 Slow Decision-Making  
Reviewing the historical background of the Saudi Arabian electricity sector presents 
two apparent observations relevant to the government‟s decisions towards the 
industry.  The first is that the negative consequences of the enforced decisions were 
underestimated and, therefore, the challenges surrounding the industry grew until the 
relevant problems became acute.  The enforced decisions relevant to reducing 
electricity tariffs, for example, promoted highly inefficient electricity usage and severe 
wastage of the country‟s natural resources, as will be discussed below.  This is in 
addition to the noticeable increase in per capita consumption, which has almost 
doubled in two decades (see Table 1).  The second striking observation is that when it 
came to acting upon these growing problems, decisions were not taken in a timely 
manner.  For example, the Ministry of Industry and Electricity recommended that the 
Council of Ministers should approve restructuring of the electricity sector in 1995.  The 
Council of Ministers approved the establishment of the SEC in 1998, as the first step 
for further restructuring, while the actual operation of the SEC began in 2000.  
Although applying any restructuring plans to such a sensitive and large industry needs 
313 
 
time to be enforced, many other problems will occur over such a long time period.  
This is especially true if approving the restructuring plans was believed to save the 
industry without considering, for example, legislation that promotes more efficient 
consumption behaviour.  Another example is relevant to the Gulf Council Countries 
transmission grid project described in Chapter 2.  Although the three-phase project is 
due for delivery and operation in 2011, the discussion between the Council members, 
where Saudi Arabia is considered the most influential member, took over 20 years 
before the establishment of the GCC Interconnection Authority in April 2002.   
  Table 1: Per capita electricity consumption in Saudi Arabia (1990 – 2009) 
 
 
 Independence of ECRA 
As was mentioned earlier, ECRA was established in 2001 and among its main roles 
are to report to higher authorities on cost- reflective, fair and affordable electricity 
tariffs and to encourage the private sector to invest in the industry and protect their 
interests in order to realise fair economic returns on their investments (ECRA, 2008).  
This entails applying the restructuring plans to transform the industry from a vertically 
integrated state-owned industry into a free-market industry.  However, there are a few 
observations that can be seen as barriers to consistent reform in the industry.  
Reviewing both ECRA‟s annual achievement reports in 2008 and 2009, it is clearly 
stated that the three phase plan would take eight years to achieve (ECRA, 2008, 
ECRA, 2009a).  Although there are movements to unbundle the three main activities of 
the supply industry (SAMA, 2010), in addition to the development of codes for use of 
Table 6.3:  Per capita electricity consumption in Saudi Arabia (1990 - 2009)
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
kWh/Capita 3957 4859 5542 6630 6890 7003 7300 7641
Source: (ECRA's National Electricity Registry)
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both transmission (completed) and distribution (in progress) networks, there is no 
explicit indication as to when the reform process will start or be started.  The absence 
of such vital information (starting year and completion year) is an implicit indication 
that transforming the industry from a vertically integrated, state-owned one to a free-
market one is highly dependent on the political will.  This is especially true since ECRA 
lacks the key authority to modify electricity tariffs, even though it is described as an 
independent authority.  Promoting attractive tariffs for private investors is essential for 
proceeding with the restructuring plans; otherwise, the investors will avoid the 
investment.  This changed in October 2009 when the Council of Ministers authorised 
ECRA to modify the tariff for non-residential usage providing it does not exceed 0.26 
Riyals/kWh.  As was expected, both commercial and industrial users showed 
resistance.  This is evident in the fact that ECRA did not publish the new tariff scheme 
until the middle of May 2010, and it began to be enforced in June 2010 (ECRA, 
2010a).  Knowing that the new tariff for industrial users was based on a time-of-use 
scheme for the period June-September presented a flaw in the ECRA scheme in that 
such short notice prevented many consumers from re-scheduling their operational 
plans.  However, this might also present evidence of the extreme resistance and the 
last-minute lobbying of both commercial and industrial users to reduce the newly 
proposed tariff as much as possible.       
 
 Investment Return of an Electricity Supply Project – Economic Evaluation 
The electricity supply industry has various direct benefits for a society.  Therefore, a 
project economic assessment must consider its impact on social wellness in addition 
to the industrial and commercial businesses.  However, a holistic project economic 
assessment will partially explain the Saudi government‟s reluctance to fully finance 
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projects required to increase the supply capacities.  The electricity demand trend in 
Saudi Arabia has raised concerns about the economic feasibility of these highly capital 
intensive projects.  In the summer of 2010, the load peaked when it reached 43,933 
MW (ECRA, 2010b) while, during other seasons, it dramatically dropped to as low as 
25,000 MW.  The extreme weather in the summer of 2010, where in some parts of the 
Kingdom the temperature exceeded 50 degrees Celsius, spiked the electricity demand 
and exceeded the SEC‟s forecasts as the demand grew just over 10% when 
compared to the peak load in 2009.  The main operational cost implication is that 
several power plants, which have cost thousands of millions of Riyals, operate for a 
few days only.  In the summer of 2007, there were generating units with total 
capacities of 2,000 MW that operated for 12 days only.  Moreover, there were 
generating units with total capacities of 5,000 MW that operated for only 4.5 months in 
the same summer (ECRA, 2009b).  This obviously significantly decreased the cost-
benefit ratio of these non-operating projects where the demand fluctuated around 40% 
during the year.  This demand trend caused serious concerns for the Independent 
Power Producers as there would be an apparent surplus in electricity production from 
their facilities in non-summer seasons.  This is especially true knowing that electricity 
produced by IPPs is sold to the SEC on a commercial basis and, therefore, is more 
expensive than electricity produced by the SEC‟s own facilities.  Therefore, private 
investors made it clear that in order to build and operate power plants, the SEC, as the 
grid owner, had to sign a 20-year Power Purchase Agreement at the minimum, 
otherwise the investments were considered too risky for these investors and they 
would have to withdraw from the industry.  The SEC was forced to agree and, 
therefore, had to shut down many facilities in which it placed significant investments 
during non-summer seasons.  
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Another important aspect questions the return on investment in electricity supply 
projects in Saudi Arabia.  Although the consumption rate in Saudi Arabia has been 
maintaining a steady growth where sales are projected to increase, most of the 
consumption, however, has been accounted for by residential users (53.4%) while less 
than a third (29.5%) has been accounted for by both commercial and industrial users 
combined (ECRA, 2009a).  This has raised the question of not only to what extent 
power industry projects are economic, but, most importantly, what role the power 
industry has played in the Saudi Arabian non-oil economy.  
 
 Perverse Subsidies 
In a relevant matter that questions the electricity industry‟s role in sustaining Saudi 
Arabia‟s economic growth, the problem of subsidies has recently become particularly 
acute.  A subsidy is broadly defined as follows: 
Subsidies comprise all measures that keep prices for consumers below market 
level or keep prices for producers above market level or that reduce cost for 
consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support.   
                                                                                                       (Moor, 2001) 
 
Governments provide many forms of energy subsidies to stimulate economic growth 
and to enhance the security of energy supply along with keeping the prices affordable 
to consumers (Badcock and Lenzen, 2010, Ritschel and Smestad, 2003, Moor, 2001).  
Energy subsidies, however, can have an overall adverse effect on the society and the 
economy and these are described as „perverse‟ subsidies (Ritschel and Smestad, 
2003).  This section will focus on two particular forms of perverse subsidies that are of 
serious concern for national security.  In fact, one of these subsidies, which is the 
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capping of fuel prices used for electricity generating plants and transportation in Saudi 
Arabia, brought into question the future demand-supply stability of the international oil 
market (Schindler, 2010).  One major reason for this is because over half the fuel used 
to generate electricity in Saudi Arabia was oil (Table 6.2), and this is projected to 
increase significantly.   
Table 2: Fuel types used for electricity generation in 2008 and 2009 
 
 
It has already been explained that for many decades Saudi Arabia has played a key 
role in supplying oil to the international energy market.  The Saudi government is keen 
to maintain this role for many more decades knowing that it has ownership of 19.8% of 
the world‟s proven oil reserves (BP, 2010).  Oil revenues have accounted for 90% of 
the Kingdom‟s total export earnings, around 75% of government budget revenues and 
45% of GDP (OPEC, 2010).  The major concern, however, in addition to the 
vulnerability of oil price fluctuations, is that the domestic demand for energy is growing 
steadily in a manner that will reduce oil availability for exports.  This is of especial 
concern when considering the fact that the International Energy Agency has recently 
identified that Saudi Arabia offers the third highest level of energy subsidies in the 
world, which is equivalent to over 10% of its GDP (IEA, 2010).  The government has 
offered the SEC highly subsidised fuel prices that are far below international market 
prices.  The Council of Ministers issued a Royal Decree in 2006 to have Saudi 
Table 6.4: Fuel types used in electricity prodution in 2008 and 2009
Fuel Type 2008 usage 2009 usage 
Natural gas 45% 38%
Diesel 22% 22%
Crude oil 20% 34%
Heavy fuel oil 13% 6%
Source: (ECRA, 2008, ECRAa, 2009)
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Aramco, the national oil company, set the fuel price for the oil supplied to the SEC. 
The government capped the price for Heavy Fuel Oil supplied to the SEC by Saudi 
Aramco at US $2 – 2.64 per barrel subject to its grade (SEC, 2009).  This also entailed 
that private investors and developers involved in the Independent Power Producer or 
Independent Power and Water Producer business structures would receive the fuel 
from SEC at no cost (which, as will be elaborated on next, is already struggling to pay 
for the fuel).  Knowing that Brent oil averaged a price of US $61.67 per barrel in 2009 
(BP, 2010) gives a good indication of how much revenue the government would have 
generated from the oil being sold to the international market.  Table 6.3 presents the 
Saudi Arabian oil production and consumption levels for the period 2002 to 2009.  
Clearly, production levels fluctuated in the quoted period, driven by the global oil 
demand while domestic oil consumption was growing steadily.  With regard to the 
issue of the increasing domestic consumption for energy, Saudi Aramco‟s CEO, Mr. 
Khalid Al-Faleh, announced that  
If no energy efficiency improvements are achieved, and the business is as 
usual, the oil availability for exports is likely to decline to less than 7 million 
barrels per day by 2028, a fall of 3 million barrels a day while global demand for 
our oil is likely to continue to rise.  
       (Allam and England, 2010)  
 
Table 3: Saudi oil production and consumption (million barrels/day) 
   
Table 6.5: Saudi oil production and consumption (million barrels/day)
Source: (BP, 2010)
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For the above reasons, in addition to being more efficient and environmentally 
friendlier when compared to oil-fired generation, gas-fired generation was considered 
more favorable as a means for producing power (SEC, 2003).  However, the reduction 
in gas production between 2008 and 2009 (Table 4) was due to supply constraints.  
This has apparently complicated the problem, limiting the option of bridging the fuel 
supply shortage with crude oil (Table 2) (Schindler, 2010).    
Table 4: Saudi production and consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent)  
 
The above has shown that the Saudi Arabian energy policy has clearly promoted 
intensive and increasing usage of its natural fossil energy resources to meet its 
increasing domestic demand for energy (including electricity and transportation).  This 
has had environmental implications as well.  A dramatic political change, however, 
was realised when King Abdullah announced in Riyadh announced the establishment 
of the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy (Allam, 2010a).  This was 
observed as an indication that the government has considered adopting a mix-
generation policy.  Although the new establishment is already negotiating with 
international companies to build the city (Carey, 2010), it may take a few years to 
realise the first nuclear power plant or a plant with renewable fuel (solar, wind, tidal 
etc.).  It is very important to focus on these clean technologies since Saudi Arabia was 
Table 6.6: Saudi gas production and consumption (million tonnes oil equivalent)
Source: (BP, 2010)
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recently identified as being among the world‟s top ten emitters of carbon dioxide 
(Doyle and Dobbie, 2010).   
 
The second form of perverse energy subsidy is concerned with the capping of 
electricity retail prices in Saudi Arabia.  This subsidy was meant to promote affordable 
electricity prices for consumers but came with unwanted financial and technical 
implications for the vertically integrated service provider, the SEC.  This topic has been 
extensively referred to in this research.  But, it is worth mentioning that the recent 
modification of tariffs for non-residential usage has faced serious resistance from both 
commercial and industrial users.  As was mentioned earlier, ECRA has been 
authorised since October 2009 to enforce a new tariff scheme, but commercial and 
industrial consumers have created political lobbies to support the maintaining of the 
subsidies (Ritschel and Smestad, 2003) despite the negative impact the subsidies are 
having on the industry‟s overall ability to provide a reliable service.  This explains why 
ECRA published the new tariff scheme in the middle of May 2010.  The financial and 
technical implications of the low tariffs are discussed below.  
 Adverse Financial Implications for the SEC  
As was mentioned previously, the SEC has inherited large debts from the merged 
companies.  This is because these companies were squeezed between inadequate 
revenues and rising costs while the government was increasingly unable to cover the 
difference.  In addition to these debts, the SEC lost 40,000 million Riyals for the period 
2000 – 2009 (4,000 million Riyals per year) as a direct result of the government‟s 
intervention in reducing the tariff within the Company‟s first seven months of operation 
(SEC, 2009). 
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Knowing that the electricity infrastructure is financially demanding with intensive 
operational costs and capital projects, the SEC was unable to pay the government for 
the supplied fuel since it began operating in 2000 (SEC, 2007).  As a result, the 
governmental institutions refrained from paying for the service until the end of 2005. 
Consequently, the SEC‟s financial situation significantly deteriorated, affecting its 
technical performance until the government finally agreed to settle the payments for 
government electricity usage for the period 5th April 2000 to 31st December 2005. 
Payments were agreed to be made over a period of three years effective from 2007 
(SEC, 2007), while the SEC will repay the government for the fuel supply over the next 
25 years.    
 
Authorising ECRA to increase the tariff in October 2009 was observed as one positive 
indication of the government‟s seriousness to reform the industry.  The question 
remains as to what implications this tariff change has for the industry.  The new tariff 
scheme is thought to provide essential financial resources required to operate and 
expand the existing infrastructure.  The average cost of unit electricity (kWh) in the 
Kingdom is 0.142 Riyals per kWh while the average price collected from consumers by 
the SEC was 0.125 Riyals per kWh before applying the new tariff in 2010.  After 
applying the new tariff, the average price collected from the consumers by the SEC 
increased to 0.137 Riyals per kWh (ECRA, 2010a).  The governmental consumers will 
provide the greatest contribution to this increase (38% of total income increase or 
1,200 million Riyals) as each governmental user will now pay a flat rate of 0.26 
Riyals/kWh for the whole year.  The commercial users will account for 30% of the 
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income increase (940 million Riyals).  Over 70% of the commercial users have an 
average consumption bill of less than 100 Riyals per month (Table 6.5) (ECRA, 
2010a).   
Table 5: Electricity tariff for commercial users as of 15th May, 2010 
 
The industrial users will account for 32% (1,040 million Riyals) of the SEC‟s income 
increase as a result of the application of the new tariff.  It is worth noting that large 
industrial users pay a flat rate of 0.14 Riyals per kWh and small industrial users pay a 
flat rate of 0.12 Riyals per kWh in non-summer seasons (October – May).  During the 
period June – September when the load peaks, all industrial consumers with non-
digital meters pay a flat rate of 0.15 Riyals per kWh.  Consumers with digital meters 
pay as high as 0.26 Riyals per kWh during the peak load hours in summer (12:00 – 
17:00 pm from Saturday to Thursday) but pay as little as 0.10 Riyal per kWh during 
off-peak hours.  This is to encourage consumers to install digital meters in their 
premises and most importantly to dispatch their loads from peak to off-peak hours.  
The main observation to be gained from this is that the total income increase from the 
new tariff scheme is 3,180 million Riyals.  This implies that the income increase does 
not fully cover SEC‟s shortage.  It is also interesting to report that ECRA has reported 
the shortage of financial resources required for the industry amounts to 3,800 million 
Riyals per year (ECRA, 2010a) while the SEC reported a shortage of 4,000 million 
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Riyals per year (SEC, 2009).  However, the ECRA has launched a project to study and 
monitor the capital and operation costs and expenditures of the SEC (SAMA, 2010).   
 
The researcher has also observed a particular problem that is relevant to the 
worsening of the SEC‟s financial status.  This is the ability to collect consumption 
payments from what the SEC has described in the English version of its annual report 
as „Special Customers‟ (SEC, 2009).  Some of these „Special Customers‟, or VIP 
consumers as they are referred to in the Arabic version, were not paying promptly for 
their consumption.  The researcher had an informal chat with an SEC officer 
(managerial level) working for the Distribution Customer Relations Department and 
explicitly asked him how this persistent problem is affecting the SEC‟s finances.  The 
answer was, understandably, a divergence from the question.  There is no clear 
definition in the SEC‟s reports as to what constitutes a customer as „special‟, but most 
probably these are customers with power since the SEC can never send an officer to 
disconnect the services from those who did not pay for the service.   
The SEC indicated that the receivable payments from „Special Customers‟ that are yet 
to be made amounted to 1,878 million Riyals in 2008.  The amount increased to 1,958 
million Riyals in 2009 (SEC, 2009).  As with „doubtful receivables‟, these also 
increased from 116.6 million Riyals in 2008 to 126 million Riyals in 2009.  This is 
valued as a barrier to businesses considering investment in the Distribution area since 
there is a serious lack of legislation and regulations that protect investors‟ interests.      
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 Adverse Technical Implications 
The financial difficulties described above have had a direct impact on the electric 
power system‟s technical capabilities.  The SEC has been forced to delay replacing 
aged infrastructure systems (SEC, 2009).  This has consequently increased the 
operational and maintenance costs of these systems.  For example, although the SEC 
has estimated the operational lives of its generating plants to range between 20-25 
years, Table 6.6 shows some generating units that exceeded 35 years in operation 
(ECRA, 2010c).  This will raise serious concerns, assuming reforming the industry is 
progressing as planned, as to which entities will hold liabilities when these units fail 
and result in service interruption for consumers.  This is especially true knowing that 
over half of the total of 622 generating units existing in the Kingdom in 2008 were 
operating beyond their lifetime expectancy (ECRA, 2009b).     
 
325 
 
Table 6: Generating units with age of 35 years and over   
  
Concluding Remarks 
The above has shown that the Saudi Arabian government has realised the necessity 
of enhancing the economic efficiency of the demanding electricity industry by applying 
the radical transformation of moving from a state-owned vertically integrated industry 
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into a free-market industry.  However, in seeking to consistently achieve the ECRA 
model, such a transformation, in which major restructuring plans will need to take 
place, faces a variety of serious barriers.  These barriers are complex and overlap with 
each other.  Among these barriers is the government‟s interaction behaviour with the 
industry-related organisations to apply the reform strategies.  Enforcing decisions such 
as lowering the tariffs that promoted rapid increases in demand for electricity without 
allocating proper financial resources to authorise projects to increase the supplies has 
created many challenges for the service provider.  The SEC had to authorise the 
urgent expansion of supply projects with insufficient resources and, therefore, failed to 
pay the government for the fuel supply.  This was especially true when the government 
lowered the suggested tariff scheme proposed once the SEC was established.  As a 
result, the Council of Ministers established an independent regulator, ECRA, to 
suggest tariffs that would be affordable for the consumers and attractive for the private 
sector to invest in the industry.  The problem with the introduction of the subsidised 
tariffs was the creation of political lobbies, especially by industrial and commercial 
consumers, who supported the continuation of these subsidies.  Although ECRA was 
established in 2001, it was authorised for the first time to enforce a new tariff scheme 
for non-residential users in October 2009.  The major observation, in addition to the 
slow provision of providing ECRA with the key authority of enforcing new tariffs, was  
the resistance of industrial and commercial users. This forced ECRA not to settle the 
tariff scheme until its publication two weeks before its enforcement.  Revenues from 
the new tariff are crucial to the operation and expansion of the industry but will not fully 
cover the financial resources required for such operation and expansion.  These 
events are being closely observed by the private sector who may decide to invest in 
the electricity infrastructure to examine whether reforms will consistently take place.  
327 
 
Besides these observations, the demand trend for electricity has significantly lowered 
the potential returns on investments.  This has tightened the IPP owners‟ terms in the 
signing of a long-term Power Purchase Agreement with the SEC, causing even further 
financial constraints.         
 
Reviewing and monitoring the capital and operation costs and expenditures of the 
SEC by ECRA may present political challenges.  There may be resistance by the SEC 
to present a maximum level of transparency while ECRA will need to exert leadership 
qualities to present itself as an independent and competent organisation.  The ability to 
collect payments from customers needs to be addressed properly otherwise investors 
will not take the risk when privatising distribution facilities.  Similarly, the aging 
electrical systems indicate these cannot be easily privatised (i.e. sold to private 
investors), especially since many of the generating units, for example, have exceeded 
their lifetime expectancy.   
 
The government has provided the SEC with financial resources but was reluctant to 
provide these in a timely manner or sufficiently.  The main driver for such behaviour 
could be reasoned by the fact that the government has provided very large subsidies 
for the fuel supplies to generate electricity.  The domestic consumption of energy, 
however, is rising at a very fast rate and this will cause serious economic and 
environmental concerns in the next decade for both Saudi Arabia and the oil market.  
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Appendix C: Letter Sample sent to Research Participants – 
Data-Collection (Phase I)  
 
Dear Dr. Saleh Al-Awaji, 
Deputy Minister of Electrical Affairs 
Our Nation is blessed with enormous natural energy resources which, with Allah‟s 
blessings, have provided the country with unique political and economic leverages.  
This is because energy is the wheel toward economic development.  Despite the 
availability of these substantial resources, in addition to being as a recognised energy 
resource exporter, the Kingdom seems to be facing unexpected challenges in this 
particular area.  Power project supplies seem to be unable to cope with the increasing 
demand for electricity, especially with the exceptional growth of the various local 
industries and population.  This calls for a clear strategy and vision to overcome these 
growing challenges. Projects are among the most important tools to transfer these 
strategies into reality.  Since my Doctorate research will tackle the challenges 
impeding project progress in the Saudi Electricity Supply Industry, I would be grateful if 
I could conduct an interview with you to explore and address your concerns.  Your vast 
experience in this area and your being close to the decision makers in the government 
will certainly illuminate and serve the research objectives.   
 
 
 
 
Bandar Khalid Alhoweish 
Mobile: 0541256065 
Attachment: Copy of the Researcher‟s educational Sponsor to confirm his identity and 
affiliation.     
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Copy of the letter issued by the researcher’s sponsor to assist him in collecting 
the necessary data.  
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Appendix D: Approval Letter Issued by the SEC Granting the 
Researcher with Data Accessibility  
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Appendix E: Confidentiality Statement with Research 
Objectives  
 
 
Identifying Project Delay Factors in the Electricity Supply Projects  
 
Dear respected SEC employee,  
 
As the national economy is growing rapidly, there is an urgent need to expand the 
existing infrastructure.  Therefore, executing projects related to generating, 
transmitting and distributing electrical energy must be in line with national needs. This 
questionnaire is meant to address delay factors facing power projects identified by a 
wide range of project managers.  Collecting data through interviews is part of my 
Doctorate programme in Industrial Management and Design at Aston University in the 
United Kingdom. I kindly ask you to take part in the interview.  Attached is the approval 
of the SEC CEO and President to conduct this research on your premises.  I hereby 
confirm the confidentiality of the participants‟ identity according to scientific research 
ethical codes.    
 
 
 
 
Attachments: Approval letter issued by the SEC CEO (Appendix B) and the letter 
issued by the sponsor identifying the researcher‟s identity (Appendix A). 
Researcher: Bandar Khalid Alhoweish 
e-mail: alhoweib@aston.ac.uk 
Mobile: 0541256065  
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Appendix F: Semi-structured interviews (Data-Collection 
Phase II) – Sample of pre-determined questions  
 
What is your job title?  
What is your role? 
What are your Department’s/Division’s roles?  
Can you give examples of reasons contributing to delaying your projects? 
How do you make sure that a project is progressing as expected? 
 
How does your organisation assess the progress of a project team or a project 
manager? 
Do you conduct post-implementation reviews? 
What kind of training is available to enable you with better performance? 
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Appendix G: Questionnaire Survey (Data-Collection Phase 
II) 
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Identifying Project Delay Factors in the Electricity Sector Questionnaire Survey 
 
As the national economy is growing rapidly, there is an urgent need to expand the existing infrastructure.  
Therefore, executing projects related to generating, transmitting and distributing electrical energy must be in line 
with the national needs. This questionnaire is meant to address delay factors facing power projects identified by 
wide range of project managers.  
 
Analyzing this questionnaire is part of my Doctorate programme in Industrial Management and Design Research 
Group in Aston University in Birmingham city in the United Kingdom. I kindly ask you to participate in the 
questionnaire that will not take more than 15 minutes to fill. Anyone is interested in knowing the results of the 
research shall enclose his/her email with the questionnaire or, alternatively, email me.  I hereby confirm the 
confidentiality of the participant’s identity according to scientific research ethical codes. 
   
 
Researcher: Bandar Khalid Alhoweish 
e-mail: alhoweib@aston.ac.uk 
Mobile: 0541256065  
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 Participant’s job: (please tick the most suitable answer) 
 
           □ Department/ division manager      □ Project manager     □ Project engineer    
  
           □ Consultant engineer       □ other  
 
 
 Type of organisation I work for:  
 
         □ Project owner     □ Contractor     □ Consultancy      □ Subcontractor 
 
 
 Participant’s project management experience (in years):  
 
 
 
 Project type I have been involved in managing: (please tick all answers that apply) 
 
            Power Generation                        Power transmission                     Power distribution       
             □ Gas turbine plants                    □ Substations                               □ Distribution networks          
             □ Steam turbine plants                □ Overhead lines                          □ Diesel generation plants 
               □ CCGT plants                            □ Underground cables                  □ Rural electrification                                                                     
                                                                            □ Load dispatch centers 
                                                                              & SCADA systems 
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Please draw a circle around the suitable number that expresses how frequent AND severe you 
experience the following delay causes: 
 
 
List of Contractor performance delay causes: (materials, equipment and manpower) 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Shortage of materials 
required (e.g. cement, 
steel, bricks, etc.)    
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Delay in materials 
delivery  
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Changes in materials 
prices 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
d. Changes in materials 
specifications 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
e. Shortage of equipment 
required (transformers, 
drillers, switchgears, etc) 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
f. Failure of equipment 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
g. Inadequate equipment 
used for the works 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
h. Shortage of manpower 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
i. Low skill of manpower 
 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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List of Contractor performance delay causes: (Project Management) 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Shortage of 
contractor’s 
administrative personnel 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. shortage of technical 
professionals in the 
contractor’s organization  
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Poor communication 
by the contractor with the 
parties involved in the 
project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
d. Contractor’s poor 
coordination with the 
parties involved in the 
project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
e. Slow preparation of 
change orders requests by 
the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
f. Ineffective contractor 
head office involvement 
in the project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
g. Delay in mobilization 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
h. Loose safety rules and 
regulations within the 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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contractor’s organization 
i. Poor qualification of the 
contractor’s technical 
staff assigned to the 
project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
j. Improper technical 
study by the contractor 
during the bidding stage 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
k. Ineffective planning 
and scheduling of the 
project by the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
l. There are no effective 
or realistic contingency 
plans in case the project is 
behind schedule or over 
budget  
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
m. Delay of field survey 
by the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
n. Ineffective control of 
the project progress by 
the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
o. Inefficient quality 
control by the contractor  
 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
p. Delay in the 
preparation of contractor 
submissions 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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List of Contractor Performance delay causes: (Project Finance) 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Difficulties in 
financing the project by 
the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Cash flow problems 
faced by the contractor 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Problems between the 
contractor and his 
subcontractors with 
regards to payments 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Owner administration delay causes: 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Delay to furnish and 
deliver the site to the 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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contractor by the owner 
 
b. Delay in the settlement 
of contractor claims by 
the owner 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Suspension of work by 
the owner 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
d. Delay in issuance of 
change orders by the 
owner 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
e. Slow decision making 
by the owner 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
f. Uncooperative owner 
with the contractor 
complicating contract 
administration 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
g. Delay in progress 
payments by the owner 
 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
h. Owner’s poor 
communication with 
related government 
authorities 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
i. Owner’s poor 
communication with the 
parties involved 
(contractor, consultant) 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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during project execution 
j. Owner’s failure to 
coordinate with 
government authorities 
during planning 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
k. Poor coordination by 
the owner with the 
various parties during 
project execution 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Early planning and design delay causes: 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Changes in the scope of 
project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Ambiguities, mistakes 
and inconsistencies in 
specifications and 
drawings 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Site conditions 
materially differing from 
contract documents 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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d. Original contract 
duration is too short 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
List of regulations delay causes: 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Ineffective delay 
penalty 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Difficulties in 
obtaining work permits 
 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Owners tendering 
system requirement of 
selecting the lowest 
bidder 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
d. Changes in government 
regulations and laws 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
List of Site and Environment conditions delay causes: 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes  Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Severe weather 
conditions on the job site 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Effects of subsurface 
conditions (type of soil, 
other utility lines) 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Traffic control and 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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restrictions on the job site 
(difficulties to reach the 
site) 
d. Effects of social and 
cultural conditions 
(Locals behavior and/or 
manpower different 
backgrounds) 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
e. Work interference 
between various 
contractors  
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
List of Site Supervision delay causes: 
 
Cause Frequency scale Severity scale 
Always Often Sometimes Never Very 
Severe 
Severe Somewhat 
severe 
No 
effect 
a. Poor qualification of 
consultant engineer’s 
staff assigned to the 
project 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
b. Delay in the approval 
of contractor submissions 
by the engineer 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
c. Poor communication 
between the consultant 
engineer and other parties 
involved 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
d. Poor coordination by 
the consultant engineer 
with other parties 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
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involved 
e. Delay in performing 
inspection and testing by 
the consultant engineer 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
f. Slow response from the 
consultant engineer to 
contractor inquiries 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your appreciated cooperation 
  
Please write any comments on this page 
 
You may inform me to collect the questionnaire with many thanks 
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Appendix H: Semi-structured Interviews (Data-Collection 
Phase III)  
 
Projects in the SEC face several challenges during construction.  Some of these 
challenges contribute to the timely delivery of projects that are authorised to develop 
the electricity infrastructure.  These challenges were conceptually developed after 
applying ranking analysis of the project delay factors surveyed previously.  Analysing 
and understanding these challenges will empower the study to suggest practical 
solutions to overcome these challenges.  Therefore, this interview is meant to capture 
your thoughts and comments relevant to the analysis results.  After applying Factor 
Analysis, the study identified the project implementation challenges and the elements 
forming these challenges facing SEC projects: 
Owner‟s Contractual Commitment 
Delay in progress payment by the owner 
Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by the owner 
Uncooperative owner with the contractor complicating contract administration  
Suspension of work by the owner 
 Delay in furnishing and delivering the site to the contractor by owner 
 Delay in issuance of change order by owner 
 Slow decision making by owner 
 Difficulties in financing the project by the contractor 
Owner‟s Communication and Coordination Effectiveness 
 Owner‟s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning  
 Owner‟s poor communication with related government authorities  
Owner‟s poor communication with contractors and consultants during project 
execution  
Poor coordination by the owner with the various parties during project execution  
Difficulties in obtaining work permits 
Contractor‟s Project Planning and Controlling Effectiveness  
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No effective or realistic contingency plans in case the project is behind schedule or 
over budget  
Ineffective planning and scheduling of the project by the contractor 
Ineffective control of the project‟s progress by the contractor 
Improper technical study by the contractor during the bidding stage 
Delay in materials delivery 
Consultant-related 
 Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer 
 Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries  
 Delay in performing inspection and testing by the consultant engineer  
 Poor communication between the consultant engineer and other parties     
           involved 
Manpower Challenges and Materials Uncertainties  
 Low skills of manpower 
 Changes in material prices 
 Shortage of manpower 
Owner‟s Tendering System 
 Owner‟s tendering system requirement of selecting the lowest bidder 
Lack of Project Requirements Clarity  
 Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and drawings  
 Changes in the project scope 
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Appendix I: Extended Data Analysis Presented in Chapter 6  
PDF 35 (‘Delay in progress payments by the SEC’) 
Delay in progressing payments to Contractors was even worse before the formation of the 
SEC in 2000.  Dr. Khoshaim, Managing Director of SCECO West before the merger with other 
SCECO‟s, explained that “if there was a problem that a contract faced, it would be not paying 
the contractor on time”. 
 
The Company at the time was not able to secure loans from banks because it struggled to pay 
the outstanding instalments it owed other banks.  Therefore, it had reached the maximum limit 
of loan volumes.  This constraint, in addition to the increasing demand for electricity, forced 
SCECO (based on the government‟s advice) to authorise and announce new project contracts 
without proper allocation of the required funds.  This resulted in chaos when Contractors 
expected their payments while SCECO, in turn, expected the government to provide financial 
aid as promised.  This financial aid was obtained either in the form of interest-free loans from 
the government‟s treasury or through the application of some political pressure on state-owned 
banks and financial institutes to provide more loans.  This financial aid, however, was not 
provided in a timely manner, especially in the 1990s when the country was affected by 
decreased oil revenues and its direct involvement in the Second Gulf War.  Public Contracting 
businesses suffered severely throughout the whole Kingdom. 
*** 
As a rule of thumb, the deliverables of Power Generation Projects were larger than those of 
Power Transmission Projects.  Moreover, the deliverables of Power Transmission Projects 
were larger than those of Power Distribution Projects.  This implies that the financial burdens 
on Contractors in Power Generation Projects were higher than both Power Transmission and 
Power Distribution Projects.  Therefore, it was not a surprise to find this PDF ranked highest 
by PG PMs.  However, it was noticed that this PDF was highly ranked by PD PMs (ranked 2nd) 
when compared to PT PMs (not among the highly ranked PDFs – ranked 12th).  The reason 
was that the Project Execution Department Manager of the SEC Power Transmission business 
sector stepped in when a few Contractors suspended their project activities.  He aggressively 
faced the Finance Department and explained that any delay in processing “his” Contractor 
payments would delay the projects.  The Finance Department, on the other hand, complained 
about the forms not being consistent.  Afterwards, the Project Execution Department Manager 
created a Division in which its main function was to review the Contractors‟ invoices.  Although 
this presented positive project ownership by the Department Manager and minimised the 
effect of this PDF, the new division was filled by some Project Managers who were pulled from 
their assigned projects.  This action, therefore, had implications for these projects as new PMs 
were assigned, causing disturbance to the project progress flow.   
*** 
PDF 38 (‘SEC’s failure to coordinate with government authorities during planning’) 
For example, the Planning Department was required to ensure the potential owner of the 
project site in the motorway, for example, (i.e. the Ministry of Transport in this case) did not 
have any future project plans that would interrupt the SEC‟s project in the future.  The other 
reason was to issue project work permits from the relevant government authorities.  Issuing 
project work permits from the government authorities was a pre-requisite step before initiating 
the project activities, otherwise projects would be interrupted by these authorities.  There were 
different types of work permits depending on the project nature.  For example, a Power 
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Generating Plant project that was to be built on the coast needed to have several permissions 
from, for example, the Coast Guard, the Environment Protection Commission and the relevant 
Municipality.  An underground cable Power Transmission project in an urban area would need 
to have, for example, permission from the Municipality to secure „the right of way‟,  permission 
from the Traffic Police to work on the roads while being used by the public, and permission 
from the Transport Ministry as the owner of public motorways that were beyond urban areas.  
For a Power Distribution project dispersed in a rural area across a village or a settlement, work 
permits were required from the relevant Municipalities and Tribal Sheiks (Leaders), for 
example.  In a few cases, the SEC had to coordinate with other public authorities, private 
organisations or individuals, to secure public or private right of way when required. 
*** 
PDF 37 (‘SEC’s poor communication with Contractors and Consultants during 
project execution’)  
In many cases, poor communication could be in information misinterpretation conveyed 
between the two (the SEC and Contractor), as WALA (SEC) described:  
Both SEC and Contractor PMs assumed they understood each other when they didn‟t! 
 
This sentence was expressed in an identical way by JAWI (SEC).  This problem could have 
been easily avoided by conducting review meetings more frequently to clarify ambiguous 
issues.  Some project managers placed great value on conducting short meetings to clarify 
any confusion, as AJ (Contractor) expressed:  
I feel that personal interaction helps more than just communication by writing letters.  It 
is true that things should be on record to keep the system transparent but personal 
interaction seems to be indispensable for communication in projects with the client.  
 
JAWI (SEC) also appreciated having short meetings with Contractors and Consultants.  These 
face-to-face meetings effectively resolved pending issues.  The problem, however, appeared 
to be not having such effective short meetings as frequently as they would have liked. JAWI 
(SEC) said: 
There is a lack of such meetings.  This goes back again to the main reason which was the 
project load each of us has.  Sometimes the technical competence of the consultant is not 
sound, causing the miscommunication between the three.  Sometimes the contractor does not 
provide sufficient documents.  But all these could have been solved completely in one 
meeting.  Going through letters will result in nothing. 
*** 
PDF 39 (‘Poor coordination by SEC with the various parties during project 
execution’) 
The subject said that during the preparation of the bidding package he noticed a few types of 
equipment (e.g. a mix of transformers, switchgears and SCADA) that were not technically 
possible to assemble.  Although these specialists were working in the very same division, the 
poor coordination between them and the lack of a comprehensive final revision of the project 
design were evident.  Moreover, SAR was a Contract Manager and not a technical specialist.  
This indicated the technical flaw did not need technical expertise for it to be noticed.   
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The above example revealed the SEC‟s poor level of coordination during the early stages of 
the project when the bid package was being prepared.  This was valued as a significant 
problem that would definitely have a direct impact on the SEC-Contractor working relationship 
during project execution.  Poor coordination in the early stages of project activities between 
various SEC Departments and Divisions led to unnecessary resource losses for either the 
SEC or the Contractor, if not both.  These unplanned incidents would spark tension between 
the two because each would then try hard to hold the counterpart liable.  ORFA (SEC) gave an 
example of the impact of poor coordination between the SEC Departments:    
There are examples in which contractors faced unfortunate situations because of a 
lack of coordination between several departments.  Contractors indeed suffer to obtain 
reliable information.  Sometimes the specification in the contract that describes the 
existing condition or feature of the equipment in the project site is different from reality. 
This happens especially in expansion projects. These mistakes can be fatal and are 
technically impossible to implement.  
  
The SEC provides the project specifications and requirements for the Contractor in the bid 
package.  ORFA (SEC), however, explicitly pointed out that the SEC protects itself 
contractually through an article that clears it from any liability. The Contractor is responsible for 
checking the site before submitting his offer even if, according to ORFA (SEC), the Contractor 
has false information.  Having the wrong technical information would cost the Contractor 
dearly because, for example, the outsourced Engineering Design services would be wasted 
since these were based on false information and so were no longer valid.      
 
There were cases when the project proponent who would operate the project after delivery 
required additional deliverables during construction.  These deliverables were beyond the 
contract procurement list, showing another example of lack of early coordination between the 
project proponent and the SEC Project Specifications and Design Department.  If these 
requested deliverables were not delivered, the project proponent managed in some cases to 
apply pressure on the Project Execution Department, otherwise they would refuse the project 
handover.  As a consequence, the Project Execution Department would become abusive in 
terms of the pressure and methods used to force the Contractor to deliver these „non-
contractual‟ deliverables without compensation or the issuing of change orders.  In many 
cases, Contractors managed to issue change orders and got compensated, but only after 
persuasive tactics had been used and prolonged discussions and, probably, disputes had 
taken place. 
*** 
PDF 21 (‘No effective or realistic contingency plans in case project is behind 
schedule or over budget’) 
It could be argued that local Contractors do not have a sound methodology which can help 
them to identify a project risk rather than planning to respond to it.  But GARI (Contractor), who 
worked for an international European organisation that had a visible presence in the Saudi 
electricity contracting market, said:  
Those who plan, if they were professionals, they do it once at the beginning of the 
project but without updating it.   
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The statement clearly shows that not updating the project plan was an invitation to lose control 
of the project.  Projects were of a progressive nature and with the day-to-day details and with 
the amount of information that needed to be managed, would reduce the Contractor PM‟s 
ability to control the project.  On the other hand, there was a single case when JAWI (SEC) 
applauded a Contractor PM‟s managerial and technical skills.  The PM was, according to 
JAWI, able to identify potential project problems and deal with them before they became 
unmanageable even though he was managing other projects.  The general feeling of all the 
SEC PMs, however, was that, in many cases, Contractors managed projects from a crisis 
point of view.       
*** 
PDF 20 (‘Ineffective project planning and scheduling by Contractor’) 
The researcher was encouraged by ORFA‟s statement that „none‟, according to his 
experience, had ever submitted an acceptable schedule.  If the time schedule was realistic 
and approved, then it was basic when compared to the complexity of the SEC project.  To 
further investigate this issue, the researcher went to several Contractors, but the previously 
addressed Contractors were very sceptical about sharing any information.   
 
However, GARA (Contractor), a PM who worked with an international European Contracting 
organisation, was explicitly asked whether the Critical Path Method, for example, was used in 
project planning; he replied: 
 Most people use Microsoft Project 
 
 Researcher: Were you taught it or did you learn it through personal efforts? 
 
 GARA: Personal efforts.   
  
 But GARA then continued: 
Okay. Honestly, the majority of project managers are not experts in planning - it's 
mostly based on personal efforts.  A project manager should have a specialised 
planner who just plans, plans and plans.  A project manager should have a complete 
team whether the project is of large-size or small size.  The team must consist of a 
project manager, project engineer (designer), civil engineer, planner and site manager.  
Some Contractors decide that since the project is of small size and is not worth it, they 
put the load on the project manager.  The project manager is the project manager is 
the project engineer is the site manager.  If someone does all that, what would you 
expect the work quality to be like? 
 
The major concern was that if an international organisation did not embrace professional 
development training programmes for its PMs, then the situation could be much worse in local 
Contractor organisations.      
*** 
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PDF 23 (‘Ineffective project progress control by Contractor’) 
In addition to the above, the SEC project practice behaviour had a significant role in not 
allowing Contractors to control the projects effectively.  GARA (Contractor) stated:   
They waste our efforts. 
 
This was because, as GARA previously explained, a Contractor PM dealt with many internal 
stakeholders when the SEC PM was supposed to be the main and only communication point 
with the Contractor.   
 
Achieving the project time delivery target was a mutual objective shared by the SEC and 
Contractors.  Since the contract was of a Fixed Lump-Sum type, the risk of material price 
change was held by Contractors only.  Therefore, the Contractors were keen to maximise, or 
at least maintain, their expected profit margins.  As a consequence, the Contractors‟ PMs 
focused on project cost control.  As GARA (Contractor) mentioned earlier, being involved with 
many responsibilities in their assigned projects made it difficult for the PM to focus on 
controlling other project aspects (scope, communication, risk, etc.).  When GARA (Contractor) 
was directly asked about his project control performance, he said:  
Same as in planning.  But people usually focus on project cost control. Someone with 
many responsibilities, as I said, would focus on that side only. I monitor the costs and 
every penny was booked for my project against the relevant Work Breakdown 
Structure.  
*** 
PDF 19 (‘Improper technical study by Contractor during bidding stage’) 
JAWI (SEC) strongly believed and asserted that the current practice of selecting and 
considering the lowest offer bidder was always associated with false assumptions found in 
their technical offers.  Although technical deviations from the original requirements were 
normally addressed before the contract award, JAWI (SEC) indicated that the Contractors 
demonstrated lack of proper study and understanding of project requirements: 
In addition to our poor planning (referred to the SEC Planning Department), some 
Contractors don't read the contracts and they sign immediately.  And then they come 
back to us to discuss the possibility of changing specific items (technical deviations) 
when they shouldn't have.  They should have studied and thoroughly understood the 
project nature and the site limitations and signed the contract based on this. 
 
The researcher also found that ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in SEC bidding 
documents were of normal and common practice.  These were also valued as major 
contributors to the Contractor‟s improper technical study.  Changing the project site location 
during the bidding stage was also common practice in SEC projects.  This caused bidders to 
repeat planning work but within a shorter time period and probably lack of enthusiasm.  These 
issues will be thoroughly discussed in the „SEC‟s Tendering System‟ Principal Component.  
Apparently, this presented an example of the complex dynamics of the PDFs and their mixed 
interrelationships.      
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*** 
PDF 54 (‘Delay in the approval of contractor submissions by the engineer’) 
Many other SEC PMs admitted that Consultants, in general, were exaggerating and 
complicating their technical decisions on the Contractor submissions.  Another reasonable 
factor for delaying approval of the submittals was the “unmanageable load of work”, as ABADI 
(SEC) described.  As a PD PM, he reviewed the Contractors‟ submittals and thought, like 
many other participants, that the workload was a reason to delay approving or rejecting the 
submittals.  In fact, he encouraged the Contractors to complain against him to his superior, the 
SEC Project Execution Division Manager, in order to find a solution.  Although this example 
was specific to the SEC PD PMs delaying Contractors‟ submittals, it was argued that having 
an „unmanageable load of work‟ was also applicable to Consultants.  In other words, the 
workload on Consultants meant it was beyond their capacities to review Contractors submittals 
without delays.  One of the research limitations was the absence of any qualitative data that 
represented the Consultants‟ view.  However, there was supportive evidence that confirmed 
the observation of Consultants having workloads beyond their capacities.  SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems were recently introduced into the SEC PD 
projects as a new project requirement.  However, the SEC PD PMs did not have any technical 
experience with SCADA and, therefore, they could not make any technical decisions on the 
Contractors‟ submittals.  On the other hand, the SEC PT projects were familiar with SCADA.  
Therefore, the SEC PD Project Execution Division Manager asked for the SEC PT Project 
Execution Department Manager‟s assistance.  As a favour, the latter made the Consultants 
review SCADA drawings and designs.   
*** 
PDF 58 (‘Slow response from the consultant engineer to contractor inquiries’) 
Consultants were not only perceived to have a slow response and thus be the cause of delay. 
A few of the SEC participants questioned their usefulness.  The following example, narrated by 
JAWI (SEC), supports this perception:   
Once I was working on two projects with the same Contractor but with two different 
contracts. The Consultant had approved the cable specifications for one and rejected 
the very same cable for the other project. Both cables were identical and manufactured 
by the same manufacturer with the same technical specifications! 
 
The Contractor PM, therefore, escalated the problem according to JAWI (SEC), who solved 
the issue in a short meeting.  The unjustifiable decision would have prevented the Contractor 
from placing the order for both projects at a time when the copper prices were subject to 
fluctuations.  However, the following interesting comment by AJ (Contractor) pointed out, 
though implicitly, that the SEC lacked a clear set of technical standards: 
Well, when you talk about Consultants who are dealing with, let‟s say, oil and gas 
industries like Saudi Aramco, those Consultants are very open, they follow Aramco‟s 
specifications and they are very professional in terms of their ability to technically 
convince them.  But when you talk about other Consultants, let's say owners of high 
rise buildings, etc., they are simply trying to justify their positions.  And there we do line 
up a lot of confrontations.  They have requirements which are not an industry standard 
or the Consultants are not very well educated, so we have to educate them and then 
they use the knowledge we gave against us. 
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The SEC indeed had difficulties in establishing a unified set of technical standards.  The SEC 
was originally composed of over 100 smaller companies spread over the Kingdom, and these 
had varying technical standards.  Therefore, especially for expansion projects, it was inevitable 
that there would be a wide range of technical standards.  In addition to this predicament, there 
was a general perception that Consultants were not knowledgeable, as WALA (SEC) and AJ 
(Contractor) stated above.  AJ‟s (Contractor) statement that Contractors „educate‟ Consultants 
was consistent with another Contractor PM who represented Alstom.   
*** 
PDF 9 (‘Low skills of manpower’) 
Contractor – related  
Contractors also faced this serious PDF.  The extent of this PDF varied across different 
Contractors, but it was a phenomenon in Saudi Arabia.  Skilled Contractor PMs proved to be 
scarce, especially in the investigated industry.  ORFA (SEC) PM thought that the SEC Top 
Management would reduce the project cost, even if this negatively affected the Contractor‟s 
project management practice: 
The Top Management acts sometimes in a way I don't agree with. For example, we 
awarded a Contractor three or four projects and the SEC asked for one project 
manager to be assigned by the Contractor in return for reducing the contract prices.  I 
see that as wrong! 
 
The usual practice was that the SEC demanded Contractors to assign one PM who fully 
focused on just one project.  The fact of having a serious shortage of PMs with engineering 
degrees, as per the SEC requirement, forced the SEC Top Management to allow the 
Contractor to manage several projects simultaneously with one PM.  However, the Contractors 
were required to assign a permanent site manager for each project.  This problem represented 
an opportunity for the SEC to reduce the project total cost, which was perceived by ORFA 
(SEC) as cost saving.      
 
Contractors, in general, also faced troubles in hiring qualified technicians who were able to 
install the procured equipment at the project site.  A few SEC PMs stated that some 
Contractors employed manpower (PMs, engineers and technicians) with false qualifications.  
Another SEC PM actually gave even more details.  When he checked the relevant documents 
of the labourers, he found that some had entered the Kingdom with barber and plumber visas 
but had been introduced to the SEC as technicians.  Discussing the explanations and root 
causes surrounding such a flaw in the immigration system would have negative implications 
for the researcher. 
 
Consultant - related 
The delay in approving or rejecting the Contractor‟s submissions and the slow response to 
Contractor inquiries were both, partially, attributed to the low skills of the hired engineers.  
ORFA (SEC), when asked whether their Consultant engineers lacked basic knowledge and 
skills, replied: 
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Honestly, yes, and this caused problems and delays by their being incapable of making 
decisions at the right time as a result of their weak background. Sometimes (laughs), in 
fact many times, they mock being knowledgeable and we reach the point where 
troubles are escalated by the Contractor for rejecting their submittals and we get 
convinced these shouldn't be rejected.  They also unjustifiably insist on things that are 
nonsense.  They don‟t want to take the risk. 
 
SAF (SEC) PM also supported the above statement when asked whether their outsourced 
Consultants delayed the Contractor submittals as a result of their low skills: 
Yes it happens. There are technical and managerial weaknesses in them and in 
supervision as well.   
 
JAWI (SEC) agreed with the above and described the Consultants‟ skills as average and 
below average, and continued:  
Consultants don't properly develop because they (SEC) outsource cheap skills and we 
award our projects to Consultants on the lowest price basis not on the qualification 
basis. 
Interestingly, although JAWI represented the SEC, he said „they‟ when he referred to the SEC.  
This indicated a tone of disagreement towards outsourcing Consultants based on the lowest 
bidder.  However, these Consultants were paid on an hourly rate basis, which meant any 
project delay would cost the SEC more money.   
*** 
PDF 3 (‘Changes in material prices’) 
Besides these external forces affecting the material prices, the Contractors were, in some 
cases, informed by the SEC they should procure materials in quantities that seemed to have 
been underestimated in terms of carrying out related project work.  This caused disputes in 
many cases as the material prices were fluctuating, and placing any additional orders meant 
additional costs for the Contractor.  This problem occurred repeatedly in the PD projects, as 
HM (SEC) described: 
We used to have unrealistic quantities estimation from the planning (the SEC Planning 
Division – PD) causing inconvenience to the contractors as they commit to the 
suppliers with the estimated quantities while the actual quantities during execution are 
different.  The difference could reach up to 30 - 40% while the normal practice should 
be around plus or minus10%. 
 
The main reason for not having accurate quantity estimations for the required materials was 
because the project site was surveyed years before the project execution.  This case was 
common, especially in rural electrification projects.  The Planning Division surveyed the project 
areas to estimate the required project budget.  However, project budgets were usually 
allocated a few years later.  By the time the surveyed areas were normally developed, these 
areas had increased populations.  This indicated more customers needed to be connected to 
the service.  This problem was solved by the Project Execution Division Manager after 4-5 
years of repeating the same problem.  He influenced the decision not to announce a project 
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before a recent project site survey had been conducted in order to better estimate the 
quantities.   
*** 
SEC’s Tendering System 
Prequalification  
The above presented an apparent weakness in the SEC prequalification system.  The SEC 
Contracting manual explicitly states that Contractors should have the available financial, 
manpower and equipment resources to be invited for any project bidding.   However, there 
was no established mechanism to objectively measure these requirements.  Instead of 
examining Contractors‟ available resources by conducting a comprehensive check of their 
financial abilities (bank statement review, for example), manpower availability (human 
resource manifest or labour supply contract reviews for example) and equipment availability 
(visiting warehouses storing the equipment or other projects under closure), the 
prequalification process was limited, rather, to screening new entrants by questioning their 
previous project experiences.  This limitation, however, revealed an acknowledgement from 
the SEC concerning the difficulties and shortages surrounding the Contracting business in 
Saudi Arabia.  Many of these Contractors were involved in public projects in addition to the 
SEC ones and, therefore, understandably, project resources were stretched and scarce.    
*** 
PDF 41 (‘Ambiguities, mistakes and inconsistencies in specifications and 
drawings’) 
An illuminating interview was conducted with Dr. Khoshaim, ex-Managing Director of SCECO 
West before the company was merged with today‟s SEC.  The interview led to the feeling that 
the „Engineering Management Department‟ at the time was seriously struggling to set project 
equipment specifications.  The Department was concerned with project planning, setting its 
specifications and design, and managing its construction and execution.  Relevant to this 
particular problem, Dr. Khoshaim said: 
Other than these there shouldn‟t be any barriers to project progress.  If the Contractor 
meets the specifications and these were clear then everything should be fine.  I can tell 
you now that the electricity companies SCECOs are professional and have a clear set 
of specifications for the procured equipment.  These specifications were not collected 
arbitrarily based on a selection of the best features from several manufacturers‟ 
standards then collect all these into one piece.  This custom made equipment will be 
too expensive and it‟s silly to have it all.  Now it is much more improved.  
 
As can be sensed from the above, the subject implies that SCECO „used‟ to have a mixed set 
of specifications in which the SCECO engineers selected some „desired‟ features from several 
manufacturers.  These selected features were chosen based on different standards.  On this 
basis, the SCECO engineers demanded that the Contractors at the time should procure 
equipment according to these „pick and mix‟ features based on several different standards.  In 
another part of the interview, the subject mentioned that    
 We used to be not so clear about our specification needs.   
 
Although the following was mentioned in a different context, this could explain how persistent 
the SCECO engineers were:  
The Contractor placed orders for equipment with specifications we did not agree on.  
He deviated to save money. 
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This, of course, created a climate of mistrust with SCECO, but the researcher feared that the 
Contractor might, in many cases, be in a position where he „had‟ to place orders for the 
equipment otherwise the manufacturer would quote additional lead time for equipment 
manufacturing and delivery.  Over specifying and over engineering products and equipment 
certainly prolonged and extended project delivery time.  This was especially true when 
Contractors continuously made an effort to influence the SCECO Engineering Managing 
Department to set realistic specifications and choose a specific standard to follow.  Therefore, 
the Contractor was forced to place the order for the equipment while he was certain that 
SCECO would not easily accept it.   
 
The research was more concerned with contemporary project issues in the SEC but analysing 
the behaviour development was necessary to examine the extent of improvement of the 
controversial set of engineering specifications and standards adopted by the SEC.  At the time 
of the research, Dr. Khoshaim trusted that the Company was mature when it came to 
specifying the procured project deliverables and activities.  The following example was 
narrated by HM (SEC):   
We used (in 2006) to have overly sophisticated design requirements for our poles 
(used for overhead line distribution networks, especially in rural areas). The main 
components of poles had specifications that caused disruptions in the manufacturing 
process.  We (both the SEC Project Execution Division and Technical Support 
Division) met to agree and choose then unify the standards of the most important 
components.  Moreover, we became more flexible with the auxiliary components and 
accessories.  This reduced the pressure on the Contractors when placing orders with 
the manufacturers and significantly reduced the cost on us.  This made it more 
predictable for the Contractors to better estimate their offers when bidding.  
 
According to the subject, Contractors very much appreciated the initiative and, apparently, it 
was a win-win result.  There were many areas where the SEC could develop its project 
contractual practice, especially those relevant to the bidding package.  Improving the bidding 
package quality would result in a more consistent project contract and, hence, a more stable 
contractual relationship with the Contractors.        
 
 
 
 
 
